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Preface
In 1972 the School of Business of the University of Kansas was privileged
to present the first of what it was hoped would become a biennial series of
symposia on matters of concern to practitioners and educators involved i n the
field of auditing. T h e 1974 A r t h u r Andersen/University of Kansas Symposium
on A u d i t i n g Problems bears testimony that the hoped-for emergence of such a
series has become a reality. Important features of the first symposium were
maintained i n 1974:
1. Limitation of the subject matter to technical and professional concerns
related to the practice of auditing. T h e subdivision of auditing practice that is
concerned with financial accounting standards was excluded i n recognition of
the extensive attention already being devoted to that vital topic.
2. Maximization of the interaction between practitioners and educators
by having (with one exception) the designated discussant of each paper selected
from the alternate sector of auditing, and by having the invited participants
equally divided i n terms of their primary concern w i t h either auditing practice
or auditing education.
3. Preparation of all papers (but not the evening address) i n advance, with
distribution to all participants, so that after brief comments by the preparer of
the paper, more than an hour was available for the remarks of the designated
discussant and the ensuing open discussion by the approximately fifty partici
pants i n attendance.
4. Publication of the Proceedings of the symposium, but w i t h no attempt
to summarize the informal discussion except that both preparers and designated
discussants had full opportunity to modify their papers and remarks as originally
presented to reflect ideas that arose during the general discussion.
T h e selection of topics for the invited papers for the 1972 symposium empha
sized future directions of auditing i n terms of response to contemporary events,
extensions of auditing practice and research, and development of standards i n
areas such as materiality and statistical sampling. T h e repeated references i n
the 1972 discussions to the pervasive problems of auditor independence suggested
the topic for the opening paper of the 1974 symposium: an historical analysis of
the development of the concept and practice of auditor independence and con
sideration of proposals for strengthening that vital element of auditing relation
ships. T h e historical orientation of the opening papers of both the 1972 and 1974
symposia reflects an intent that has emerged that these and subsequent papers
covering aspects of the history and evolution of auditing w i l l eventually provide
a comprehensive dissertation on the development and heritage of the auditing
segment of the accounting discipline.
Other papers i n the present volume examine various controversial questions,
ranging from the "sample of one" and standards for confidence levels i n sam
pling, to an examination of the case for mandated independent audits of publicly
held companies. A change of pace and an extension of the forward look of the

1972 symposium is evident in the paper setting forth a decision theory model
of the audit process.
As was true for the 1972 symposium, I take full responsibility for the selection of topics for the invited papers, but the views expressed in the papers are
those of the preparers, and, of course, not necessarily those of the organizations
with which they are affiliated. For future auditing symposia, I wish to invite
proposals for papers on topics consistent with the general theme of the symposia,
and I urge those interested in preparing a paper for a future auditing symposium
to contact me in that regard.
The 1974 symposium and the printing of the Proceedings would not have
been possible without the financial support of Arthur Andersen & Co. arranged
by Robert A . Long, managing partner of the Kansas City office of the firm,
alumnus of the University of Kansas, member of the Board of Advisers of the
School of Business, and long-time personal confrere.
H O W A R D F. S T E T T L E R

July 1974
University of Kansas
Lawrence
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1
Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development
And some Proposals for Research
R. Glen Berryman
University of Minnesota
A 1950 publication of the A I C P A , written primarily for readers of audit
reports, stated "Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the founda
tion of the public accounting profession." 1 More recently the same idea has
been restated as follows: "Independence has always been a concept fundamental
to the accounting profession, the cornerstone of its philosophical structure." 2
Auditors and the users of audit reports then and now would strongly support
the above assertion. Independence has been a developing concept, as evidenced
by shifts i n position as to what constitutes an independent status for the auditor.
F o r example, "strong" rules on independence have been adopted only recently.
T h e sections that follow review the historical development of auditor inde
pendence and note the need for the presence of its various aspects i n connection
with the attest function. Specific proposals for research are developed, w i t h
emphasis being placed on user perceptions of independence.
English Backgrounds
A n early concern for independence is noted i n the English
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, Section 102, which stated:

Companies

Where no other Qualification shall be prescribed by the special A c t ,
every Auditor shall have at least One Share i n the undertaking; and
he shall not hold any Office i n the Company, nor be i n any other
Manner interested i n its Concerns, except as a Shareholder.
T h e requirement of shareholding, however, has not been retained i n Britain as
an auditor qualification as evidenced by the Companies Act of 1862, which per
mitted but d i d not require shareholding, and by subsequent Companies Acts.
T h e provision against auditors serving as officers or employees of their auditees
appears to have been maintained continually i n the British system. The English
Companies Act of 1948 i n Section 161 provided that no person who is " . . . an
officer or servant of the company"; or is " . . . a partner of or i n the employment
of an officer or servant of the company"; is qualified for appointment as auditor
of such company.
T h e relationship of the auditors to the shareholders was established i n the
same 1845 English statute noted above. A t the first meeting of a company after
passage of that 1845 statute, the auditors would be elected by the shareholders.
1

Further, Section 118 of that A c t directed that the shareholders be provided with
the report of the auditors. T h e Companies Act of 1900, Section 21, provided
that i f an auditor was not appointed at the annual general meeting of the com
pany, the Board of Trade would, on written application of any member of the
company, appoint the auditor for the year and fix his remuneration. T h e Companies Act of 1929, Section 134, provided that the auditors were entitled to
attend any general meeting of the company at which any accounts that they
had examined or had reported on were to be presented and, further, that they
were entitled to make any statement or explanations which they wished to make.
Continued concern with auditor independence is evidenced by the Companies
Act of 1948. Section 160 of that A c t provided that a special annual meeting
notice would be required for either the appointment of an auditor other than a
retiring auditor or nonappointment of the retiring auditor.
Developments i n the U . S . to 1940
In the United States, independent status for the auditor appears to have
emerged slowly as a major concern. O f course, the profession itself d i d not
grow to major size and influence until much later than i n Great Britain. T h e
American Association of Public Accountants, established i n 1887, d i d not, i n its
early years, formally recognize the need for independence i n its constitution
or bylaws. A n amendment to the bylaws adopted i n 1907 d i d recognize the
desirability of avoiding incompatible or inconsistent occupations. Recognition
of the importance of independence is noted by the following comment of an
early practitioner:
T h e position of the public accountant i n respect to corporations and
their management is always an independent one. U n l i k e the attorney,
he is not expected to make out a case. T h e character of the service he
renders is impersonal. 3
T h e American Institute of Accountants, formed i n 1916, and its predecessor
organization d i d not appear to have been actively concerned with independence
until about 1930. A 1928 editorial i n The Journal of Accountancy demonstrated
interest i n identifying improper relationships between auditors and their clients.
T h e editor pointed out that an auditor should not be involved as a stockholder,
bondholder, officer, or director of the organization he was serving as auditor.
H e did recognize one exception, namely, a company could appoint an auditor
as a director when it was being reorganized. T h e editor stated:
T h e accountant should be so utterly divorced from financial or other
participation i n the success or failure of an undertaking under audit
that no one could ever point an accusing finger, however unjustly, and
allege the possibility of bias. 4
A t the 1931 annual meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, a proposal was introduced as follows:
R E S O L V E D , that the maintenance of a dual relationship, as director or
officer of a corporation, while acting as auditor of that corporation is
against the best interests of the public and the profession and tends to
2

destroy that independence of action considered essential i n the relation
ship between client and auditor. 5
This resolution was referred to the Committee on Professional Ethics, but was
not acted upon by the Institute that year.
The following year the Congress of the United States exhibited substantial
interest i n financial representations supported by an independent review. T h e
Federal Securities Act of 1933, Section 77aa, required that certain financial i n 
formation filed with the Government be certified by an independent certified
accountant or public accountant. T h e Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section
78(1), stated that balance sheets and income statements were to be certified by
independent public accountants i f such is required by the rules and regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These are the first formal require
ments mandating auditor independence.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, under authority granted it by
the 1933 A c t , adopted the following rule on July 6, 1933:
The Commission w i l l not recognize any such certified accountant or
public accountant as independent i f such accountant is not i n fact inde
pendent. Unless the Commission otherwise directs, such accountant
w i l l not be considered independent w i t h respect to any person i n w h o m
he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or w i t h w h o m he is con
nected as an officer, agent, employee, promoter, underwriter, trustee,
partner, director, or person performing similar function. 6
In 1934, the American Institute of Accountants' Council adopted and the annual
meeting approved the following resolution:
R E S O L V E D , that no member or associate shall certify the financial
statements of any enterprise financed i n whole or i n part by the public
distribution of securities i f he is himself the actual or beneficial owner
of a substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed
to acquire such an interest. 7
The S E C rule prohibited any interest, direct or indirect, i n any person w i t h
respect to w h o m the accountant is alleging independence, while the A I A position
focused on "substantial financial interest," and omitted any reference to em
ployment.
In 1936, T h e Securities and Exchange Commission d i d amend its rule w i t h
respect to independence and adopted the Institute's position prohibiting any
substantial interest. 8 Shortly after this, the Securities and Exchange Commission
i n Accounting Series Release #2, dated M a y 6, 1937, discussed briefly the inde
pendence of an accountant as follows:
In response to such requests, the Commission has taken the position
that an accountant cannot be deemed to be independent if he is, or has
been during the period under review, an officer or director of the regis
trant or i f he holds an interest i n the registrant that is significant w i t h
respect to its total capital or his own personal fortune.
The Release continued:
In a recent case involving a firm of public accountants, one member
of which owned stock i n a corporation contemplating registration, the
3

Commission refused to hold that the firm could be considered inde
pendent for the purpose of certifying the financial statements of such
corporation and based its refusal upon the fact that the value of such
holdings was substantial and constituted more than 1 percent of the
partner's personal fortune.
In the decade of the 1930's, both the Federal government and the public
accounting profession adopted the view that auditors should be independent of
their clients. The S E C exerted leadership i n determining what constituted inde
pendence, as evidenced by its issuance of A S R #2. Emphasis was placed on
financial interest and on employment by the client of the auditor i n capacities
other than that of auditor.
Independence: 1940-1955
In 1940, the Institute adopted the following rule on independence as part
of its Code of Professional Ethics:
A member or associate shall not express his opinion on financial state
ments of any enterprise financed i n whole or i n part by public distribu
tion of securities, if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a
substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed to
acquire such an interest; nor shall a member or an associate express his
opinion on financial statements which are used as a basis of credit,
if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a substantial interest
in the enterprise or if he is committed to acquire such interest, unless he
discloses his financial interest i n his report. 9
This adoption is noteworthy because (1) the financial independence rule first
became part of the Code of Professional Ethics and (2) when financials are
used for credit purposes, approval was apparently given for an auditor's holding
of a substantial financial interest i f he disclosed such holding.
In 1942, an amplification of the rule on financial independence was adopted—
" . . . i f he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest i n the enterprise
which is substantial either i n relation to its capital or to his o w n personal
fortune . . . " 1 0 T h i s action brought the Institute i n line w i t h the SEC's 1937
action i n ASR #2 as to investment, but not w i t h respect to other employment
arrangements.
The S E C i n Accounting Series Release #22, of March 14, 1941, reported an
opinion of its Chief Accountant, W i l l i a m W . Werntz, as follows:
W h e n an accountant and his client, directly or through an affiliate, have
entered into an agreement of indemnity which seeks to assure to the
accountant immunity from liability for his own negligent acts, whether
of omission or commission, it is my opinion that one of the major
stimuli to objective and unbiased consideration of the problems encoun
tered i n a particular engagement is removed or greatly weakened. Such
condition must frequently induce a departure from the standards of
objectivity and impartiality which the concept of independence implies.
T h a t same release also cited, w i t h approval, the Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S E C
364, (1936) decision which held that the certification of a balance sheet prepared
by an employee of the auditor who was also serving as an unsalaried but principal
4

financial accounting officer of the registrant and who was also a shareholder
of the registrant was not a certification by an independent accountant.
T h e S E C i n Accounting Series Release #37, dated November 7, 1942, indi
cated that i n determining independence, consideration would be given to the
propriety of the relationships and practices involved i n all services performed
for the company by such accountant. Accounting Series Release #47, dated
January 25, 1944, reported several situations i n which non-independence was
found, including the following:
1. Both an accountant and a business associate made loans to the regis
trant. Further, a son of the accountant was an officer of the regis
trant.
2. T h e accountant advanced funds to the registrant for financing a
new department.
3. The registrant was unable to pay the accountant's fee and the regis
trant pledged shares of its o w n stock to assure that such fee would
be paid. In addition, it had given the accountant an option to
purchase the pledged security at market price at the option date.
4. The accountant was the treasurer and a shareholder of a company
which sold some of a registrant's products.
5. The son of a partner was serving as assistant treasurer and chief
accountant of a registrant. The son resided with his father.
6. The accountant audited cash reports prepared by the client's staff,
entered them i n a summary record, posted such data to the general
ledger and made adjusting journal entries each month.
The above list provides additional evidence that the S E C wanted to maximize
the likelihood of an objective review by prohibiting a significant financial interest
or a close personal relationship w i t h the client.
T h e American Institute of Accountants through its Committee on A u d i t i n g
Procedure produced a special report i n 1947 entitled Tentative Statement of
Auditing
Standards; Their Generally Accepted Significance and Scope. T h e
second general standard stated, " I n all matters relating to the assignment, an
independence i n mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors."
Independence in fact is emphasized i n this document, as discussed on p. 17—
Independence i n the last analysis bespeaks an honest disinterest on the
part of the auditor i n the formulation and expression of his opinion,
which means unbiased judgment and objective consideration of facts as
determinants of that opinion. It implies not the attitude of a prosecutor,
but a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation on his part for
a fair presentation of facts which he owes not only to the management
and the owners of a business (generally, i n these days, the holder of
equity securities i n a corporation) but also to the creditors of a busi
ness, and to those who may otherwise have a right to rely ( i n part, at
least) upon the auditor's report, as i n the case of prospective owners
or creditors.
This position was subsequently affirmed i n the 1954 publication Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards.
In 1950 the S E C revised its rule on independence by deleting the word
"substantial" from the phrase "any substantial interest." T h u s , the S E C went
5

back to its 1933 position i n which there was a prohibition against the accountant
having any direct financial interest i n his client. T h e Institute i n January, 1962,
some twelve years after the above stated S E C rule revision, moved to prohibit
the direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest i n an enterprise
under audit by the member. 1 1 D u r i n g the interim (1950-1962) a double standard
as to investment i n the client company prevailed—no direct financial interest for
S E C work and no substantial direct financial interest for other engagements.
T h e double standard also existed w i t h respect to employment—no employment
of the types listed i n A S R #2 was permitted for S E C work. T h e Institute was
silent on the matter of other employment of the auditor by the client company.
T h e concept of independence was being developed and articulated i n the
1940-1955 period. Specific rules were adopted to require independence. T h o u g h
independence i n fact was emphasized, the illustrations publicized by the S E C
could be interpreted to suggest that the appearance of independence was a major
factor i n its evaluations of the independence of accountants. Prohibition of an
auditor's holding of a financial interest i n a client was being established.
Independence: 1956-1973
T h e membership of the A I C P A i n January 1962 adopted the following rule
on independence as part of its Code of Professional Ethics. A R T I C L E 1: Relations with Clients and Public.
1.01 Neither a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a partner,
shall express an opinion o n financial statements of any enterprise unless
he and his firm are i n fact independent w i t h respect to such enterprise.
Independence is not susceptible of precise definition, but is an expression
of the professional integrity of the individual. A member or associate,
before expressing his opinion on financial statements, has the responsi
bility of assessing his relationships w i t h an enterprise to determine
whether, i n the circumstances, he might expect his opinion to be con
sidered independent, objective and unbiased by one who had knowledge
of all the facts.
A member or associate w i l l be considered not independent, for example,
with respect to any enterprise if he, or one of his partners, (a) during
the period of his professional engagement or at the time of expressing
his opinion, had, or was committed to acquire, any direct financial i n 
terest or material indirect financial interest i n the enterprise, or (b)
during the period of his professional engagement, at the time of ex
pressing his opinion or during the period covered by the financial state
ments, was connected w i t h the enterprise as a promoter, underwriter,
voting trustee, director, officer or key employee. I n cases where a
member or associate ceases to be the independent accountant for an
enterprise and is subquently called upon to re-express a previously
expressed opinion on financial statements, the phrase, "at the time of
expressing his opinion" refers only to the time at which the member
or associate first expressed his opinion on the financial statements i n
question. T h e word "director" is not intended to apply to a connection
in such a capacity with a charitable, religious, civic or other similar
type of nonprofit organization when the duties performed i n such a
6

capacity are such as to make it clear that the member or associate can
express an independent opinion on the financial statements. The
example cited i n this paragraph, of circumstances under which a mem
ber or associate w i l l be considered not independent, is not intended to
be all inclusive.
This rule moved the A I C P A closer to the S E C position i n that it prohibited
direct financial interest i n the client and for the first time prohibited specific
employment relationships, such as director or officer of a client, d u r i n g the period
of the professional engagement. Independence i n fact was emphasized i n the
first paragraph of this rule, while independence i n appearance was specified i n
the second paragraph.
Effective March 1, 1973, the membership of the A I C P A adopted new rules
of conduct that included the following:
R U L E 1 0 1 — I N D E P E N D E N C E . A member or a firm of which he is a
partner or shareholder shall not express an opinion on financial state
ments of an enterprise unless he and his firm are independent with
respect to such enterprise. Independence w i l l be considered to be i m 
paired if, for example:
A . D u r i n g the period of his professional engagement, or at the time
of expressing his opinion, he or his firm:
1. H a d or was committed to acquire any direct or material indirect
financial interest i n the enterprise; or
2. H a d any joint closely held business investment w i t h the enter
prise or any officer, director, or principal stockholder thereof which
was material i n relation to his or his firm's net worth; or
3. H a d any loan to or from the enterprise or any officer, director
or principal stockholder thereof. T h i s latter proscription does not
apply to the following loans from a financial institution when made
under normal lending procedures, terms and requirements:
(a) Loans obtained by a member of his firm w h i c h are not
material i n relation to the net worth of such borrower.
(b) H o m e mortgages.
(c) Other secured loans, except loans guaranteed by a member's
firm which are otherwise unsecured.
B. D u r i n g the period covered by the financial statements, during the
period of the professional engagement or at the time of expressing an
opinion, he or his firm
1. Was connected w i t h the enterprise as a promoter, underwiter
or voting trustee, a director or officer or i n any capacity equivalent
to that of a member of management or of an employee; or
2. W a s a trustee of any trust or executor or administrator of any
estate if such trust or estate had a direct or material indirect financial
interest i n the enterprise; or was a trustee for any pension or profit
sharing trust of the enterprise.
The above examples are not intended to be all-inclusive. 1 2
R U L E 1 0 2 — I N T E G R I T Y A N D O B J E C T I V I T Y . A member shall not
knowingly misrepresent facts, and when engaged i n the practice of
7

public accounting, including the rendering of tax and management
advisory services, shall not subordinate his judgment to others. In tax
practice, a member may resolve doubt i n favor of his client as long as
there is reasonable support for his position. 1 3
The need for the appearance of independence is not stated as it was i n the
previous Rule 1.01 (. . . he might expect his opinion to be considered inde
pendent, objective and unbiased by one w h o had knowledge of all the facts.) but
the listing of the prohibitions and the indication of specific situations which are
acceptable strongly urges continued interest i n the appearance of independence.
It is also interesting to note that some of the previous "Interpretations of Rules
of Conduct of the A I C P A Division of Professional E t h i c s " were incorporated i n
the new Restatement publication. Interpretation "101-3—Accounting Services"
emphasizes independence i n appearance by suggesting that the auditor consider
whether he is " . . . lacking i n independence i n the eyes of a reasonable ob
server." 1 4 It is also noteworthy that the 1973 Restatement includes Rule 202
which incorporates expressly generally accepted auditing standards. Those stand
ards include the general standard requiring an "independence i n mental attitude,"
which is independence i n fact.
Statement on Auditing Standards #1, dated November, 1972, issued by the
Committee on A u d i t i n g Procedure of the A I C P A , included i n paragraph 220.03
the following statement. " T o be independent the auditor must be intellectually
honest; to be recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation
to or interest i n the client, its management, or its owners." Thus, continued
emphasis on independence i n fact as well as the appearance of independence is
maintained i n this document.
The S E C continued to push the development of rules related to independence,
as evidenced by its issuing of Accounting Series Release #81, December 11, 1958,
and Accounting Series Release #97, M a y 21, 1963. In A S R #81, 54 situations
were reviewed, 34 of which noted the accountants as "not independent," 19 of
which noted the accountants "have not been held to be not independent" and
one i n which accountants would be independent as to one entity and not inde
pendent as to another entity. T h e S E C i n A S R #97 found that a C P A i n
practice was not independent where he was one of three stockholders and an
officer and co-manager of a finance company w h i c h made loans to customers and
employees of a client who was a registered broker-dealer.
The SEC's primary pronouncement on independence is Rule 2-01 (b)
Regulation S-X. That rule, enforced today, states:
The Commission w i l l not recognize any certified public accountant or
public accountant as independent who is not i n fact independent. F o r
example, an accountant w i l l be considered not independent with respect
to any person or any of its parents, its subsidiaries, or any other affili
ates, (1) i n which, during the period of his professional engagement
to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date
of his report, he or his firm or a member thereof had, or is committed
to acquire, any direct financial interest or any material indirect financial
interest; or (2) w i t h w h i c h , during the period of his professional en
gagement to examine the financial statements being reported on, at the
date of his report or during the period being covered by the financial
8

of

statements, he or his firm or a member thereof was connected as a
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee,
except that a firm w i l l not be deemed not independent i n regard to a
particular person i f a former officer or employee of such person is em
ployed by the firm and such individual has completely disassociated
himself from the person and its affiliates and does not participate i n
auditing financial statements of the person or its affiliates covering any
period of his employment by the person. F o r the purposes of Rule 2-01,
the term "member" means all partners i n the firm and all professional
employees participating i n the audit or located i n an office of the firm
participating i n a significant portion of the audit. 1 5
It is interesting to note that the S E C rule does not include a distinction between
independence i n fact and the appearance of independence.
Accounting Series Release #123, March 23, 1972, endorsed the establishment
of standing audit committees composed of outside directors as a means of pro
viding "protection to investors who rely upon such financial statements." Accounting Series Release #126, July 5, 1972, provided some guidelines for
accountants for determining existence or lack thereof of independence. It stated,
" T h e concept of independence, as it relates to the accountant, is fundamental to
this purpose because it implies an objective analysis of the situation by a dis
interested third party." Examples were provided of situations i n w h i c h the
independence of accountants could be challenged. W i t h respect to management
service activities, the Release states . . .
T h e basic consideration is whether, to a third party, the client appears
to be totally dependent upon the accountant's skill and judgment i n its
financial operations or to be reliant only to the extent of the customary
type of consultation of advice.
As to E D P and bookkeeping services, the Release states . . .
Systems design is a proper function of the qualified public accountant.
Computer programming is an aspect of systems design and does not con
stitute a bookkeeping service . . . where source data is provided by
the client and the accountant's work is limited to processing and produc
tion of listings and reports, independence w i l l be adversely affected if the
listings and reports become part of the basic accounting records on
which, at least i n part, the accountant would base his opinion.
As to unpaid fees the Release indicated,
W h e n the fees for an audit or other professional service remain unpaid
over an extended period of time and become material i n relation to the
current audit fee, it may raise questions concerning the accountant's
independence because he appears to have a financial interest i n the
client . . . normally the fees for the prior year's audit should be paid
prior to the commencement of the current engagement.
As to business relationships w i t h clients, the Release suggested that joint business
ventures with clients, limited partnership agreements, investments i n supplier
or customer companies, rental of blocks of computer time to a client (except i n
emergency or temporary situations) would adversely affect independence.
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Accounting
Series Release #144, of M a y 23, 1973, considered the inde
pendence of a large firm of public accountants and alleged that they were not
independent because partners or employees of accountant's branch office during
the time when they were w o r k i n g on the audit of a client, received payments
from the general partners of the client company totaling about $17,000, " i n the
guise of profits from participation i n the purchase and sale of "hot issues'."
D u r i n g the 1956-1973 period, emphasis centered on refining the rules for
determination of the existence of independence. T h e S E C tended to lead the
way i n establishing guidelines, though substantial efforts were made by the
A I C P A to clarify the meaning of its ethics and its concept of independence. T h e
appearance of independence was considered critical, though the profession and
the S E C remained as "judges" of independence. T h e A I C P A adopted the S E C
position on avoidance of any direct financial interest i n a client.
Aspects of Independence
The purpose of the auditor's representation as to his independence is to
develop i n users' minds a high level of confidence i n his reports. If that con
fidence with respect to his technical skills and his independence is not present,
then the value of the audit report is diminished greatly.
The concept of independence implies freedom from control and domination
by another party. It implies impartiality and the absence of bias i n the gathering
of evidence, interpretation of evidence and opinion formulation. T h e auditor
as an independent party must be w i l l i n g and be i n a strong position to insist
on that course of action which his professional judgment urges is the appropriate
one i n the circumstances.
Independence has a "time" component—it must exist for some m i n i m u m
period of time for each audit situation. A n independent state of m i n d must exist
from the time an audit contract comes into existence until the report is rend
ered and subsequent responses interpreting such report have been given. It
seems to be generally agreed that an independent attitude must be maintained
from the time that an engagement is undertaken until a l l audit work, including
reporting, is completed.
Independence has a "party" component—the auditor must not be under
the influence of the client or other party at interest. Aspects of this are reflected
by the question raised by a C P A , quoted i n a Forbes article, "Since auditors are
selected and paid by management, are they truly independent?" 1 6 T h i s raises
a series of issues, including: (1) W h o should select the auditor? (2) W h o should
make the decision to change auditors? (3) W h o should pay the audit fee? and
(4) W i t h respect to what parties should the auditor be independent?
Independence has a "what" component. Carey has stated:
Independence has three meanings to the certified public accountant.
First, i n the sense of not being subordinate, it means honesty, integrity,
objectivity and responsibility. Second, i n the narrower sense i n w h i c h
it is used i n connection with auditing and expression of opinions on
financial statements, independence means avoidance of any relationship
which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the C P A ' s ob
jectivity as auditor. T h i r d , it means avoidance of relationships which
to a reasonable observer would suggest a conflict of interest. 1 7
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M a u t z and Sharaf suggest, "Three phases of independence are important to
independent auditing. First is the independence of approach and attitude . . .
The second phase . . . freedom from bias and prejudice, . . . T h e third phase
. . . to separate the two divisions (auditing and other services) of public ac
counting . . . " 1 8 Questions could be asked such as (1) H o w important is the
appearance of independence? (2) C a n independence i n fact be measured? and
(3) W h a t relationships should be avoided?
Independence has a "How shall it be maintained?" component. T h i s raises
questions such as (1) W h o shall judge whether it has or has not been main
tained? (2) W h a t procedures should be adopted to provide assurance to users
that independence has been maintained? and (3) What operational tests shall
be applied by reviewers to detect a lack of independence?
Selection, Payment and Change of Auditors
The user group for audit service n o w includes at least management, credi
tors, the current shareholders, prospective shareholders, employees, and govern
mental units. External users i n general have a strong desire for the auditor to
take an impartial and unbiased approach to his work.
The auditor's role can be likened to that of a judge, who listens to the
charges or petitions, hears the arguments, evaluates the evidence presented and
its bearing on the issues, considers the legal rules that are applicable, reasons to
a conclusion and renders an opinion indicating his findings and their underlying
rationale. But audit practice differs somewhat. T h e auditor collects his o w n
evidence rather than rely on the two or more parties i n the case to each collect
evidence and present it i n an adversary proceeding. Also, no cross examination
is provided for i n auditing. O n the other hand, the public accountant must be
aware of the underlying rules, must reason to a conclusion and must render
an opinion as does the judge.
W h o should select the auditor? T h e parties i n a legal action do not make
the final determination as to what judge w i l l hear the case nor what jurors w i l l
be called. W o u l d the user's view of auditor independence be strengthened by
having auditors appointed by a governmental authority (e.g., an equivalent to
the English Board of Trade)? Some companies have audit committees com
posed of outside directors. Does this arrangement, as far as it is related to
selection of auditors and communications w i t h the auditors, increase perceived
independence?
W h o should pay the auditor? A judge receives his "fee" i n the form of
salary from the state, whereas the auditor receives his fee from his client and
the auditor has some control over the size of the fee. Is this arrangement on
audit fees one that should be continued or do the users perceive this arrangement
as one which impairs the auditor's independence?
O n what basis should public accounting firms accept new clients? A t the
present time, each firm adopts its o w n criteria for acceptance of new engage
ments. Consideration could be given to the question of whether independence
w i t h respect to any existing client would be affected adversely by the acceptance
of a new client.
W h e n should auditors be changed? W h a t internal or external changes i n
relationships might have an effect on independence? W h a t relationships between
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auditor and client could impact independence? F o r example, would the hiring
by the client of several audit staff members have a negative impact? W h o should
be responsible for detecting such changes and then urging and or m a k i n g a change
i n auditor?
A number of questions have been asked above, and no answers appear to be
readily available. Research could well be undertaken to ascertain user and
auditor views on each of the above, including their implications for the be
havior of the auditor under varying sets of circumstances.
What Constitutes Independence?
Independence i n appearance has received attention i n the literature. It
involves the perception of the auditor's independence by parties interested i n
audit reports. F r o m the standpoint of the external user, every judgment made
by the auditor has an independence aspect. Such judgments include but are not
limited to his search for clientele, staff hiring, assignment of staff to the engage
ment, approach to his audit investigation, evaluation of evidence, and develop
ment of his opinions. If any judgment appears to involve compromise, even
though of apparent minor import, subordination may be alleged and perceived
independence may be questioned. F o r example, the decision to omit a con
firmation of a specified receivable or auditor acquiescence to the change i n the
wording of a footnote could give rise to a feeling by a user that the auditor's
judgment was subordinated.
H o w can auditors be assured that users have a high level of confidence i n
their independence? T h e perception of the user must certainly be taken into
account. H o w do we measure the reader's perception of independence? Perhaps
some measuring instrument 1 9 could be developed such that the profession as a
whole could monitor user pulse. Deterioration of the level of perceived inde
pendence could then be attacked by the profession i n a variety of ways, such as
proscriptions as to activities felt by the user to be impinging on independence
and education of the users as to the " r e a l " state of auditor independence. Dif
ferent users and different groups of users may have different concepts of what
constitute independence and " h o w m u c h " independence is essential. T h e dif
ferences or even conflicts i n view points could present difficulties as well as
could attempts to develop recommendations for actions to raise the level of
perceived independence.
There has been little emphasis placed on the determination of what attri
butes create independence i n fact. Independence i n fact seems to require absolute
intellectual honesty and the absence of obligation to any potential user.
Professor Barrett has indicated that " . . . the audit profession's ethical
notion of apparent independence can be operationally defined as a sociological
role construct, and . . . its conception of real independence can be operationally
defined as a personality construct." 2 0 H e suggests that:
Professional Audit Independence contains two constructs. Interpersonal
Independence describes functional situations which promote or dys
functional situations which impair the profession's auditor image as per
ceived by reasonable observers . . . Intrapersonal Independence is the
second order factor containing three operational content variables. It is
assumed that male individuals—who are field analytical rather than
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global field types, who evidence a low social approval need rather than
being approval motivated and who prefer to describe themselves i n
terms of independent rather than intermediate or dependent personality
typologies—tend to possess a high degree of intrapersonal independence
as characterized by their behavior i n test and non-test situations. 2 1
Professor Barrett goes on to indicate that, i n his opinion, on the basis of ex
ploratory studies, interpersonal and intrapersonal independence can both be
determined by means of empirical testing. Additional research i n this area,
largely untouched to date, seems warranted.
W h a t relationships should be avoided? A t a recent bank's annual meeting,
a minority shareholder sharply criticized a $1,600,000 loan by the bank to the
company's auditors on the ground that such was a "conflict of interest and
jeopardized the independent status of the a u d i t o r . " 2 2 M a n y public accounting
firms are strongly interested i n "selling" management services. M i g h t not the
user of an audit report suspect a tradeoff between the accounting firm and its
client on the basis that the audit might be reduced i n scope or a disclosure
requirement changed i f the particular management service was "purchased"?
A s related earlier, the S E C has indicated i n various releases situations where
independence is questioned N o comprehensive research appears to have been
undertaken on this question. A substantial pay-off should be obtainable from
a comprehensive research project covering satisfactory and unsatisfactory rela
tionships, particularly if user views are taken into account i n the project.
Maintenance of Independence
W h a t party or parties should assess the presence or absence of independence?
T o date, the public accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange C o m 
mission have been the formulators of the rules regarding independence and also
the enforcers of such rules. T h e view of the S E C can be presumed to reflect
their perception of the needs of the security investors for auditor independence.
However, it appears that a major thrust of the S E C work and of the A I C P A
documents is providing for the appearance of independence. If such appearance
of independence is the prime focus, why should not all external parties or their
representatives have a voice i n formation and enforcement of the rules on inde
pendence? W o u l d not such position provide a "watch-dog" and aid greatly
i n maintenance of confidence by users i n auditors' reports?
In developing confidence i n the minds of the users of financials, should we
institute a review of the audit report and its underlying documentation? In
the judicial system a judge's opinion is appealable to successively higher levels,
up to the Supreme Court of the U . S . W e do not have an equivalent procedure
for appeal of an auditor opinion, nor for a subsequent investigation of it by
another professional. M i g h t not the adoption of a procedure for auditing the
auditor enhance user confidence levels i n the effective independence of the
auditor? Research into the opinion of users and auditor reactions to such a
required review would be helpful i n anticipating the effect of such a requirement.
Operational tests of independence must await a determination of those
attributes which contribute to independence and those that detract from it. If
those attributes can be determined, the profession and the users of its services,
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or the parties designated to assess the existence of independence, can proceed to
formulate operational tests or guides to ascertain the existence of a satisfactory
state of independence.
Summary
Independence has, i n varying degrees, been a concern of auditors and the
users of audit reports since the early days of the profession i n England and the
United States. In the U.S., development of the concept of independence has
been pushed by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a representative of
one set of users. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has,
through various publications, articulated concepts of independence and has
adopted independence as a mandatory qualification for the auditor. It is sug
gested that the need for independence is related exclusively to the attest function
and that unless the user perceives independence to exist, the attest function has
extremely limited value. Various relationships between (1) auditor and client
and (2) auditor and external parties can have impacts on perceived independence
and independence i n fact.
Research needs to be undertaken with respect to user perceptions of inde
pendence; the relationships which they feel impair independence as well as
those which promote independence. Research could be undertaken on a joint
basis by representatives of the profession and representatives of various user
groups. T h i s arrangement should promote soundness of research design, i m 
partiality i n evidence gathering, summarization and interpretation, and accepta
bility of the research reports. T h e research projects could focus on many ques
tions, such as (1) W h o should appoint and remove the auditors? (2) W h a t
relationships between client and auditor are likely to impede the exercise of
impartial, unbiased judgments? (3) W h o should pay for audit services ren
dered? (4) Should reviews of auditor work, including audit independence, be
undertaken? and (5) W h a t instruments best measure independence?
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Discussant's Response to
Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development
And some Proposals for Research
LeRoy E. Kist
Ernst & Ernst
G l e n Berryman's paper conveys to me a very clear impression of the thought
ful sifting of voluminous source material to present a comprehensive yet concise
account of the evolution of the independence concept. By contrasting the
actions of the A I C P A with the actions of Congress and the Securities Exchange
Commission and with the English background, he has brought the reader up
to date so that he can at least begin to understand and appreciate the problem
of independence and to consider the possible need for further research.
In his book The CPA Plans for the Future John Carey stated, " F r o m the
beginning, independent auditors have recognized that they would be useless to
society unless they were fair and objective i n their attestations to financial
data . . . T h e assumption that auditors must be independent was taken for
granted." Independence i n an abstract sense may have been taken for granted
but certainly a precise definition of independence and the specifics of its imple
mentation could not be taken for granted. Development of the independence
concept obviously didn't come easy and I am inclined to believe that there was,
i n part, some effort by the American Institute to accommodate a dual standard
that would permit the practitioner's occasional financial interest, or other close
relationships, i n his closely-held client. W e have come a long way from the
tainted independence of the twenties, and w i t h the adoption of the revised
Code of Professional Ethics as of March 1, 1973, I hope that we do not have
too much further to go.
Questions for Further Research
G l e n has asked five basic questions w h i c h , he proposes, should be subjected
to further research. The questions relate to the following principal issues:
1. Appointment and discharge of auditors.
2. Relationships between client and auditor that are likely to impede
the exercise of impartial, unbiased judgments.
3. Payment for audit services rendered.
4. Reviews of auditor w o r k , including audit independence.
5. Measurement of independence i n fact.
In addition, he has asked questions which, i f answered, could help i n improving
the appearance of independence which, we must acknowledge, is of some con16

sequence. In my discussion, I w i l l try to comment on these issues and hopefully
to expose another viewpoint for your consideration.
In commenting upon the selection, change, and payment of auditors, the
author has drawn an analogy between the w o r k of the independent accountant
and that of a judge i n a judicial proceeding. Because of the similarities of the
activities of the two, he has suggested the possibility of having auditors appointed
by a governmental authority, paying them from public funds, and requiring
their change when the regulatory agency perceives any diminution of inde
pendence.
I agree that the similarities exist; however, there are also dissimilarities and
other factors to be considered. I question that a true analogy exists i n that,
unlike the judge, the auditor must be prepared to defend his judgments i f ques
tioned by the users of his reports and, i f found to be i n error, to take the con
sequences of his work. T h e role of an auditor should not be considered as
one of resolving differences between antagonists (his client on one side and
stockholders, creditors, etc., on the other) but one of searching for the right
answers to complex business problems and then reporting them i n a manner
that is fair to all concerned.
Appointment and Discharge of Auditors
A s noted i n Glen's paper, the selection process is normally undertaken by
management w i t h the concurrence of the Board of Directors. In addition, a
number of companies have adopted the practice of asking the stockholders to
ratify the selection. I am not aware of any general criticism of that process;
however, questions have been raised about the freedom of management to dis
charge its auditors, probably i n some cases for being too independent. In this
latter regard, the S E C has been helpful i n a recent modification of F o r m 8-K,
which requires the reporting of various current events. Item 12 of that form
requests a registrant to report the engagement of a new auditor and also to
furnish a separate letter stating whether i n the 18 months preceding the engage
ment there were any disagreements with the former accountant on any matter
of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing
procedures, which disagreements, i f not resolved to the satisfaction of the former
accountant, would have caused h i m to make reference i n connection w i t h his
opinion to the subject matter of the disagreement. T h e former auditor is re
quested to furnish a letter stating whether he agrees w i t h the statements con
tained i n the letter of the registrant. T h i s requirement should have a deterring
effect upon registrants who may hope to find a more compliant auditor i n
connection with the change. There is some problem, of course, i n deciding
whether a bona fide disagreement existed or whether there was merely a differ
ence of opinion which was eventually resolved i n the manner requested by the
auditor. Is a table-pounding session needed before it can be said that a true
disagreement existed? T h i s is a matter requiring careful consideration by the
deposed auditor and, hopefully, some concern by the newly appointed auditor.
I understand that consideration currently is being given to requiring the
report to be filed at the time of the discharge of the former auditor, rather than
upon the engagement of the new auditor. T h i s change should improve the
value of the report, but I believe that other changes could be made to improve
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it even more. F o r example, consideration might be given to requiring the regis
trant to report any intention to discharge its present auditor several months
before doing so. A panel including representatives of the accounting profession,
as well as the S E C , could review the facts and circumstances and decide whether
the divorce should be granted. A s it n o w stands, the discharged auditor may get
some satisfaction from k n o w i n g that his former client and the successor auditor
w i l l be watched carefully, but that knowledge would do little to strengthen his
independent attitude i n the first place. Research i n this direction should be
productive.
Relationships between Client and Auditor that Are Likely to
Impede the Exercise of Impartial, Unbiased Judgments
In this matter, the pronouncements of the S E C and the interpretations
of the A I C P A have been very useful and do much to clarify specific situations
encountered i n practice. Interpretations for the most part have been under
standable and progressive. I w i l l not attempt to comment upon any particular
interpretation included i n the numerous Accounting Series Releases issued by
the S E C , other than to note that when the S E C took a d i m view of unpaid
fees i n A S R #126, many accountants must have been made much happier.
W h a t is probably needed i n this area is to classify and analyze the various i n 
terpretations of the S E C and of the A I C P A i n an attempt to derive from them
the fundamental features i n a more abstract form.
Payment for Audit Services
A s mentioned previously, G l e n has suggested the possibility of paying
the auditor from public funds. Because of the wide disparity i n the extent of
services required and the absence of a universal need, this does not seem to be
a practical solution. Fees conceivably can affect the independence of the auditor
as much or more than i f he were to have a direct financial interest i n his client.
Nevertheless, this aspect appears to be more detrimental to perceived inde
pendence than to independence i n fact, provided, of course, that other controls
and conditions are effective.
Reviews of Auditor Work including Audit Independence
Recently the A I C P A , i n part upon the urging of the Securities Exchange
Commission, undertook to develop a program of quality control. T h e program,
which has been accepted by the Board of Directors of the Institute, calls for
the independent review of an accounting firm's performance, looking at the
adequacy of the procedures being followed, and later assessing the degree of
compliance of the firm w i t h its o w n procedures. T h i s is something like the
review, evaluation, and test of compliance of a system of internal control. I n
addition to its other features, the review w o u l d be concerned w i t h client selection
and retention, and independence. W h e n this program is operative, the account
ing profession should have another strong and worthwhile tool to police its
membership and to maintain a satisfactory level of independence.
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Measurement of Independence i n Fact
Independence is a very complex issue. F o r those who have not been involved
i n an audit, it might seem quite easy to hold a client at arm's length and subject
its financial statements to a dispassionate, microscopic review. In actual practice,
however, we realize that an auditor must maintain a close relationship with
his client i n order to understand its operations and to obtain appropriate infor
mation essential to the formation of his opinion. Possibly for this reason I
would not be very receptive to a suggestion that persons outside the profession
should evaluate our performance and independence. In this respect, I strongly
believe that the profession should be self-policing.
In the discussion of what constitutes independence, the author appears to
be concerned about the appearance of independence. It seems to me that i f we
are concerned primarily w i t h independence i n fact, the appearance of inde
pendence w i l l largely take care of itself. Is an active P R program necessary
for the accounting profession, or w i l l doing a good job observing all of the
present rules of conduct be sufficient? It may be useful to obtain the views of
users, but the ultimate conclusion as to what does and what does not constitute
independence should be generated from within the profession itself.
Additional Suggestions
Many here may have heard of the so-called "auditor of record" concept,
which is receiving active consideration by the S E C . T h i s concept would require
the auditor to become more closely associated w i t h his client throughout the year
and would require h i m to assume some, as yet unspecified, degree of responsi
bility for the adequacy of interim financial reporting. T h e auditor w i l l become
more deeply involved i n the day-to-day decisions regarding accounting matters,
which he w i l l then be expected to audit and report on at a later date. T h i s
association raises a question as to whether the auditor's independence w i l l be
adversely affected. It seems to me that research should be undertaken i n this
matter.
T h e personal characteristics or traits of honesty and integrity are critical
to independence, and men and women entering the accounting profession should
possess, and be well aware of the need for, those characteristics i n abundance.
It has been said that everyone's character is almost completely established during
his childhood; however, an awareness of the demands of the public accounting
profession i n this regard becomes implanted at a much later date. It seems to
me that educators could provide a real service to the public if they were to
discuss and ponder over these considerations with their accounting students
as an integral part of the academic program.
W h e n I was a young man I clerked i n a drugstore for several years. A t
that time I noticed a motto appearing on the label of a large pharmaceutical
company that impressed me a great deal, and I have never forgotten it. It
said, " T h e priceless ingredient of every product is the honor and integrity of its
maker." T h i s also should be true for every audit engagement. If we were
assured of the quality of these ingredients, there would be no need to be con
cerned over independence.
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The New AICPA Audit Commission—
Will the Real Questions Please Stand Up?
Stephen D. Harlan, Jr.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & C o .
The A I C P A ' s Board of Directors has recently authorized the appointment
of a Commission to make a full-scale study of the functions and responsibilities
of independent auditors. It is m y understanding that the Commission w i l l consist
of seven members, with four members coming from outside the C P A ranks and
three from within. T h e Commission members are yet to be appointed, but I
understand the chairman w i l l be from outside the auditing profession. Basically,
I believe the establishment of such a Commission is a very positive step that
can lead to vast improvements i n the world of auditing—IF. If the right issues
are addressed and the right questions asked.
D u r i n g the past fifteen years, as we a l l know, the auditing profession has
come under severe attack. T h i s is particularly true today w i t h increasing pres
sures from the regulatory bodies, the courts, and society as a whole. T h e volume
of suits filed against auditors has gone u p dramatically i n the past few years.
Also, the grounds for these suits appear to be widening, as indicated by the fact
that criminal indictments are being sought and returned against auditors. It
seems as though every day is a new day w i t h a different set of ground rules
and the auditor is caught somewhere i n the middle.
If this is true, then can the mere establishment of a Commission to study
auditing be effective? I n order to address that question, let us examine the
Commission's potential charge as i t might be gleaned from the questions con
tained i n the March 11, 1974 issue of The CPA:
1. W h a t responsibility should an auditor have for detecting fraud?
2. Should auditors monitor a l l financial information released to the
public and, i f so, what should be the extent of their responsibilities?
3. Should the auditor's standard report, particularly the phrase "presents
fairly," be changed to express better the responsibilities of auditors?
4. W h a t mechanisms should be adopted to strengthen the functions of
auditors?
5. Is the mechanism for developing auditing standards adequate?
6. W h a t should the profession do to reduce the risks of misunderstand
ing about its role?
In reading these questions, I get the feeling we are continuing to take the
same old approach that we have i n the past. T h e questions appear to be ad
dressed primarily to segments of our activities and do not deal with the broader
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issues of auditing. Unless the Commission interprets its charge broadly i n light
of recent and anticipated changes i n our society and our economy, I hold little
hope for its success. W h a t are these so called broad fundamental issues?
Some Premises
Certain assumptions defining the environment of auditing are necessary
i n order to properly address ourselves to the issues.
A u d i t i n g Exists i n a D y n a m i c E n v i r o n m e n t Almost every aspect of the
audit is subject to change. A t one end of the spectrum, information processing
technology has given rise to new auditing techniques. A t the other end, society's
values are changing—our performance and utility are measured by a constantly
changing yardstick.
Information Technology. One of the most noticeable areas of change relates
to information processing technology. Changes implemented by clients have
necessitated adaptation of many traditional auditing tools. T h i s same technology
has permitted the profession to introduce more sophisticated and more effective
tools.
The processing activities being carried out by clients have changed. Com
munications and terminal technology have led to extensive remote access to
machine-sensible data. T h i s , i n turn, has had some tendency to reduce the
volume of documents that are available for verification. Still further, the develop
ment of integrated systems w i t h operations research models imbedded into the
normal flow of data processing has resulted i n having transactions initiated and
then processed within the same computer system. W i t h o u t dwelling excessively
on this point, it suffices to say that it has been necessary to adapt auditing pro
cedures to meet the changing situation.
In a very real sense, the auditing firm is a business that must itself take
advantage of changing technology to improve both the cost and effectiveness
of its operations; it has been necessary to use computers to apply tools such as
statistical sampling and model building that are needed to meet our professional
obligations.
Some of the advances i n the information processing area have the potential
for m a k i n g subtle, but significant changes i n auditing objectives. T h e develop
ment and implementation of large-scale data bases has raised increasing concern
regarding security and privacy issues. W i l l the auditor, who is already charged
with an objective review of a company's data processing system, eventually be
held responsible for attesting to the performance of controls i n this area?
As another possibility, assume that a company's financial statements are
disseminated by having investors use remote terminals to access reports main
tained i n the data bank of an information utility. W i l l this movement have an
impact on the auditor's liability exposure by altering the definition of the fore
seeable class of users? W i l l the flexible retrieval capabilities of such systems force
the auditor to offer the equivalent of piecemeal reports, since users can access
any parts of the statements that are relevant to their decisions? W i l l the auditor's
opinion have to be broadened to encompass interim reports, since reports main
tained on such a system w i l l certainly be updated during the year?
Social Attitudes. In the same sense that it was possible to say that the
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changes i n information processing technology are altering the operating en
vironment, it is equally clear that there have been changes i n social attitudes.
Directly and indirectly, more attention is being focused on managerial actions.
W i l l (should?) we eventually take a position regarding the effect of manage
ment's actions on resource allocation, on the utilization of energy resources, or on
minority groups as a potential source of employees?
Changes i n social attitudes are particularly important for the auditing
profession. T h e scope of our liability is ill-defined. In this age of consumerism,
it is all too common for limits to be imposed after the fact by courts that are
reacting to legal actions. T h i s point is of crucial importance. Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure makes it easy to institute class actions. T h e
class actions, i n turn, increase the magnitude of our exposure and tend sometimes
to shift the focus of interest away from the party allegedly wronged and to the
plaintiff's attorney as the individual w h o has the largest readily identifiable
financial interest i n the action.
In summary, then, the auditor is operating w i t h i n an ever-changing environ
ment—one that is creating both new opportunities and new pressures.
Utility Is i n the Eyes of the Beholder
There is no rationale for auditing services unless they serve some definable
objective. I n a market-oriented economy, this means that the absence of such
utility w i l l certainly result i n an unwillingness to incur the cost of the services.
In the quasi-regulated position of auditing, the lack of utility results i n either
a reluctance to mandate the performance of services or the establishment of addi
tional regulatory pressures to align the services provided with the identified
needs.
The most important observation following from this premise is that the
auditor has only limited control over the nature of the attest function. Utility
is determined, not by the auditor, but by the market for his services. T h i s is a
complicated situation, because the attitudes of the market place are constantly
changing. N o t only are the values changing, but the use of the regulatory
agencies and courts to force further changes and realign economic distributions
compounds the problem.
A System Is Needed to L i n k the A u d i t o r to H i s V a r i e d Audience
Operating within the environment specified above, it is clear that commu
nication between the auditor and his audience should not be left to afterthe-fact determinations by the courts and the regulatory agencies. T h e current
situation leaves something to be desired.
A n argument can be made that the profession is talking to itself when we
talk about not having any responsibility for detecting fraud. T h e same is true
with regard to our attempts to define the class of intended financial statement
users as being either informed or naive (or both simultaneously).
Leaving the resolution of these issues solely to the regulatory bodies may
not be useful. In the past, regulatory attempts have often proven to be hap
hazard efforts to resolve short-run issues. F o r example, the S E C has recently
the profession must rest upon.
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issued a pronouncement requiring the disclosure of inventory profits. W h i l e well
intended, the requirement fails to give adequate recognition to the broader issues
associated with reporting the effects of price level changes. Regulatory agency
rulings rarely reflect the k i n d of unified, internally consistent, perspective that
In summary, then, the auditing environment can be characterized by:
1. A need to operate i n a constantly changing environment.
2. A utility structure that is influenced by its audience.
3. A need for communication between the auditor and the market for
his services.
General Parameters of a Useful Framework
It is necessary to examine the framework of auditing before we can make
sensible recommendations regarding crucial issues influencing the profession.
There should be general agreement that the major product of the auditing
profession is attestation, i.e., offering a professional opinion regarding actions
taken by others.
Attestation. Systems theory tells us that the effective functioning of a system
requires that each of its elements must function i n accordance with predetermined
performance standards. Also, each element must have available information on
the conditions existing i n any other elements on w h i c h it depends, i.e., there
must be reliable communication.
Attestation enters into this process i n two ways. First, it is a convenient
tool for use i n a very large system where it is not possible for each element to
individually verify the functioning of the elements upon which it depends. In
this context, it can be argued that to justify reliance, it is more efficient for an
independent attestor to review various elements and offer judgments regarding
their functioning, than to have each element verify each other element's per
formance. A n d second, one should not overlook the behavioral impact of
attestation on a system that has a goal and knows that its actions are being
examined. This is the well documented behavioral impact of auditing—the fact
that people w i l l alter their behavior because they k n o w that they are being
watched.
Attestation is thus a two-pronged tool for controlling a system. It provides
information regarding the activities that are taking place i n a given segment of
the system. A t the same time, it alters the actions of some system elements i n
order to keep them aligned w i t h a set of assumed goals.
Parties of Benefit. If you are w i l l i n g to grant the framework presented
above, then it becomes clear that we can get our feet back on the ground and
identify two specific groups that can and do benefit from our attestation services:
1. Users of Information. T h i s class includes credit grantors, investors
and regulatory agencies. In a less direct sense, it includes the voting
populace, who by their electoral capabilities, can influence the regu
latory environment. T h e class also includes decision makers i n a
large organization who are located a distance away and therefore
unable to conduct their own verifications.
2. Managers. Reference is being made here to the behavioral impact
of the attestation process. T h e class of managers is potentially very
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large. T h e owners of large corporations are certainly included,
since they use this process as one of several tools for keeping manage
ment aligned w i t h stockholder objectives. T h e regulatory agencies
fall into this same broad category. A n d finally, the management
of the business uses this same approach on a much smaller scale.
Attestation and the Auditor
If one is to make sense out of the current situation, one must take the state
ments regarding attestation i n general and relate them to the current situation.
There are several questions of critical importance. W h a t is the relationship
between the profession and the various governmental agencies? W h a t is the
scope of the profession?
Governmental Relationship. A very careful balancing act must take place
i n terms of the relationship between the auditing firm and the governmental
agency. The agency mandating auditing services should certainly be one that is
influential, i.e., one that can associate serious penalties w i t h failure to satisfy
existing standards. A t the same time, the requirement for attestation services
must be framed i n a manner that does not take away flexibility i n meeting the
needs of the market place. There is, of course, a middle ground that attempts
to balance the needs of the regulatory agency w i t h those of the auditing profes
sion and society.
Identification of the auditing profession w i t h a particular governmental
agency is a two-edged sword. F o r historical reasons, the profession has become
identified with financial representations. T h i s , i n turn, led to its association w i t h
the S E C . W h i l e the power of the S E C gives the profession much of the power
that it currently has, it also creates problems. There is the constant threat of the
S E C "take-over." There is also an identification w i t h the financial community
that makes it hard for us to address other attestation-related needs to society.
Scope. There is conceptually no limit to the scope of attestation activities.
A t the same time very practical limits do exist. A s a practical matter, the value
of the attestation services must be validated i n the market place by the willingness
of society to pay for the services. Hence, there is a definite need to recognize
two factors—the expertise that is actually possessed by the attestor and the extent
to which society is w i l l i n g to grant h i m this expertise.
T h e close relationship w i t h societal attitudes is at the heart of many of
our problems. A u d i t i n g has been traditionally associated with financial repre
sentations. F i r m s i n the field have thus sought to employ staff members who
have a financial orientation, just as these financially trained people have sought
out the firms. Financial identification is further reinforced by the involvement
of the profession w i t h the S E C . There is thus a definite limit to the profession's
ability to define its own scope (at least i n the short r u n ) . T h i s point is the basis
for some of our present difficulties. O n the one hand, society sometimes attributes
expertise to us, even i f we deny that we possess it. T h i s is the case w i t h regard
to the detection of fraud. O n the other hand, it limits our ability to alter the
scope of practice, since the value of the services provided depends on both the
expertise that we actually possess and on the expertise that society is w i l l i n g
to grant us.
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T o w a r d a Dynamic Future
The present situation is far from satisfactory. A s members of a recognized
profession, we cannot sit back with any real degree of self-satisfaction.
There is a definite need for two types of research and development activities
on an on-going basis. It goes without saying that there must be a continual
up-grading of current services. Hence, there must be research to maintain the
status quo i n the face of changing technology and to improve the things that
we are now doing.
It is absolutely essential that there be an on-going program looking into
new areas of attestation. There are two reasons for this need. First, like any
business, the auditing firm must be able to adapt to changing needs and to
introduce new services for which there is a demand. T h e fact that the value
of auditors' services is at least partially determined by society is a point that
cannot be overlooked. If there is no research to develop skills with which we
can be identified, it is highly unlikely that society w i l l give us credit for these
skills (and what's more, dangerous if they do give us such credit).
It may sound heretical, but as a practical matter, the profession does and
should pay attention to the marketing of its services. Classical lore has it that
the market beats a path to the better mousetrap, but that is not a safe enough
base upon which to build the profession. It is necessary to give explicit attention
to the development of a well organized marketing mechanism for the profession
that not only makes the market aware of our expertise, but also of the limits
associated w i t h our services.
The Real Questions
In my preceding remarks emphasis has been placed on financial representa
tions, because this has been the traditional area of our expertise. O u r legitimacy
has been derived from both the market place and the securities laws, and this
has further acted to define the nature of our image i n the eyes of our audiences.
However, the current situation is quite critical. Legal suits are mounting
together with the magnitude of the damages being claimed. Respected publi
cations are questioning the way i n which we are handling our affairs. There
is reason to believe that auditing lacks respectability within the academic insti
tutions—our primary education and research arm. H o w many schools would
offer auditing courses i n the absence of the C P A exam and state licensing
requirements? H o w many doctoral students are looking to auditing as an area
for specialization and research?
Commissions are appointed infrequently, w i t h an expectation that they w i l l
have a significant impact. Hence, due care should be addressed to the charge
of such a group. Appropriate objectives of this Commission should be to identify
the issues facing the profession, the options available, alternative courses of
action, and a structure for achieving an orderly resolution of the issues.
The questions that should be addressed should focus on the fundamental
issues that are impacting the profession at the present, and those that have the
potential for impact i n the future. A m o n g those issues are:
1. What is the role of the auditor in society? O u r environment is
formed by our expertise, by the legal structure surrounding our
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actions, and by the attitudes of those who (potentially) use our
services. T o w h o m are we responsible? W h a t are the attitudes
towards the profession? W h a t are our perceived strengths and weak
nesses? W h a t factors do our audiences focus upon when forming
their opinions of us?
2. To what extent do we have the ability to influence our role in the
future? A s stated above, this role depends upon both our expertise
and audience perception of our expertise. T h e apparent gap between
our self-image and the users' views of us is at the heart of many of
our current problems. Is it possible for us to establish a structure
that w i l l help to keep this image discrepancy w i t h i n some acceptable
bounds? H o w can we do this?
3. Who are the users of our services? T h e present structure assumes
that particular users of our services (the relatively sophisticated
creditors and investors) are dominant. T h i s assumption is the basis
of some present difficulties. Consideration must also be given to
potential investors and creditors, as well as to management and the
general public.
4. What are the decision making needs of the users? T h e Trueblood
Committee studied the objectives of financial statements, and the
committee findings are now being considered by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. Other user-related questions include
the need to attest to forecasts and related underlying assumptions,
adequacy of internal control, and management effectiveness.
5.

What should the structure be to control quality and auditing standards? T o what extent can the profession operate i n a self-contained
manner? W h o should establish auditing standards? W h o should
monitor auditing quality? H o w can auditing be kept current, or
w i l l we need another Commission i n a few years?

6. Should there be changes in the relationship between the auditor and
the firm being audited? A t the present time, the auditing firm is
retained by a firm i n order to offer an opinion regarding its financial
representations. T h e auditing firm is presumably independent. It
also presumably has a large degree of influence on the choice between
alternative techniques. However, there are many who question
this independence. There is no easy solution to the problem. W h i l e
I a m not proposing this solution, it is useful to recognize that i n
England, once the firm has chosen an auditor, it is very difficult
for it to make a change. T h e system appears to w o r k .
These are not all of the questions requiring answers and there may be some
debate regarding the inclusion of one or two. Nevertheless, I believe they do
focus on the fundamental issues that face the profession.
This is a most unique moment i n the history of our profession. W e have
asked "outsiders" to help us identify the problems and develop solutions. W e
should view this Commission as an opportunity to objectively study our entire
role and responsibility to society. Let's all hope that the real questions—and
answers—eventually stand up.
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Discussant's Response to
The New AICPA Audit Commission—
Will the Real Questions Please Stand Up?
Jack C. Robertson
University of Texas at A u s t i n
One finds no argument with M r . Harlan's belief that establishment of the
A I C P A A u d i t Commission can be a positive step toward improvement i n the
world of auditing. However, as he implies, i t is not merely the appointment
that represents progress but rather the ultimate product of the Commission that
finally must be perceived as relevant and meaningful. I n order to attain these
latter qualities not only must relevant and meaningful (i.e., real) questions and
issues be raised, but they must be resolved to the satisfaction of the " w o r l d s "
that exist outside the world of auditing.
Other Worlds
Some view auditing as a very small sub-world i n society and others view
it as a universal, pervasive and larger world i n its o w n right. Typical expres
sions of the various worlds, which auditing is both i n and of, are couched i n
terms of the societal segments that are interested i n financial communications.
In order not to belabor this old and familiar concern, let me just draw a
picture i n words: Visualize a series of concentric circles that represent various
societal spheres of interest. I n the inner circle lies accountancy, and i n suc
cessively larger outer circles management, present stockholders, all other present
investors, other economic interests (e.g., labor, competitors, suppliers), potential
future investors, and other social-political interests (e.g., regulators, ecologists).
In my mind's eye, auditing is the set of spokes that connects these other worlds
to accountancy, for better or for worse.
I wish to make two points based on the foregoing preamble: First, auditing
is inextricably bound to accountancy i n current thought, thus it is oftentimes
difficult to distinguish an accounting question from an auditing question. (More
on this point later.) Second, the length of the imaginary spokes is important to
auditors i n the context of specifying auditors' role(s) i n society. A closely allied
corollary question i n this regard is: " W h o is the auditor's client?"
I submit that the definition of "client" is more than a mere exercise i n
semantics. T h e definition lies at the heart of auditors' acceptance of professional
responsibility, and the issue constitutes the premier real question for the new
audit commission. T h e A I C P A Code of Ethics defines client as the person(s)
or entity which retains an auditor for professional services. I perceive this
definition as deficient because it does not fully recognize the social-political
concerns of other worlds w i t h w h o m an auditor has a social contract to fulfill.
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M r . H a r l a n has recognized this issue forthrightly i n his o w n first question
for the commission, and I am i n full agreement w i t h h i m . H e has augmented
his first question with his last one, raising the issue of the relationship between
the auditor and the auditee. These two real questions are parts of the same
issue, but they have been somewhat slighted i n the reported charge to the
Commission.
T h e A r t of Raising Questions
Relevant and meaningful decision outputs cannot be attained unless the real
questions are first identified. T h i s assertion is a truism long recognized i n a
technical sense by practicing auditors as a matter of decision theory (viz., rele
vant evidence cannot be obtained unless first the relevant assertion, explicit or
implicit, has been recognized and formulated as a decision problem). In the
context of the charge to the Commission, questions are real only to the extent
that they are relevant and meaningful to the "other worlds." T h i s does not
preclude their being relevant and meaningful to auditors alone, but i f they are
limited to technical issues, then the other worlds w i l l be disinterested and w i l l
perceive the Commission's product as self-serving.
T h e essence of the art of raising questions about auditing, thus, is the art
of making them meaningful to non-auditors. T h e other worlds, i n m y opinion,
are interested i n meta-conceptual questions and the philosophical impact of re
sponses to them. Competing w i t h this line of approach is the auditor's need to
pose operational questions which can be resolved i n a manner amenable to
" m a k i n g things w o r k . " A s an expedient, the Commission charge could cloak
the operational questions i n a mantle of philosophy, but it has not been done
i n this manner.
Nevertheless, I believe that the Commission charge contains operational
questions that correspond i n part w i t h Steve Harlan's first and last question
points. In order to be quite specific, I suggest that the following portions of the
charge are consistent w i t h real questions of auditor role and auditor-auditee
relationships.
1. W h a t responsibility should an auditor have for detecting fraud?
2. Should auditors monitor all financial information released to the
public and, if so, what should be the extent of their responsibilities?
3. Should the auditor's standard report, particularly the phrase "presents
fairly," be changed to express better the responsibilities of auditors?
In my perception of the social milieu, each of these questions w i l l have to
be answered i n such a manner as to expand the responsibilities presently accepted
by auditors to match the expectations of the social circles that lie beyond man
agement. T h e other worlds w i l l apparently perceive anything less as a recalci
trant and self-serving ploy to avoid professional responsibilities. Society, as we
know it today, expects more not less from independent auditors. Resistance to
this force would be futile and self-defeating.
In a like manner I believe that the Commission charge recognizes two other
of M r . Harlan's real questions: his second and fifth ones concerning auditors'
ability to influence their future role and the structure to control quality and
auditing standards. A s before, the Commission charge is phrased i n operational
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terms rather than the conceptual language used by H a r l a n .
Commission's questions are these:

Specifically, the

1. W h a t mechanisms should be adopted to strengthen the functions
of auditors?
2. Is the mechanism for developing auditing standards adequate?
3. W h a t should the profession do to reduce the risks of misunderstand
i n g about its role?
However, this set of questions does not provide m u c h comfort and succor.
T h e last one contains the seed of self-serving limitation of responsibility. It
smacks of the context of bringing social expectations down to the level of current
auditor acceptability i n order to reduce the incidence of lawsuits. A neutral
expression of the same concern would allow the possibility that auditors would
raise their functions to the level of social expectations, and this possibility is
implicit i n Harlan's phrasing of the issues.
In order to summarize on the art of raising questions at this point, let me
observe first that four of the issues that Steve H a r l a n poses and the questions
charged to the Commission appear to be closer i n spirit than is suggested by h i m .
There still exists the gulf between the meta-conceptual concerns of the other
worlds and the operational concerns of professional auditors, and the issue of
" w h o is the client" is apparently to be neglected by the Commission. If forced
to a choice, I would find more relevance and meaning i n M r . Harlan's presenta
tion because it is more conceptual and more cognizant of the real issues.
A Troublesome Dichotomy
T h e art of auditing is uniquely characterized by investigatory problems of
recognizing economic assertions and obtaining evidence related to them. These
facets are essentially private concerns of the auditor, becoming public concerns
only when an audit report is the center of a dispute (as i n a lawsuit). T h e on
going public facet of auditing lies i n the auditor's duty to match assertions and
evidence to criteria and i n the communication of his findings to users. A t this
latter stage auditing becomes inextricably bound to accountancy and bound to
the public interest.
Although I would personally be relieved of many troublesome problems i f
I, as auditor, could slay the accountancy dragon by declaring the independence
of auditors, nevertheless, I fear that I w o u l d have only toppled a straw man,
and may well have succeeded only i n creating more problems rather than fewer.
Yet this philosophical independence from accountancy appears to be important
to members of the other worlds. T h e manifestation arises i n argumentation over
the phrase "presents fairly" and i n discussions of reports on controls, forecasts,
interim statements and other matters that have largely been given only passing
attention i n official accounting theory.
M r . H a r l a n has fearlessly thrust these accounting questions on the new
A u d i t Commission. Apparently, as a practicing auditor, he does not share m y
academic proclivity to keep accounting and auditing questions neatly separated.
U p o n reflection I confess that I too a m convinced that it is incumbent o n auditors
to identify the users and their information needs, thus identifying the appropriate
content of audit communications. T o undertake such a task would indeed repre30

sent a break with the past and would i n fact be a new approach; it would take
audit practice out of its o w n ivory tower and marry it to the other worlds that
it purports to serve.
One must recognize, however, that acceptance of these real questions (the
third and fourth ones presented by H a r l a n ) could easily lead auditors to many
of the same issues currently being addressed by the S E C . W e need not be
reminded that accountants and auditors are presently resisting many S E C
decisions. Nevertheless, to proceed as M r . H a r l a n suggests might result i n the
identification of classes of users (justifying differential disclosure or multiple
special statements i n place of general financial statements). T h e Commission
might find sufficient demand for attestation to interim statements, forecasts, and
other matters currently favored more heavily by non-auditor worlds. A s a corol
lary issue, the Commission could support the efficacy of quality control organiza
tions that would "audit the auditors." In brief, the new A u d i t Commission
could emerge as a private-enterprise S E C .
Herein lie two possibilities: (1) Rejection of the Commission and resistance
of the same type that characterizes current relations w i t h the S E C , or (2) H a p p y
acceptance of the Commission as the means of recovering responsibilities that
were slipping away into other-world hands. T h e latter alternative would require
action responsive to the meta-conceptual concerns of non-auditors, and i n all
likelihood would transform the world of auditing.
In Closing
A m o n g points that I have thus far neglected is the important matter of
expertise—that which auditors admit to having and that which others presume
they have. I agree that non-auditors may be w i l l i n g to presume that auditors
have greater abilities than the auditors themselves w i l l admit. T h i s incongruence
creates a very real barrier to satisfying the meta-conceptual questions. A "market
i n g " approach may ameliorate the problem, but it must not degenerate into a
defense of the status quo which is so often characterized as "education of the
public." Auditors should be pleased rather than frightened that the other
worlds w i l l grant such recognition of professionalism, and we should begin to
accept the societal recognition lest it melt away.
As a summary, I find an appeal i n Harlan's real questions for the new
A u d i t Commission to accept the k i n d of meta-conceptual questions that other
worlds wish to raise. I find too that the operational questions charged to the
Commission are technical transformations of some of the real concerns, and I
believe that full credit has not been given where it is due. Yet other important
issues remain, and i f they are not raised, I anticipate w i t h H a r l a n that we may
need another Commission i n a few years.

31

3

Controlling Audit Quality:
A Responsibility of the Profession?
Andrew P. Marincovich
A n d r e w P . Marincovich & C o . ; President, National Association
of State Boards of Accountancy
W h e n the chairman asked me to deal with the subject "Controlling A u d i t
Quality: A Responsibility of the Profession" he d i d not indicate the printed
program title w o u l d end w i t h a question mark. It would take a brave m a n to
answer the broad question of responsibility of the profession i n the negative,
but it may be constructive to inquire whether the programs of the profession—
either i n being or under study—are adequate to discharge this responsibility.
T h e subject of controlling audit quality involves three inter-related questions:
" W h e n , " " H o w , " and " B y W h o m . " It seems clear that optimum audit quality
requires control measures at each stage of the game, i.e., i n the educational
preparation, i n the examination and accreditation process, and i n actual pro
fessional practice. T h e questions of " H o w " and " B y W h o m " are more complex,
and we shall attempt to explore some possibilities.
Initial Controls
State laws have established educational requirements for entrance into the
profession—usually a baccalaureate degree with a certain m i n i m u m concentration
in accounting and related subjects.
In a 1970 California study, Professor A l a n R . Cerf made certain comparisons
between the legal profession and the accounting profession i n which he men
tioned the importance of the l a w school and the standard of legal education for
admission to the bar. H e posed the following questions:
T h e C P A has made significant strides i n developing examinations
for admission to the profession. B u t has he given sufficient attention
to the preceding education? Particularly has he related the educational
requirements to the entire functions of the C P A ? 1
In M a y of 1969 the A I C P A council adopted the recommendations of the
Beamer Committee. A m o n g the recommendations of the committee were a five
year program of professional preparation and elimination of the experience
requirement of state boards. T w o years after the report, i n a presentation at
N A S B A ' s annual meeting, M r . Beamer reported that i n eleven states, under
varying conditions and amounts of education, it was possible for a candidate
to receive the C P A certificate without meeting an experience requirement.
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A joint A I C P A - N A S B A Committee on Professional Recognition and Regu
lation concluded i n 1973 that, "the accounting profession can attain full profes
sional stature only through establishment of professional schools. In support
of this position, we point out that other learned professions, w h i c h the accounting
profession often seeks to emulate, have professional schools with close ties to
the practicing portion of the profession." 2
T h e question of academic professional preparation continues to have the
attention of the profession's leaders. Their judgment as to the proper course
to be selected i n the light of realistic future needs w i l l be an important factor
i n fostering high standards of audit quality. T h e National Association of State
Boards of Accountancy ( N A S B A ) can act as a catalyst i n the consideration of
these matters by State boards and can promote a reasonable consistency of ap
proach among jurisdictions.
Critical to the performance of a profession as a whole is the quality of the
personnel who gain entrance to that profession. Education, demonstration of
competence by examination, and character are the basic ingredients for a suc
cessful candidate. It has been suggested that character checks on those entering
the profession may be an important step i n strengthening the standards of the
accounting profession. By w h o m should such checks be made? The State Boards
are the focal point. Their investigation of applicants may not be as searching
as it should be. T h e routine inspection of a few letters of reference hardly
insures the desired standards of integrity, dedication, professionalism, etc. Should
not the inquiry into the character of a candidate be at least as searching as that
given i n connection with a security clearance, a mortgage application, or mem
bership i n a social club? T h i s may be an area where N A S B A can provide a
suggested approach, or possibly assist i n actual screening of candidates as a
service to State Boards.
W e might also inquire whether educational institutions, particularly the
professional schools of the future, should not be more selective i n admitting
students to the study of accounting with a view to entering the profession. One
prominent educator has suggested that such a selection process might be more
effective i n raising standards than mandatory continuing education after entrance
into the profession. Professional schools of law, medicine and the ministry have
long utilized techniques for "weeding out" those deemed to be unfitted for
professional careers by reasons of temperament or character.
Administered by individual state boards, all states and territorial jurisdic
tions, fifty-four i n all, utilize the same national examination and national advisory
grading service provided by the A I C P A . T h i s is a major achievement and
certainly is a unifying force i n the accounting profession. Careful attention is
paid to the preparation and security of examination questions by the A I C P A .
N A S B A has developed and distributed among state boards a procedural manual
for state boards to help guarantee, as m u c h as possible, uniform conditions for
the C P A candidate. N A S B A also collaborates w i t h the A I C P A Board of E x 
aminers i n a continuing evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the
examination.
So much for the initial controls which have some relation to achieving a
satisfactory level of audit quality. H o w can we insure these levels of quality
i n actual professional practice and whose responsibility should it be?
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Subsequent Controls: Mandatory Continuing Education, a Need?
U n t i l recently, once a candidate received his certificate the only requirement
to retain his certificate and license to practice was to pay his annual or biannual
fees.
W i t h i n the past few years, the concept of a structured continuing education
requirement (either mandatory or voluntary) has come to the fore as an i m 
portant means of insuring a higher standard of audit quality. Mandatory con
tinuing education was recommended i n a report of the Beamer Committee of
the A I C P A . T h e recommendation was approved by the Council of the A I C P A .
A t last count twelve states had adopted mandatory continuing education statutes
and regulations and at least fifteen others were i n the process of doing so.
W i t h certain exceptions, all licensees i n continuing education states w i l l be
required to provide evidence to their respective state boards that they have
complied w i t h the regulations. These programs are directed to individual com
petence, however, and do not deal directly w i t h the mechanisms for controlling
audit quality from a firm point of view.
Another Way
Is there another way to approach the problem—namely, some k i n d of
quality review directed to the end-product: the auditor's report (plus the
organizational structure which produces it)?
In the 1960's a Practice Review Program was initiated by the A I C P A for
review of published corporate reports and w i t h subsequent correspondence w i t h
the accountant i f a report was determined to be deficient. State Societies were
encouraged to supplement the A I C P A program. W i l l i a m C . Bruschi, Institute
Vice-President, reported i n a paper at the T h i r d A n n u a l Symposium for A c 
counting Educators that " . . . unfortunately i n many states, the state society
program has languished because of an absence of reports for the committee to
work o n . " D u r i n g eight years of service on the Board of Accountancy i n m y
own state I was not aware of any case where a substandard report was referred
to the Board for disciplinary action by the Practice Review Committee of the
State Society. I hasten to add that it is understood by me that the program was
intended to be educational and not disciplinary; however, particularly i n cases
of flagrant substandard reports, I wonder w h y it should be so limited. H o w
can we get more grist for the mill? In California various state agencies require
filings of financial reports for various reasons such as the Department of Finance
for school district audits, State Controllers Office for municipal reports and the
Department of Health for health care provider reports to name a few. Staff
investigators from the California Board w o u l d routinely review such filings
for deficient reports. Because of lack of personnel i n recent years the volume
of reports reviewed has been limited. T h e agencies themselves occasionally
submit apparent substandard reports to the Board. Should State Boards initiate
a vigorous program for the review of such reports? Except for listed companies,
public agencies and governmental agencies, a vast majority of audited and un
audited financial reports prepared for third party use by C P A s are not potentially
subject to peer review. Should they be? If so, with what agency should they be
filed and by w h o m should they be reviewed? W o u l d legislation be required
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or only an administrative agency ruling? W h a t about the confidentiality of
information where non-public companies are concerned? W o u l d the added
"red tape" and potential lack of confidentiality discourage use of the inde
pendent audit i n the " s m a l l " or "closely h e l d " corporate situation? W o u l d
credibility be enhanced sufficiently to provide encouragement for peer reviews?
These are not easy questions. W e can point out that i n some countries
of the world, financial statements of all businesses must be filed with an ap
propriate agency, thus opening the door for a review of audit quality on a broad
basis—assuming the requisite authority and capability.
A n Independent Audit of the Auditors
T h e "hot question," at the moment, seems to be the independent perfor
mance audit (quality control review) of the auditor. T h i s concept deals with
the firm's controls more than with individual competence. T h e C P A would
be the first to point out that the independent audit of publicly held companies
is a cornerstone of the capital market i n the United States. Should he not be
receptive, therefore, to an audit (quality review) of his o w n firm?
In an address at the annual meeting of the Institute i n 1972 W i l l i a m J.
Casey, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested that
the profession is " . . . very much i n partnership w i t h the S E C . T h i s partner
ship was formed by the congressional decision made almost 40 years ago to
refrain from any effort to establish a Federal corps of auditors to verify corporate
reports but rather to rely on the independent audits made by independent ac
countants." 3 H i s comments may have been prophetic of certain more recent
developments.
T h e Quality Review program of the Institute began i n 1971 on an experi
mental basis and was fully operational in 1973. T h e program came to the
attention of the Chief Accountant of the S E C , John Burton, w h o requested
that a program be developed for reviewing the quality control standards of
firms considered by the S E C to be i n need of such a review. T h e agency has
the necessary authority to perform such reviews but prefers not to do so. T h e
intent of the program w o u l d be to provide the S E C an alternative to or supple
ment to " . . . other types of sanctions which might be imposed under Rule
2(e) as a means of providing assurance to the public and the Commission that
adequate standards have been established and implemented. It is felt that prac
ticing firms w i l l be benefited by such a program with consequent benefits to
the public which the profession serves." 4
H o w w i l l the program w o r k ? T h e A I C P A w i l l designate a panel of quali
fied reviewers. T h e S E C w i l l select a Review Team manager w h o w i l l then
appoint other members of the team from the panel. T h e work of the review
team would be done under Court Order which would provide a cloak of con
fidentiality to the review procedure. Whereas the A I C P A ' s review program for
local and regional firms focuses upon audit procedures and reports, the thrust
of the program developed w i t h agreement of the S E C is upon the reviewed
firm's quality control procedures. A t least two firms are presently scheduled
for review. T h e A I C P A Special Committee on Quality Control i n a report
outlining a tentative program for an inspection of quality control standards
states:
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A n inspection conducted by practicing Professionals under A I C P A
auspices, is preferable to one conducted by persons who may not suf
ficiently understand auditing practice, whether they be members of the
staff of the S E C or other persons selected by the S E C .
It should be pointed out that this type of examination is a new
exercise i n many respects. U n t i l the first examination is conducted, a
pattern of conduct by the examiners and by the S E C is not fully dis
cernible. 5
Professor Cerf i n his 1970 study suggests:
T h e publicity for a profession associated with malpractice suits
tends to damage the public confidence i n the profession. It would take
a great deal of study to determine h o w the C P A s could perform autop
sies on the work of their fellow practitioners. However, this may be a
better solution to maintenance of discipline than revocation of licenses
or expulsion from the professional societies. 6
Except for the voluntary Quality Review program of the Institute which
is just getting under way and has achieved limited coverage, other programs
seem to accentuate the negative (disciplinary aspects of control). T h e Institute
and some state societies are considering an abridged version of the voluntary
program, i.e., a one-man-day review for smaller firms. Unresolved questions
include:
W h o would pay for such reviews?
W o u l d they be coordinated or supervised by State Boards?
W o u l d they be really adequate or only cosmetic?
W o u l d they be educational or would they include sanctions?
It may be helpful to return to M r . Casey's 1972 address to the Institute i n
which he said:
It seems to me that an important profession-wide requirement for
the accounting profession is the establishment of an improved profes
sional quality control system. Membership i n the national professional
organization of accountants should represent more than a license and
paying dues. It should represent more even than agreement to a code
of ethics, as vital and necessary as that is.
It might be that a more formal mandatory self-policing system
should be established so that every professional practice is reviewed
periodically by other professionals. In the self-regulation of the securi
ties industry, a comprehensive annual inspection is called for. T h e
situation is not exactly analogous, and such a comprehensive inspection
may not be necessary on an annual basis i n your work. However, if
your organization is to be a truly responsible self-regulatory body, some
self-policing effort seems called for. 7
Other Steps
In the meantime, other steps must be taken to improve the regulatory
control procedures affecting the profession.
Underscoring this need is a recent Wisconsin court decision which declared
unconstitutional Wisconsin statutes that gave the State Medical Examining
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Board the power to investigate and discipline doctors for unprofessional conduct.
State boards of accountancy may very well be required to get out of the business
of acting as the investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. If, however, state
boards of accountancy are permitted to continue i n those roles, should it be the
responsibility of the profession to develop and present cases of substandard
professional performance to state boards when the educative process fails or has
been shunned? Is such cooperation and assistance to regulatory boards and
commissions a legitimate part of self-regulatory procedures? Is it a national
outgrowth of the Institute's present efforts to integrate its procedures w i t h the
state societies?
Conclusion
It seems clear that the problem of controlling audit quality is so complex
that it w i l l require a cooperative effort on the part of practitioners, professional
organizations, government agencies, and regulatory boards. N o small part of
the problem lies i n the heterogeneous nature of the profession. Measures which
are designed to insure a level of competence i n individual C P A s may have little
effect when related to the quality control "apparatus" of a medium- or largesize firm. Measures which might give comfort as to quality control w i t h i n a
firm might rest on "quick-sand" i f a basic level of competence of individual
licensees is not looked after. It may well be that a multi-pronged approach is
required which would include:
1. A continuing education program for the individual licensee.
2. A n effective investigatory procedure, possibly the peer review, as a
prophylaxis for the "cause celebres," the flagrant cases.
3. A n availability of talent which can be programmed for voluntary
reviews under the auspices of professional organizations.
4. A testing program by State Boards, under statutory authority, of
the quality control apparatus of firms.
It is encouraging to note that these questions and others are being actively
considered i n a number of forums. T h e C P A must have high standards and
the public must have confidence that he is what he says he is. W a l l y Olson
suggests:
It is crucial to our credibility that we carry on a vigorous program
of self-discipline. Such a program must not only be effective but must
be perceived to be effective by the public at large. 8
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Discussant's Response to
Controlling Audit Quality:
A Responsibility of the Profession?
Gordon L. Murray
Haskins & Sells
W h i l e I have done a lot of speaking over the years, I have never participated
in a meeting w i t h this particular format. I assume that m y comments are to be
directed toward stimulating discussion during the period that w i l l follow. In
the interest of stimulating such discussion and to preserve my o w n integrity, my
comments on this question w i l l be strictly as I see it.
I have studied A n d y Marincovich's paper and it appears to me that the
following points emerge:
• T h e title is "Controlling A u d i t Quality: A Responsibiltiy of the Pro
fession?" w i t h a question mark. T o me the question mark is the most significant
item i n that tide.
• Andy's paper says " . . . it may be constructive to inquire whether the
programs of the profession—either i n being or under study—are adequate to
discharge this responsibility." T h i s statement appears to assume that the answer
to the question is that controlling audit quality is a responsibility of the pro
fession. Is that really so?
• Reference is made to the Beamer Committee on the matter of continuing
education requirement. W h i l e M r . Beamer was a partner of mine before his
retirement, it does not necessarily follow that I agree with h i m on continuing
education. However, I also don't presume to be an expert i n this particular area.
Therefore, I w i l l dispose of the continuing education matter by simply saying
that what I have seen adopted so far is a very feeble, and perhaps unnecessary
effort. I also have a bias that formal education for a practitioner has very definite
limitations and that essentially a person's continuing education is what he does
i n connection w i t h researching to find solutions to particular problems occurring
in day-to-day practice. T o show h o w far I a m probably away from current
thinking on this subject, m y o w n firm now has a continuing education program
that is required for all persons through the age of 50. T h e best part of this
program, to me, is that I a m now 56 and therefore I a m not going to be involved.
• T h e paper suggests that " . . . character checks on those entering the
profession may be an important step i n strengthening the standards of the
accounting profession." M y o w n experience has included w o r k for two B i g 8
accounting firms, three industrial firms as the chief financial officer, and a major
firm of management consultants, a l l of which have involved extensive executive
recruiting activities. I can only say that I believe there are very real limitations
to what can be accomplished through any attempt to conduct "checks of char39

acter." In one instance a person that I was evaluating had a l l of the evident
credentials for a particular position but subsequently turned out to be homosexual.
N o one is going to tell you i n a character check that a person has that problem,
nor is anyone going to tell you that a person is an alcoholic. Therefore, I con
clude, based upon experience, that there are important limitations i n any effort
to elicit character representations.
• A n d y refers to the Practice Review Program as "another way." T o me,
practice review, however conducted, is not necessarily "another w a y " of getting
at the quality problem, as this and other possible programs are not mutually
exclusive or inclusive. Rather, one must consider the whole matter.
• I n speaking of an independent audit of the auditors, the paper cites
M r . Casey, the former Chairman of the S E C , as suggesting that the profession
is very much i n partnership w i t h the S E C . T h i s poses a vital question of to
what extent the profession wishes to become part of the enforcement machinery
of the S E C and therefore a quasi-arm of the Government, as contrasted with
the independent practice of public accountancy. This, I suggest, is a very vital
matter for everyone i n the profession to assess although some already say that
we have been functioning i n an enforcement role as an agent of the Government
for some many years.
T o all of these suggestions that the profession has the responsibility for the
enforcement of performance—for continuing education—for some more stringent
entrance requirement to the profession—it is very easy to respond with a "yes"
answer. It is at first blush obvious that no responsible person within the pro
fession could be against such actions. However, when one introspectively ex
amines what is involved i n accomplishing such objectives, one might well be
concerned with the realities involved.
Reviews of Quality Performance
I have already commented to the extent I wish on the matters of continuing
education and character checks and would n o w like to turn to the area I know
most about—that of reviews of the quality of performance of accounting firms,
however structured.
For some years the A I C P A has had a committee to conduct quality control
reviews of accounting firms. T h i s has been generally directed toward providing
smaller practitioners with an opportunity to have their procedures and practice
reviewed by others i n the profession. However, this program has been quite
limited—consisting of a review of only 2 or 3 days, of selected engagements, and
conducted on a voluntary basis.
It was not until the S E C proposed that quality control reviews of major
firms be required as a consequence of proceedings under Rule 2(e) of the rules
of practice of the S E C that this matter really heated u p . Subsequent to the con
siderations of the A I C P A to assess h o w the profession might accommodate the
wishes of the S E C , a program was developed for the A I C P A to structure a
voluntary quality review program which would be extended to multi-office firms.
A s you know, I have been chairman of the committee to consider the SEC's
request for accommodation with respect to reviews required under Rule 2 ( e ) .
T h e charge to our committee was to consider the SEC's request and to negotiate
the best accommodation that could be achieved so that the Board of Directors
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could reach a conclusion as to whether the A I C P A would participate i n the
SEC's program or not. T h e result of our committee effort was the "Tentative
Program for an Inspection of the Quality Control Standards and Procedures of
an Accounting F i r m Pursuant to 2(e) of the S E C Rules of Practice." T h i s
program outlines the ground rules for conducting such an examination and was
adopted by the Board of Directors w i t h the understanding that the A I C P A
would participate i n the examination of the first firm so charged under rule
2(e) and would also cooperate i n what we call the "front e n d " of the next
two or three firms to be so charged.
Essentially, the proposed program provides that the A I C P A assemble a
panel of persons from firms engaged i n S E C practice; the S E C w i l l select a
chairman of a review team; the chairman w i l l assemble, from the list, a team
of reviewers; the reviewers w i l l assess the quality standards and practices of the
defendant firm; and subsequently—some 15 months later—will conduct a review
to determine that firm's compliance. T h i s is a very abbreviated statement of the
plan.
T h i s program is i n the process of application at the moment w i t h respect
to Laventhol Krekstein H o r w a t h & H o r w a t h and is also to be applied to Touche
Ross & C o . I also understand that two other members of the B i g 8 are i n the
process of negotiating a similar deal. O f course, you realize that this program
was proposed by the S E C as an alternative to a suspension from practice before
the S E C which could be disastrous for any firm i f the suspension was for any
significant period of time. I should say that throughout a l l our deliberations,
our committee never had any reason to question the sincerity of S E C staff motives
i n advocating this program.
Our committee "backed i n t o " a recommendation that the A I C P A should
accommodate the S E C i n the first of such reviews, recognizing the onerous
alternatives, and also recognizing that a major firm had already made a com
mitment to accept this treatment.
Legal and Other Problems
N o w you should realize that there are very many difficult, unique legal
questions involved i n this type of exercise. I don't intend to attempt to identify
or discuss a l l these legal questions except to point out that they involve matters
of confidentiality, matters of discovery i n litigation involving any of the clients
of a given firm, the legal position of those serving as quality control reviewers,
the legal problems of the A I C P A , etc. T h e S E C staff has been largely disinter
ested i n our legal problems associated w i t h the program, and has expressed the
attitude that we should forget our legal problems and get o n w i t h the job. I n
our committe's final report to the Board of Directors i n January 1974, we ex
pressed a number of serious reservations regarding this program. A m o n g these
reservations were:
• T h e S E C provides, i n the L K H & H case, that a quality control review
is to be conducted by persons selected from a panel put up by the A I C P A , or
by accountants selected by the S E C from the total population of accountants, or
by the staff of the S E C . O u r committee concluded that a peer review by persons
practicing i n the accounting profession and selected by the A I C P A was by far
the preferable approach.
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The S E C provides that a quality assurance review may result from:

— A Court Order and Consent Decree as provided i n the L K H & H
case,
— B y a negotiated settlement of a 2(e) proceeding w i t h a given
firm without benefit of a court order and consent decree, which is the
Touche Ross situation, or
—Simply by the S E C advising a given firm that while they do not
intend at the moment to initiate a 2(e) proceeding, their view of the
quality of performance of that firm would suggest that they volun
tarily submit themselves to such a review.
Y o u should recognize that the legal problems involved i n these three types
of reviews are most significant and any review without the benefit of participa
tion of the Court leaves the reviewed firm and other parties i n a significantly
vulnerable legal situation.
• O u r committee was quite concerned with the fact that the profession
has never established generally accepted quality control standards of practice.
T h i s is a most complex subject considering the differences i n type and size of
practice among accounting firms and makes it quite difficult to establish uni
versally applicable generalizations. T h e A u d i t i n g Standards Executive C o m 
mittee of the Institute has this item on their agenda, but based upon past experi
ence with Institute projects I would not expect to see any final product very
soon. In the L K H & H case the consent decree includes by reference a statement
of the quality control organization, procedures, and methods that they agree to
apply. I must say that I have read this document and it prescribes about all the
apparatus anyone could visualize. T h e tentative program negotiated by our
committee w i t h the S E C prescribes that i n the future cases the review team w i l l
inspect the firm coincident w i t h the 2(e) action to develop the prescribed
quality practices applicable i n that firm's situation and then return some 15
months later to inspect for compliance. W e had considerable concern w i t h the
S E C prescribing quality control procedures from the standpoint that each suc
cessive case could add layer on layer of quality control procedures that could
constitute a body of precedent that could prove to be unreasonable and could
be applied against any given firm i n a matter of litigation. W e suggested that
qualified practitioners are the ones that should prescribe quality control practices
and remedies.
• O u r committee had a fundamental concern whether the proposed pro
gram would i n fact accomplish the objective of improving the quality control
performance of a given firm. W e concluded that i n the first instance, quality
of performance depends on a firm establishing a conscientious policy of high
standards—a professional rather than a commercial attitude toward its practice.
In the last analysis, quality of performance is attributable to the competence of
a staff accountant and his supervision i n performing all aspects of an audit and
whether such competence, if it existed, was conscientiously applied. Therefore
a program such as that proposed, consisting of a post-review of w o r k i n g papers,
reports, etc., has inherent limitations i n assessing the fundamentals of a firm's
quality of performance.

42

Problems and Limitations of Review Programs
W h a t I am trying to convey is the feeling of our committee that a postreview of performance may be more of a facade than an exercise of substance.
In fact, during our committee's deliberations we adopted the code name "chicken
soup." ( F o r those of you w h o have not come from Brooklyn, chicken soup
refers to a Jewish mother's practice of preparing chicken soup whenever a
member of the family is ill—not because chicken soup is going to do any good,
but at least she is doing something, and it is not going to do the patient any
harm.)
Many aspects of the audit process are essentially predictive and therefore
judgmental i n nature. O u r committee concluded that an analysis of the causes
of audit or reporting failure would disclose that such failures are generally a
matter of the judgments applied during the process rather than procedural
matters, and a quality control program per se would have limited effect i n curing
the causes of poor results.
W e concluded that good control procedures do not necessarily insure good
audits and good auditors may function effectively i n an environment with poor
quality controls.
The Committee's Views on Quality Control Review
W e were quite positive i n our contention that a quality control review of
selected audits i n a given organization should be to establish whether there is
confidence that the firm is applying the procedures it agreed to apply, rather
than to second-guess the actions of the reviewed firm i n a given instance; also,
the environment of the review is one where the applicable rules and standards
are i n a constant state of flux. I n other words, we were not disposed to offer
the S E C a service wherein the reviewers would be expected to second-guess
audit results and report them to the S E C .
D u r i n g the early discussion w i t h the S E C our committee proposed that a
more regular procedure for quality control reviews would be for the S E C to
select a firm of C P A s to review the practices of the defendant firm on the basis
of a regular professional engagement between firms for that purpose. O u r com
mittee continues to believe that the firm-to-firm approach has distinct advantages
i n providing a professional level relationship wherein reviewers would have
access to the resources of their firm as i n any other engagement; participants
would function under the usual protection of their firms regarding legal liability
and other matters; and the organizational and administrative problems associated
with such an exercise would be minimized. F i r m s have greater strength as
professional performers than do individual practitioners. Separating reviewers
from their firms for purposes of these special reviews, weakens rather than
strengthens the effort. However, the firm-to-firm approach was not acceptable
to the S E C and I suspect that attitude reflected a desire to strengthen their public
relations posture.
A s a practical matter, the use of a panel of practitioners from various firms
put up by the A I C P A represents an inherent problem wherein, i n due course,
panel members w i l l come from firms that have previously been subject to quality
reviews. I believe it is realistic to recognize that i n today's environment all of
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the major firms with a substantive S E C practice w i l l i n due course get " h i t "
with a quality control review.
W e recognize that today every relationship i n our society is suspect of a
conflict of interest. However, we would like to think that not everyone's motives
are so suspect that the more normal and professional approach of a firm-to-firm
review should not be acceptable.
There was considerable discussion w i t h the S E C concerning the responsibili
ties of the reviewers, should they encounter what appeared to be errors i n a
particular engagement inspected during the course of a review. W e proposed
that the reviewer's responsibility would be to report such apparent errors to the
firm under review and that they should have the responsibility to assess their
course of action regarding disclosure to the S E C as they would i n the event
they themselves discovered an error. T h i s approach was not acceptable to the
S E C and the tentative program provides that such errors, should they be material
with respect to adequate disclosure to the investigating public, must be reported
to the S E C by the reviewers. This is but one aspect of the larger problem of
whether the A I C P A quality review program is to become a part of the S E C
enforcement apparatus or not.
There was also discussion and negotiation about whether the reviewers
would be asked to select and pursue engagements of a firm that were of particu
lar interest to the S E C . W e hope that our understanding is that the review of
any particular engagement is a matter of selection by the reviewers and their
purpose is to review the engagement to assess the application of a firm's quality
control procedures rather than to second-guess the appropriateness of the ac
counting and reporting resulting from a given audit.
Confidentiality and Legal Problems
O u r early discussions w i t h the S E C and w i t h A I C P A legal counsel were
concerned w i t h matters of confidentiality and the legal position of the various
parties involved. A s the discussions progressed, the legal protections applicable
i n this program became more and more vague and less and less protective—
but then we are i n an unexplored area, so I can understand why the legal
questions are so much i n doubt. Y o u can be sure that once this type of inspec
tion process is initiated a standard question i n any legal action involving C P A
firms w i l l be whether a given firm has been subject to a quality review and there
w i l l be an attempt to disclose the reviewers' report and their w o r k i n g papers
even though the particular case at hand involves a particular client rather than
the overall practices of a firm. T h e S E C has said that the w o r k i n g papers and
reports resulting from a quality review can never be destroyed without their
permission and that they would be disposed to disclose this material to any
litigant who has, i n their judgment, a legitimate interest i n the performance
of the firm. T h i s has got to be a new adventure, which added to all of the legal
action currently going on involving accounting firms must cause some of us to
pause. O u r committee believes that this quality control exercise could certainly
not be expected to lessen the legal actions against accountants but only add grist
to the m i l l . In my view, the severe penalties associated w i t h any firm's failure
to perform effectively are already so onerous that no additional motivations are
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required to encourage firms of accountants to give priority attention to the
quality of their performance.
Conclusion
So this is where we stand at the moment. T h e Board of Directors has
authorized the A I C P A to put up a panel of reviewers to conduct the first review
of L K H & H and to do the front end of the next 2 or 3 cases. A panel has been
established, and one of my partners has been selected as the chairman of the
first review team. W h a t the motivation for this selection was, I do not know,
but I would like to think that my partner was selected because our firm is not
now high on the list of those to be reviewed. In any event, the first review w i l l
be conducted, and the Board of Directors has reserved the right to reassess this
whole exercise i n the light of the experience gained on the Laventhol matter.
I should also add that our committee was asked to consider the formulation
of a voluntary review program of multi-office firms sponsored by the A I C P A .
For many of the reasons already noted, our committee rejected this proposal outof-hand. Subsequently, a new committee was appointed under the chairmanship
of T o m Holton of Peat, M a r w i c k , Mitchell & Co., which has n o w developed a
voluntary program which is under consideration by the Board of Directors.
Whether or not such a voluntary program w i l l fly remains to be seen. I really
don't know h o w much "chicken soup" the Institute should be brewing on the
quality control matter, but if anyone thinks that a voluntary program established
by the A I C P A is going to blunt the thrust of the SEC's interest i n demonstrating
that they are performing the regulatory role, I believe they are "whistling D i x i e . "
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Relationship of Auditing Standards
To Detection of Fraud
George R. Catlett
A r t h u r Andersen & C o .
The accounting profession is facing a wide diversity of difficult challenges.
One of the current problems facing C P A s i n public practice is how to achieve a
proper understanding on the part of the public and others of 1) the relation
ship of auditing standards to the detection of fraud, and 2) the responsibilities
of auditors for the detection of fraud.
Nature of F r a u d
Dishonesty and deceit have always been present to some degree not only
i n the business community but i n all walks of life. However, fraud i n business
enterprises has been increasing i n recent years. W h i l e most managements and
employees are honest, there are enough material cases of dishonesty to cause
concern among independent auditors.
Fifteen years ago, most accounting firms had only an occasional fraud case,
and many of those were not of any great significance. Today, w i t h fraud cases
becoming more common, and w i t h investigations by governmental agencies and
resulting litigation exploding i n all directions, this disturbing trend is becoming
a major factor i n the operation of accounting firms. Some of the reasons for
this situation are interesting, but time limitations do not permit us to discuss
that topic.
W h a t constitutes fraud is not always clear. In cases of bankruptcies and
failures, fraud is sometimes alleged when what really may have occurred was
bad management decisions and/or adverse business conditions, with a resulting
loss of money by investors and creditors. T h e tendency to allege " f r a u d " under
these circumstances frequently seems to be irresistible. In any event, what is
referred to as " f r a u d " i n some cases may not actually be " f r a u d . "
Legal liability of independent auditors for alleged negligence and other
deficiencies i n their work has many ramifications. M r . A . A . Sommer, Jr., now
a Commissioner of the S E C , discussed this area at the Symposium here i n 1972.
The number of court cases involving the question of whether and under what
circumstances an auditor may have legal liability is still somewhat limited; but
more such cases w i l l probably go to trial i n the next few years, and the guide
lines may become clearer than they are at the present time.
M a n y different kinds and magnitudes of fraud exist, w i t h some not affecting
the financial statements at all or only i n a minor way, while others have a
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material effect on the financial statements.
of fraud are:

Some examples of the various types

1. Misappropriation of assets.
2. Overstatement of assets or understatement of liabilities to present
more favorable financial position and/or results of operations.
3. Siphoning off of assets through transactions w i t h affiliated entities
or i n other ways.
4. " K i c k b a c k s " and other irregular transactions between officers or
employees of an enterprise and outside parties.
5. L a c k of disclosure of significant information.
Fraud i n a business entity may be covered up i n many ways, but major
cases usually include collusion among officers and/or employees, or collusion
w i t h outside persons. T h e cover-up may involve false accounting entries or mis
leading information, forgeries, unrecorded transactions, or other such means.
Responsibilities of Management
Management has the primary responsiblity for the use and safeguarding
of corporate assets and the incurrence of liabilities of the business enterprise on
behalf of the stockholders. A n additional responsibility runs to creditors and
other parties and agencies w i t h a legitimate interest i n the enterprise.
T h e responsibilities of the board of directors i n monitoring the management
are becoming of increasing concern to many directors, particularly the outside
directors. Even though the directors, as representatives of the stockholders,
review or approve management actions i n various ways, the responsibilities of
directors for various kinds of management fraud are still somewhat undefined
from a legal standpoint.
One of the important functions of management is the establishment of an
adequate accounting system along w i t h appropriate administrative and internal
accounting controls and the necessary internal auditing. T h e resulting financial
statements are the direct representations of management, setting forth the finan
cial position and results of operations of the enterprise along with the necessary
disclosures for interpretation of the financial statements.
Primary reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed
on an adequate system of internal control because such a system is i n constant
operation and covers a great many periods and transactions when the inde
pendent auditor is not present. It is not feasible for the auditor to check these
transactions later i n any detail. Management should realize that a good system
of internal control can be circumvented by collusion among employees or by
collusion between one or more employees and persons outside the enterprise.
This possibility must be considered by management, and internal auditing is an
additional safeguard.
W h e n collusion to circumvent the accounting system is directed by man
agement, an additional and complicating dimension is added to the problem
of deciding when and h o w an auditor might detect fraud, assuming that gen
erally accepted auditing standards have been followed.
Managements involved i n some fraud cases have been held legally responsi
ble from a civil and/or criminal standpoint. However, the number of cases is
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disturbing i n which the independent auditor appears to be the main "target" i n
governmental investigations and class action suits rather than the individuals
who perpetrated the fraud.
Present Auditing Standards
W h a t effect, i f any, should recent fraud cases and the resulting governmental
investigations and litigation have o n auditing standards? A r e the present stand
ards satisfactory? Have w e learned as m u c h as we should have from our
experiences? Have the fraud situations gone undetected by auditors because of
ineffective work or inadequate auditing standards; or has the cause been
fraudulent concealment by management or other actions not detectable by nor
mally appropriate auditing procedures? T h e answers to these and many other
related questions are not self-evident.
The auditor should constantly exercise his professional judgment i n deciding
whether it is reasonable to assume that he has a l l the pertinent facts and what
auditing standards and procedures are necessary i n attempting to obtain the
facts. A u d i t i n g cannot be done entirely by rules and forms.
T h e greater use of electronic computers and a l l sorts of sophisticated equip
ment for accounting and related purposes also represents new challenges i n
developing audit techniques. Some of the basic concepts of auditing may be
changed. However, the standards of auditing should not be thwarted by
equipment. People, not machines, commit fraud.
T h e A I C P A has a special committee reviewing the E q u i t y F u n d i n g case
to determine whether i n the light of that case consideration should be given by
the A I C P A to possible changes i n any auditing standards and procedures. T h e
report of that committee has not been issued.
T h e most authoritative statement by the A I C P A of the independent audi
tor's responsibility for the detection of fraud is set forth i n Statement on A u d i t i n g
Standards N o . 1 (paragraphs 110.05-110.08), and this is quoted i n Appendix A .
Chapter 6, " D u e A u d i t Care," from The Philosophy of Auditing by M a u t z
and Sharaf, contains this statement: "Independent auditors should accept re
sponsibility for the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities which the
exercise of due audit care by a prudent practitioner w o u l d normally uncover."
A summary of some of the views expressed i n that chapter is quoted i n A p 
pendix B .
The membership of the A I C P A adopted ten standards that are referred to
as "generally accepted auditing standards," and these are classified as general
standards, standards of field work, and standards of reporting. These standards
contain such requirements as technical training and proficiency, independence,
due professional care, adequate planning, proper study and evaluation of internal
control, and sufficient competent evidential matter. Careful distinction should
be drawn between these "auditing standards" and the "auditing procedures" to
be selected and executed i n accordance with the standards.
A l l of the items referred to above are well written and pertinent to the
subject under discussion. W h e n we relate what is said i n those documents to
the situation i n which the accounting profession finds itself today, it is evident
that controversial questions and misunderstandings exist.
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Internal Control
Internal control, for many reasons, has become an increasingly important
factor i n the conduct of audits. T h e A I C P A second standard of field work
states: "There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted."
The evolution i n auditing over many years i n the direction of greater reliance
on internal controls and the use of test-checking i n reviewing those controls is
not just a theoretical or philosophical development. T h i s trend is the result of
practical necessity. W i t h the large business enterprises that n o w exist, detailed
auditing to any significant extent is not economically feasible.
W h e n there are millions of transactions i n a single enterprise i n a year, an
auditor must rely on test-checks for much of his work. Therefore, the effective
ness of the accounting system and internal controls and the integrity of manage
ment are crucial to the auditor.
Most of the significant fraud cases publicized i n the financial press are the
result of a breakdown i n internal control as a result of management direction,
collusion of officers and/or employees, deterioration of internal control from
neglect, or a combination of these and similar factors.
T h e auditor's evaluation of internal control is an important phase of an
audit engagement. Management has a responsibility to its shareholders to see
that adequate internal control exists. A n absence of adequate control raises a
serious question; one to which professional judgment must be applied as to
whether the auditor can compensate by expanding the scope of his w o r k or
should withdraw from the engagement.
Representations by Clients
Representations by management and employees take many forms i n the
conduct of an audit. If an auditor is precluded from relying on such representa
tions and should be required to assume that all of them are wrong until he can
prove them correct, an audit w o u l d have to be viewed from a vastly different
perspective. A n auditor certainly does not accept all information and data
given to h i m by a client without question. O n the other hand, when an auditor
is given misinformation or information is withheld without his knowledge,
there are limits to the steps he should be expected to take to find something he
does not know exists. If each audit is to be approached w i t h the viewpoint that
the client is dishonest until proven otherwise, not only would an entirely new
approach be needed but also the auditor may well be placed i n an untenable
position.
T h e credibility and integrity of management are an important factor for
an auditor to assess i n the conduct of his work. If the auditor finds that a man
agement does not have sufficient integrity to rely on its representations, he is
running a serious risk that frequently cannot adequately be dealt with by a n
extension or expansion of the audit procedures. O n the other hand, an auditor
may assume that integrity exists and then find to his dismay that his trust and
confidence i n this regard were misplaced.
Auditors do have responsibilities i n the conduct of an audit, but these
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responsibilities do not include infallibility or clairvoyance. Management should
be held responsible for misrepresentations and withholding of material matters
from the auditor. A n auditor should not be held responsible when he follows
customary auditing procedures, those procedures do not disclose the deception,
and no apparent reason exists to expand the customary audit procedures.
What are Some of the Pertinent Questions?
A few pertinent questions regarding auditing standards and procedures
as they relate to the detection of fraud are set forth below i n order to serve as a
basis for discussion.
The first question is: Should an unqualified auditor's opinion be construed
to constitute a representation that there is no undetected fraud having a material
effect on the financial statements?
A second and somewhat related question is: Should an auditor be held to
be a "guarantor" of the financial statements or of the fairness with which they
are presented insofar as fraud is concerned? Put another way, should the auditor
be held to have a joint responsibility w i t h the management for the financial
statements i n this regard?
The third question is: C a n fraud become so extensive or massive that the
answers to the first two questions are different?
A fourth question, especially i f the first two are answered affirmatively, is:
Are any basic changes needed i n current auditing standards and procedures?
A fifth question is: Should auditors rate clients as to quality and take only
the better ones? If so, what are the criteria for this purpose?
A further question is: Should legislation be passed establishing greater
responsibility on the part of everyone not to intentially mislead auditors?
I w i l l not try as a part of my formal remarks to answer these questions i n
detail, but I w i l l make a few comments on them.
Hindsight is a wonderful faculty. There is no area i n which hindsight is
more readily applied than to undetected fraud after such fraud is later discovered.
It inevitably seems to appear obvious that the fraud should have been detected.
The circumstances at the time are most difficult to recreate and comprehend, and
little effort is really made to do so. Second-guessing becomes prevalent, and
the less experience or knowledge one has about auditing, the more certain one
becomes of the righteousness of his condemnation. Subsequently judging the
effectiveness of a professional person i n doing his w o r k under the stress and
strain and actual conditions at the time should not be taken lightly.
Auditors should not be presumed to have represented or guaranteed that
no undetected fraud exists or to have guaranteed that the financial statements
are a fair presentation of the financial position and results of operations. Those
who suggest that the auditor has a joint, and presumably equal, responsibility
with management for the financial statements do not i n my view understand
the relative roles of management and the auditor. There is no more justification
for an auditor to be a guarantor than there would be for a lawyer to guarantee
that he w i l l w i n a lawsuit or a doctor to guarantee that an operation w i l l be
successful. A lawyer does not have a joint responsibility for a client's morals,
and a doctor does not have a joint responsibility for a patient's health habits.
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Insofar as the extent or massiveness of a fraud is concerned, about all to be
said about this is that the larger the fraud the more likely it is to be detected
by the auditor i n following proper audit procedures. However, counter forces
to detection may be the extent of the collusion inside and outside of the enter
prise, the existence of expert forgery, or other sophisticated deterrents to detection.
Generally accepted auditing standards and procedures should be constantly
reevaluated i n the light of improved knowledge and current developments. T h i s
should be done by the accounting profession and by accounting firms. A s an
example, some of our past ideas i n this regard may be changed by computers.
Some improvements can undoubtedly be made i n auditing techniques and pro
cedures, but I see no particular evidence that any revolutionary change is needed
in the standards.
O u r free-enterprise system w i l l be hampered and the tradition of opportunity
for all w i l l be affected, i f the accounting firms decide only to perform audit
services for "safe" clients. A relatively new enterprise w i t h a first-time registra
tion statement is frequently of greater risk for an auditor than an established
business. T h e new enterprise is more likely to result i n failure or disillusioned
investors. However, the public interest may not best be served if auditors are
forced to avoid such risks. T h e auditor should be able to perform a professional
service for these entitles i n a proper manner without being subjected to the
threat of a lawsuit whenever one of them fails.
As to whether legislation is desirable w i t h respect to putting greater penalties
on misleading the duly appointed auditors of a company, many factors are
involved. I would not advocate such legislation at this time, but something
needs to be done to protect the auditor, who all too frequently is left "holding
the bag" as a result of management misconduct.
Auditors are well aware that fraud can occur. They are also concerned
about the possibility of fraud being so material as to have a significant effect
on the financial statements upon which they are reporting. O n the other hand,
the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming
responsibilities or accepting a role that cannot be successfully fulfilled.
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Appendix A
Extract from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1973)
110

Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent A u d i t o r

Detection of F r a u d
.05
In m a k i n g the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware
of the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresenta
tion by management, or both. T h e auditor recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently
material, may affect his opinion on the financial statements, and his examina
tion, made i n accordance w i t h generally accepted auditing standards, gives con
sideration to this possibility. However, the ordinary examination directed to the
expression of an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically
designed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar
irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the
discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is usually more closely
associated w i t h the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. T h e responsibility of the inde
pendent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to
clients and others) arises only when such failure clearly results from failure to
comply with generally accepted auditing standards.
.06
Reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed
principally upon an adequate accounting system with appropriate internal con
trol. T h e well-established practice of the independent auditor of evaluating the
adequacy and effectiveness of the system of internal control by testing the
accounting records and related data and by relying on such evaluation for the
selection and t i m i n g of his other auditing procedures has generally proved
sufficient for making an adequate examination. If an objective of an independent
auditor's examination were the discovery of all fraud, he would have to extend
his work to a point where its cost would be prohibitive. E v e n then he could
not give assurance that all types of fraud had been detected, or that none existed,
because items such as unrecorded transactions, forgeries, and collusive fraud
would not necessarily be uncovered. Acordingly, it is generally recognized that
good internal control and fidelity bonds provide protection more economically
and effectively. In the case of fidelity bonds, protection is afforded not only by
the indemnification for discovered defalcations but also by the possible deterrent
effect upon employees; the presence of fidelity bonds, however, should not affect
the scope of the auditor's examination.
.07
W h e n an independent auditor's examination leading to an opinion on
financial statements discloses specific circumstances that make h i m suspect that
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fraud may exist, he should decide whether the fraud, if i n fact it should exist,
might be of such magnitude as to affect his opinion on the financial statements.
If the independent auditor believes that fraud so material as to affect his opinion
may have occurred, he should reach an understanding w i t h the proper repre
sentatives of the client as to whether the auditor or the client, subject to the
auditor's review, is to make the investigation necessary to determine whether
fraud has i n fact occurred, and, i f so, the amount thereof. If, on the other hand,
the independent auditor concludes that any such fraud could not be so material
as to affect his opinion, he should refer the matter to the proper representatives
of the client w i t h the recommendation that it be pursued to a conclusion. F o r
example, frauds involving " l a p p i n g " accounts receivable collections, or frauds
involving overstatements of inventory, could be material, while those involving
peculations from a small imprest fund w o u l d normally be of little significance
because the operation and size of the fund tend to establish a limitation.
.08
The subsequent discovery that fraud existed during the period covered
by the independent auditor's examination does not of itself indicate negligence
on his part. H e is not an insurer or guarantor; i f his examination was made w i t h
due professional skill and care i n accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, he has fulfilled all of the obligations implicit i n his undertaking.
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Appendix B
Extract from R . K . Mautz and Hussein A . Sharaf,
The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association, 1961
Chapter 6—Due Audit Care, pp. 139-140
Summary. I n this chapter we have tried to establish a concept of due audit
care as the basis for judging the responsibility of independent auditors i n the
performance of their professional duties. T h i s concept is based on an assumed
prudent practitioner and the knowledge, skill, caution, and responsiveness that
could be expected from h i m under the circumstances at issue. T h e usefulness
of such a concept seems clear. If i t can be developed, it w i l l give to all concerned
with the subject a more explicit statement than is now available i n the literature.
The difficulty of formulating such a concept is closely related to the problem
of irregularity detection. There are some irregularities which should be discovered
in any standard examination; the obligation of discovering certain other irregu
larities would be so onerous a burden as to be unbearable. Between these ex
tremes are perhaps innumerable cases varying from one extreme to the other.
W e are unable to find i n the characteristics of irregularities themselves any
significant clues which permit a precise statement of audit responsibility for
detection. T h i s leads us naturally and inevitably to consideration of the legal
doctrine of a prudent man and its application to auditing.
It must be recognized that a concept of due audit care, founded on the
legal concept of a prudent m a n acting reasonably w i t h average knowledge and
average judgment i n the specific circumstances, cannot give us objective advance
answers to the question of responsibility i n any given case. W e feel it does give
a useful criterion to the auditor himself and to those who must judge the quality
of his work, a criterion which w i l l increase i n usefulness as experience sharpens
and strengthens the concept itself.
W e also believe that a statement indicating the extent of responsibility
accepted can be formulated i n a manner that w i l l make its usefulness apparent,
both to practitioners i n their daily affairs and to the profession as an indication
of acceptance of its just and fair responsibilities. L i k e development of the concept
of due audit care, this may take some time, but it is a worthy endeavor and w i l l
repay the effort. A s a beginning, we suggest the following summary. It w i l l be
apparent to the careful reader that its component ideas have been borrowed from
a variety of sources.
Independent auditors should accept responsibility for the discovery and
disclosure of those irregularities which the exercise of due audit care by a
prudent practitioner would normally uncover. A prudent practitioner is assumed
to have a knowledge of the philosophy and practice of auditing, to have the
degree of training, experience, and skill common to the average independent
auditor, to have the ability to recognize indications or irregularities, and to keep
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abreast of developments i n the perpetration and detection of irregularities. Due
audit care requires the auditor to acquaint himself w i t h the company under
examination, its method of operation and any significant practices peculiar to it
or the industry of which it is a part, to review the method of internal control
operating i n the company under examination by inquiry and such other methods
as are desirable, to obtain any knowledge readily available w h i c h is pertinent
to the accounting and financial problems of the company under examination,
to be responsive to unusual events and unfamiliar circumstances, to persist until
he has eliminated from his o w n m i n d any reasonable doubts he may have about
the existence of material irregularities, and to exercise caution i n instructing his
assistants and reviewing their w o r k .
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Discussant's Response to
Relationship of Auditing Standards
To Detection of Fraud
John J. Willingham
University of Houston
I believe it fair to begin by summarizing George Catlett's paper as an
affirmation of the conventional wisdom of the accounting profession. Adherence
to the standards of a profession must always be seen by responsible citizens as
admirable, and therefore criticism is difficult. I n this regard, I w i l l not present
esoteric criticism that sometimes characterizes the remarks of teachers i n situa
tions such as this, nor w i l l I dwell at length o n selected statements i n the paper.
However, i f you w i l l indulge me, I wish to respond to one statement because
it sets a tone for the paper and for the conventional wisdom of the profession
which I would like to see changed. Under the heading "Representations by
Clients," the following statement can be found: "[Auditors'] . . . responsibili
ties do not include infallibility or clairvoyance."
"Responsibilities" of CPAs
In this statement, as well as in many other parts of the paper, either ex
plicitly or implicitly, Catlett suggests that the detection of fraud could become
a "responsibility" and an onerous one at that. Presently it is reasonably clear,
at least to accounting practitioners and students, that detection of fraud is not
an objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements. However, should
this objective be undertaken by C P A s , i t would not necessarily constitute a new
"responsibility." Should such an objective be assumed, it seems likely that it
would result from a demand for service either directly from clients or indirectly
from clients through a governmental or other agency charged to represent the
public. Further, I might add, that assumption of such a "responsibility" should
carry with it appropriate remuneration.
I a m suggesting that the services or functions of a profession evolve over
time and the nature of these services is dictated largely by customers w h o
demand services and are w i l l i n g to pay for them. Finally, I a m also suggesting
that the accounting profession should feel flattered and privileged to be asked
to extend its services to a desirous public. T h i s is, of course, a simplification of
the rather complex problem of attesting to the material absence of fraud i n the
operations of an entity. T o clarify m y position, however, I would like to take
up several specific topics included i n the subject paper and attempt to relate
them to this potential extension of the attest function.
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Nature of Fraud
T h e paper outlines the nature of fraud i n a manner that should be satisfy
i n g to most accountants. Examples of various types of fraud are listed and even
these examples appear to be inclusive of the vast majority of frauds that are
perpetrated. However, the paper dwells at length on cases of fraud which are
concealed through collusion and tends to ignore defalcation and embezzlement
by individuals. Catlett states that " . . . major cases usually include collusion
among officers and/or employees, or collusion w i t h outside persons." C P A
firms certainly should be able to support a statement such as this one. I cannot,
but I do k n o w that there are many individuals now i n prison w h o were convicted
of embezzlement and who d i d not collude w i t h anyone. Many of you probably
w i l l remember the study of defalcators published over 20 years ago i n The
Journal of Accountancy. T h e study by D o n a l d Cressey centered on convicted
defalcators incarcerated at Illinois State Prison at Joliet. Cressey's purpose was
to determine the causes of defalcations. H e generalized about the process of
defalcation i n the following way:
Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive
of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-sharable; (2)
have the knowledge or awareness that this problem can be secretly
resolved by violation of the position of financial trust; and (3) are able
to apply to their own conduct i n that situation a verbalization which
enables them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons
with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or
property. Unless there is movement through this sequence, a trusted
person does not become a violator. 1
T h i s study along with other studies by students of D r . Cressey have indi
cated that some types of fraud do not include collusion. If an auditor were to
attest to the material absence of fraud, he should consider this type of fraud
as well as such misrepresentations by management as over- or under-statement
of assets and liabilities and irregular and/or deceitful transactions. Presently,
auditors have an excellent opportunity to uncover an individual defalcation
through the review and evaluation of internal control. A l l pronouncements on
the nature of internal control emphasize division of duties and responsibilities
in a manner that prevents errors and defalcations unless collusion exists. If most
perpetrators (at least those who are caught and convicted) have nonsharable
problems and perpetrate embezzlements w i t h no collusive help, the auditor
should be able to discern weaknesses i n the control system which could allow
for the existence of such fraud w i t h the use of current internal control evalua
tion standards and procedures.
Audit Objectives
Apparently, some frauds involve collusive arrangements, but some do not.
It would seem that all should be included i n any definition of fraud if a stance
is taken on the subject of attesting to the material absence of fraud. However,
a more important consideration to this discussion concerns objectives of audits.
Historically, these objectives have changed. B r o w n suggests that the detection
of fraud was recognized as a major audit objective until at least 1940. 2 H e
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also indicates that beginning around the turn of the century fairness began to
overshadow detection of fraud as a stated audit objective, and that detection
of fraud seemed to disappear as a stated audit objective around 1940 due largely
to the effect on the profession of the McKesson & Robbins case. Perhaps the
discussion of the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud has not yet
diminished because it was a stated audit objective for over 400 years and was
removed as an objective by the profession rather than by a change i n demand
of clients of accounting firms. A solicitous consuming public could reinstate it.
If this were to happen, the terms might be more advantageous for C P A s than
they were during the period previous to the McKesson & Robbins case.
The detection of fraud as an audit objective might resurface as a part of the
ordinary examination of financial statements or as a special examination of
financial statements. Recently there has been much more interest i n attestation
of representations other than those which appear i n historical financial state
ments. Forecasts and interim financial statements are two possible extensions
of the attest function that are of current interest to the profession.
Whether the potential extension of the auditor's opinion is forecasts, interim
financial statements, or detection of fraud, history indicates that the process w i l l
evolve slowly over time. A n y extension probably w i l l not result from a sudden
pronouncement of the A I C P A ; instead, any such pronouncement w i l l follow
rather widespread practice i n the field. Should detection of fraud again become
a stated audit objective, either as a part of the ordinary examination of financial
statements or through a demand for special reports asserting the absence of fraud,
auditing standards must be judged for their appropriateness to the task.
Auditing Standards
Current general and field work standards seem to apply equally well to
audits of financial statements and to audits designed to detect the existence of
fraud. A s mentioned earlier, the requirement for review and evaluation of
internal control should ferret out all but the most insignificant embezzlement
or defalcation perpetrated by a lone individual. T h e search for other types of
fraud seems to be covered by the third standard of field w o r k which requires
"sufficient competent evidential matter." T h a t standard goes on to indicate that
this evidence should be obtained "through inspection, observation, inquiries, and
confirmations." A l l of the types of fraud that result from situations other than
"nonsharable problems" are transaction based. Purchases, sales, cash receipts,
and cash disbursements are recorded and result i n balances that appear i n
accounts. If the balances are incorrect due to fraud, evidence of that fraud
should be available. T h i s evidence may not always be conclusive, as sometimes
seems to be true i n the ordinary examination of financial statements. Neverthe
less, some evidence w i l l exist.
Because accounting data are transaction based, evidence theory indicates
that auditors should corroborate client representations by obtaining information
from the other party to the transaction or a third independent party such as a
bank. Evidence is gathered by auditors i n the field by applying this theory
through the use of confirmations (a direct means) and such things as examina
tion of invoices and cancelled checks (an indirect means). In summary, auditing
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standards seem broad enough to encompass audits for the purpose of detection
of fraud.
In most of the fraud cases that are covered i n the literature there are prob
lems of interpretation of auditing standards, and i n a few cases, apparent viola
tions of them. A s M r . Catlett suggests, standards must be distinguished from
procedures and I would suggest that it is procedures used i n applying standards
that might have to be changed should fraud detection become an objective of
either a special examination or the ordinary examination of financial statements.
A u d i t i n g Procedures
T h e changes that should occur i n audit procedures are really changes that
should occur whether or not fraud detection becomes an objective of the ordinary
examination. T o discover any characteristic of a population of data, sampling
techniques can be used. Discovery sampling, for example, seems particularly
appropriate to investigation of potential frauds. Discovery sampling is not par
ticularly helpful i n situations where fraudulent transactions or behavior constitute
an extremely minor percent of the transactions or behavior experienced i n an
organization. However, i f fraud is material, such techniques could be helpful.
Scientific sampling currently is very helpful i n the ordinary examination of
financial statements. T h e characteristics of interest are different, but the purpose
is identical: to discover characteristics and assess their importance. It is difficult
to assess the degree to which statistical sampling is utilized by auditors, but it
seems clear from the literature that it is far more reliable than judgment sampling
techniques. Should detection of fraud become a n objective of the auditor's
examination, scientific sampling certainly w o u l d have to be used i n order to
assess the risk taken i n attesting to the absence of material fraud. Also, an
auditor should be interested i n assessing the risk he is now taking i n his opinion
on financial statements for an ordinary examination where fraud is explicitly
denied as an objective.
One additional example of an audit procedure that might change should
fraud again become an audit objective is confirmation. It is m y understanding
that negative confirmation requests are still quite prevalent i n spite of the fact
that when a n auditor does not receive a reply from a request, he has no basis
for determining whether the amount to be confirmed is correct or the respondent
is nonexistent, uninterested, or unresponsive. I n an audit of accounts receivable,
if confirmation requests were sent and the objective were to determine whether
the accounts receivable were fraudulently stated, I do not believe that many audi
tors would want to rely on the use of negative confirmations. Instead, positive
confirmations would be utilized with careful and extensive followup. A g a i n ,
I would suggest that such procedure would be appropriate i n the ordinary
examination where the objective is not detection of fraud; however, it becomes
much more important when the objective is detection of fraud.
Professional A u d i t Service
Earlier, it was suggested that the use of the term "responsibility" perhaps
was inappropriate. Instead it was suggested that demands for C P A s ' services
should be treated as opportunities and privileges to serve society. W h e n such
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requests are made, they represent recognition by society that C P A s have the
competence and the integrity to perform the services requested. Competence
often is brought into arguments against extension of the attest function to other
areas. I n such arguments it is suggested that the competence of C P A s lies i n
their abilities as accountants and that to attest anything or offer a service that
is outside of the field that has been k n o w n traditionally as accounting w o u l d
be to engage i n services beyond their abilities and that therefore the public
might lose confidence. T h i s , of course, could happen; however, i n my opinion
C P A s w i l l not seek out engagements i n which they must offer a service that
they have not offered previously. Rather, society w i l l ask C P A s to provide the
new service. T h i s has happened i n many instances over the years to the extent
that management services departments of C P A firms engage i n salary surveys,
executive search and other activities that cannot be considered, even remotely,
as traditional accounting services. T h u s far, no consequent loss of public con
fidence has occurred.
Although I a m not a practitioner, I think there is one change that should
be made i n the practice of public accounting, should requests for extensions of
the attest function and other services be made by the public. I n almost every
profession, some allowance is made i n the fee structure for the relative risk
involved. Delicate surgical operations are more expensive than routine low-risk
surgical operations. W i t h the possible exception of some securities registrations,
C P A s apparently have not built into their billing structures any allowance for
risk that might be present i n a given engagement. Should C P A s be asked to
attest to the absence or presence of material fraud, i t would seem wise to adjust
billing methods to allow for risks being undertaken. A g a i n , there is a parallel
to attestation of financial statements. G i v e n current litigation against accountants,
it would seem appropriate for C P A s to assess risk i n each ordinary engagement
and adjust the fee according to the estimate of the risk to be undertaken.
Conclusion
Services or functions of any profession evolve over time and should be
seen as opportunities or privileges. A t the same time, professionals should assess
the value of their services and the risks that may be involved and bill clients
accordingly. Furthermore, historically, audit examinations w i t h some stated
objective have been undertaken before standards were developed. A s indicated
previously, B r o w n asserted i n his article that audits occurred prior to the year
1500 and were carried on for hundreds of years before auditing standards were
developed. A more recent example is that of attesting to some aspects of fore
casts. Such services have been performed and are being performed n o w by
C P A s without any explicit standards. Therefore, I think it is unreasonable to
assume that standards should be developed before examinations w i t h the stated
objective of detection of fraud can be undertaken.
Finally, there is one important suggestion that comes from this paper. M r .
Catlett made assertions about the nature of fraud which can be substantiated
through research. If there is client interest i n attestation to the absence or
existence of material fraud, research should be undertaken i n the area. Almost
all C P A firms maintain files with experiences catalogued i n many different ways.
As a first step, it would be interesting to examine the files of C P A firms catalog61

i n g a l l types of fraud that have been discovered either during the course of an
examination or afterward. A classification system for this examination might
include type of fraud, method of concealment, industry, client size, and the
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the fraud. O n l y after extensive
research of this type can the profession properly assess the likelihood of discovery
of fraud and the risk the C P A is taking when he attests to the absence of it.
Catlett's paper concludes w i t h the following statement: " . . . the account
i n g profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming responsibilities
or accepting a role that cannot be successfuly fulfilled." I would add to that
statement that the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed
by refusing to provide requested services to society. Destruction i n this latter
case w i l l be much slower but nonetheless definite.

Footnotes
1. Donald R. Cressey, " W h y D o Trusted Persons Commit Fraud? A Social-Psychological
Study of Defalcators," The Journal of Accountancy, November 1951, pp. 577-578.
2. R. Gene Brown, "Changing Audit Objectives and Techniques," The
Accounting
Review, October 1962, pp. 696-703.
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5
A Decision Theory View of Auditing
William L. Felix, Jr.
University of Washington, Seattle
T h e major objective of the field of applied statistics is to help solve decision
problems i n the face of uncertainty. T h i s help has traditionally been provided
by making inferences based on a probability model. These probability models
are the statistician's models of the uncertainty faced by a real world problemsolver. T h e field of auditing has been the beneficiary over the past ten to fifteen
years of increasing assistance from the field of applied statistics. T h i s paper
w i l l review these contributions and then consider a new contribution that is a
logical next step.
Dealing with Uncertainty
The auditor is continually making choices i n the face of uncertainty. T h e
first statistical recognition of this fact occurred w i t h the use of classical statistics
i n evaluating the results of random sampling. 1 T h e significance of this approach
was not that uncertainty was first recognized, but that the risks associated w i t h
one particular aspect of auditing were made explicit. That is, the classical state
ment of confidence interval and level (e.g., ± 50 at 95% confidence) specifies
the risk of sampling error. 2 Thus one element of the uncertainty faced by an
auditor with which he has always had to treat was now disclosed i n statistical
terms. Given this beginning contribution, expansion of the potential uses of
applied statistics to auditing, comparable to other disciplines facing uncertainty,
should follow.
In using classical sampling, the contribution of statistics is restricted to the
evaluation of evidence obtained by random sampling. Incorporation of this
evidence with other evidence is left to the auditor's judgment. More recently
a method for combining sample evidence with other auditing evidence has been
proposed. 3 Inferential methods i n Bayesian statistics are based on a posterior
probability distribution which is a combination of a prior probability distribu
tion, representing evidence the auditor has evaluated up to the point of sampling,
and a likelihood function, representing the information i n the sample. By sub
jectively specifying the results of evidence evaluated up to a point of time as a
probability function, the auditor has expanded the explicit recognition of the
uncertainty he faces i n carrying out an audit. A g a i n , this uncertainty previously
existed but was considered only through intuition and judgment. T h e advantages
for the auditor that result from being more precise i n considering risk have been
argued by Roberts. 4
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W h i l e classical sampling methods have met w i t h some acceptance by the
auditing profession, Bayesian sampling methods have not. One major reason for
this lack of acceptance is the need for a practical method of expressing the prior
probability distribution. W h i l e some research has been carried out, a confidenceinspiring method still awaits development. 5 Another source of resistance to
Bayesian methods is the "subjective" nature of the prior distribution. T h e use
of classical sampling has been " s o l d " to some members of the auditing profession
on the basis that it is more objective. Since the result of the audit process is an
opinion or judgment decision, over-stating applied statistics as a source of
objectivity can be misleading. Statistical methods discussed i n this paper can
make the parameters or bases of judgment more explicit. 6 But even i f these
approaches are carried to their full extent, judgment w i l be required as a critical
input to the model. T h e prior probability distribution is an example of an input
based on judgment.
Both classical and Bayesian methods discussed above are methods of infer
ence. T h e next logical step i n the use of applied statistics is to move from
inference to action. A n audit action or decision can be addressed by use of
statistical decision theory. T h i s methodology requires as an input a payoff
function i n addition to the requirements for inference. T h i s payoff function is a
specification of the consequences of each possible outcome of the audit to the
auditor. T h e use of this method allows the auditor to maximize i n the sense
that he w i l l make the decision that has the highest expected payoff.
In addition to the problems discussed above i n applying Bayesian methods,
the use of decision theory also requires an auditor to specify his payoff function.
For each possible outcome of the audit he must specify the "value" (possibly i n
monetary terms) to h i m . 7 I n the auditor's complex environment this specification
of outcome consequences w i l l be quite difficult. F o r example, consider that an
outcome consequence to an auditor w i l l probably represent a combination or
matching of the form of his opinion and the discovery or lack thereof of a
material error with the reaction of the firm (fee bargaining, lawsuits, future
business), the reaction of users (lawsuits), the reactions of the regulators (right
to practice, criminal prosecution), and the reaction of the rest of the auditor's
environment (professional regulation, loss of other clients).
The remainder of this paper w i l l illustrate the application of decision theory
to a relatively constrained audit decision followed by a discussion of the prob
lems involved i n relaxing the constraints and the related need for research.
Some discussion of the reasons for the author's bias that such inquiry is needed
is incorporated i n these comments.
A Decision Theory M o d e l
A u d i t decision m a k i n g can be described as a series of choices beginning
with the acceptance of the client, followed by a series of choices as to type and
quantity of evidence, and may conclude with the choice of opinion. T h e evolu
tion of these choices is likely to be complex. F o r purposes of this discussion a
single artificially isolated audit decision w i l l be modeled.
100
Suppose an audit of a single balance, B, such that
Σ b i = B. The
i=1
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auditor's choice i n this examination is to give either a clean opinion ( a 1 ) , or
require an adjustment (a2),
to B. The existence ( s 1 ) , or absence ( s 2 ) , of a
"material error" i n B is the criterion w h i c h the auditor wishes to employ. T h i s
specification of possible actions, a i , and states of the balance, si, provides the
basis for the construction of a payoff table as follows:
Error

S1

N o error S 2

Clean opinion a1
Adjustment

a2

In this payoff table the auditor w i l l put the consequences or payoffs to h i m of
each action-state combination. T h e objective at this point is to choose payoffs
that, while arbitrary, have some intuitive appeal. The values i n the following
table represent dollars ( i n thousands). 8
S1
-20

Clean opinion a1
Adjustment

S2

7

3

a2

-1

T h e $7,000 amount i n the no error-clean opinion combination represents the
fee net of ordinary expenses and is usually the most desired outcome. T h e no
error adjustment combination is —$1,000 because it is assumed that the adjust
ment involves extra audit w o r k for which the client w i l l not pay. T h e $3,000
amount i n the error adjustment combination represents extra w o r k that i n part
is billed and collected from the client. T h e —$20,000 for the error clean opinion
combination represents the impact of a settlement with the client (or a third
party) to not pursue a suit for negligence.
T h e auditor plans to sample for evidence regarding the balance but before
doing so, assesses his prior belief regarding the balance he is examining. Based
on his knowledge of the client and of the system generating the balance, he
states that S 1 , a material error, has a .10 chance of existing and S 2 an absence
of a material error, has a .90 chance of existing.
A t this point the auditor could decide to not sample and simply make a
choice based on his prior probability distribution and his payoff function as
stated i n the payoff table. (Such a decision might be correct i n decision theory,
but the auditor must also respond to professional conventions which w i l l require
at least some testing.) The criterion for choice is to select the action with the
highest expected value. U s i n g the auditor's prior probability distribution, these
expected values are as follows:
E (a 1 ) =

E (clean opinion) =

E (a 2 ) = E (adjustment) =

.1 ( - 2 0 )

.1 (3) +

+

.9 (7) =

.9 ( - 1 ) =

The decision indicated at this point is a clean opinion.
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4.3

- .6

T h e auditor's next step is to collect additional evidence and modify his
prior distribution. In obtaining and using sample evidence i n a decision theory
framework some basic tools have been developed. T h e first is called the expected
value of perfect information ( E V P I ) . It indicates the upper limit on the value
and thereby the amount that should be spent for additional information. T h e
E V P I is computed by summing the values of the best action for each state, Si,
weighted by its probability of occurring and then deducting the value or payoff
of the best decision (a clean opinion) under the prior distribution. T h e expected
value of the best decision is 3(.1) + 7(.9) = 6.6. Subtracting 4.3 results i n an
E V P I of 2.3. T h i s indicates that no more than $2,300 should be spent on
sampling.
Perfect information is seldom available and, for this reason, the expected
value of sample information ( E V S I ) is a useful number to the decision maker.
T o compute this value, the decision maker must have or assume some knowledge
about the population from w h i c h he plans to sample. In this case we w i l l
continue m a k i n g assumptions that keep the presentation and computations
simple.
T h e computation of E V S I requires the use of Bayes' Model to combine the
audit decision-maker's prior probability w i t h each possible sample outcome,
compute the expected values of each possible outcome, and then identify those
sample outcomes that would indicate a change from the decision indicated by
the auditor's prior distribution. The E V S I for a particular sample size is the
sum of the expected values of all actions for all sample outcomes indicating a
change i n decision weighted by the probability of that sample outcome occurring.
The Appendix summarizes the computations of E V S I for a sample of five from
the b i making up our balance, B . In this sample we have assumed that only
two situations could exist i n the balance B. Either a material error exists, defined
as exactly 20 b i 's i n error by their total amount, or there is no material error
which is defined as exactly 5 bi's i n error. Sampling is defined to be w i t h re
placement to permit use of binomial tables. T h e computed E V S I is .443. If the
cost of taking each sample item is twenty dollars (.02 i n terms of the payoff
matrix), the expected net gain of sampling ( E N G S ) to the auditor is E V S I less
the cost of the sample or .443 — 5(.02) = .343. T h i s value should be positive
for a particular sample to be worthwhile. In this case the sample is worth $343
to the auditor i n terms of his payoff table.
Given acceptable means of assessing prior beliefs and payoff functions,
statistical decision theory presents auditors with an interesting and potentially
desirable alternative. U s i n g the expected net gain from sampling as a criterion,
the auditor could compute the value of alternative sample sizes and choose a
sample size that is optimal i n terms of his payoff function. T h e cost of sampling
can be expected to increase i n an approximately linear fashion while the E V S I
w i l l tend to increase rapidly and then level out. Figure 1 approximates the effect
of increasing sample size on E N G S . In this figure n * would be the optimal
sample size.
After the auditor chooses his sample size, he w i l l take the sample and
evaluate it. H i s final decision is based on a terminal posterior probability distri
bution based on actual rather than expected sample results. If i n the above
example a sample of five were taken w i t h two errors (as described above)
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FIGURE 1

located, a specific terminal posterior distribution can be obtained. W h e n this
posterior is combined with the loss function (table), either a1 or a 2 w i l l have
a higher payoff indicating the appropriate action for the auditor to take. In
the example the posterior distribution on the states would be:
P ( S 1 ) = .515
P ( S 2 ) =.485
as indicated by the Appendix. T h e expected payoff of the two actions would be:
a 1 : - 2 0 (.515) + 7 (.485) =

-6.905

a 2 : 3 (.515) + - 1 (.485) = 1.060.
The indicated action is to require an adjustment to B .
Extensions and Research
The simplifications made i n the above illustration can be relaxed to develop
a model more closely fitting actual audit decisions. Without actually construct
ing an example, a modification particularly appropriate for audit decisions w i l l
be proposed i n the following paragraphs.
In comparing the above example to the auditor's decision environment, the
first point that might occur to the experienced auditor is " i f only the real world
were so simple!" Instead of a single decision i n isolation, the auditor i n exam
ining a set of financial statements must make a series of complex, interrelated
decisions as to the type and quantity of evidence to collect and evaluate. T o deal
with this complexity, the profession has relied on good, "intuition based" judg
ment developed through training and experience. A less charitable observer
might add that auditors may tend to over-rely on conventional practices to deal
with this complexity. F o r example, it has been observed that some practitioners
do too much cash work. T h i s event might be a result of relying on convention
rather than good judgment.
T o deal with the auditor's decision environment, the decision theorist needs
a structure or sequential model of the auditor's decision or judgment processes.
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Such a model has not been clearly exposed i n the literature, but S A P N o . 54
(now Section 320 of Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards N o . 1) does implicitly seem
to include the framework of such a model. One possible view of that framework
is as follows:
1. T h e auditor engages i n a process of learning the client's operations,
operating environment, accounting systems, and personnel. In a deci
sion theory context he is collecting general evidence so that he can
claim to be an expert w i t h regard to the client and begin his examina
tion with non-diffuse or concentrated prior probability distributions
on each material element i n the financial statements.
2. F o r each significant class of transactions the firm is likely to have
a separate information subsystem providing the basis for one or more
balances or parts of balances i n the financial statements. F o r each
such subsystem, for the system handling miscellaneous transactions,
and for the system combining the results into financial statements,
the auditor evaluates the internal control. I n a decision theory con
text the auditor is assessing his belief to this point regarding the
probability distribution on each accounting subsystem generating and
not correcting a material error.
3. U s i n g the prior distribution developed i n (2) above, the auditor w i l l
plan, both as to type and scope, systems (compliance) tests and out
put (substantive) tests. I n a decision theory context he is engaging
i n assessing the expected net gain from sampling, E N G S , for both
(1) different types of tests and (2) different sample sizes (up to and
including a census). T h i s assessment requires the use of a payoff
function and is based on the expected results of sampling as the
above example indicates.
4. T h e execution of the plan established i n (3) above w i l l i n essence
be a series of Bayesian revisions of the auditor's subjunctive beliefs
regarding the financial statements based on the actual results of
sampling. A t each major step i n execution the auditor should revise
his remaining plans based on the results of the preceding evidence.
Each posterior distribution becomes a prior probability distribution
for the next evidence collection activity. Note that at the conclusion
of systems testing for all accounting subsystems, the auditor must
combine the results of one or more systems to complete his prior
assessment of balances. F o r example, the accounts receivable balance
may be the result of an accounting subsystem for credit sales being
combined with a cash collection subsystem. T h e posterior distribu
tions for both systems should be combined for use as a prior distri
bution i n testing the accounts receivable balance. In addition, the
interrelationship of financial statement balances w o u l d have to be
considered. T h e results of tests of sales and cash balances could in
fluence the posterior distribution on accounts receivable.
5. Finally, the auditor reports his opinion on the financial statements
choosing from among those opinions proscribed by his profession.
In a decision theory context, this would be a final decision based on
the payoff function and his confidence i n the balances as expressed
i n his terminal posterior distribution on the balances.
W h i l e representing an untested suggestion, the above process clearly indi
cates that a modeling of this complex series of decisions is a challenging task.
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In practice the computations and analysis suggested by this process would require
computer algorithms.
In addition to the usual advantages of modeling judgment processes to gain
insights for improvements and further productive research, decision theory seems
to promise another possibility. 9 The auditor's current environment is litigation
prone and many cases suggest that trouble for the auditor may have been
the result of slow response to a changing environment. A n auditor may be
undesirably slow to change because of the " w e i g h t " of professional conventions.
A decision theory approach to an audit may encourage and help justify change
in the face of this pressure from conventional practices because it provides a
means of comparing alternative sources of evidence i n terms of criteria that
should be convincing.
Additional benefits that a decision theory approach to auditing may provide
are i n the area of communication. In the application of the current intuition/
judgment-based approach to scope and evidence source decisions, it is often
difficult to articulate clearly the criteria used i n m a k i n g decisions. If decision
theory could make these criteria more explicit, it is likely that the on-the-job
training and supervision of inexperienced assistants could be facilitated. In
addition, communication between experienced auditors is less likely to be
garbled if it is based on explicit agreement on risk and payoffs. Another aspect
of communication relates to the evaluation of our services by society. W h i l e
certainly not a panacea, a decision theory approach may facilitate the documenta
tion of decisions and criteria that w i l l be more convincing and less "mystic" to
outsiders (such as attorneys and regulators).
Concluding Observations
In concluding an exploratory discussion of an untested source of new tech
niques, it is appropriate to reinforce the problem areas that must be carefully
researched before an evaluation of their usefulness can be made. There are at
least three significant problems. T h e first is identification of the structure of the
process discussed above. Second, as noted above, some research on assessing
prior probability distributions has been published. But before such techniques
can be considered practical for auditors, considerable additional effort i n devel
oping appropriate distributions and means of training professionals i n their use
is needed. T h i r d , the payoff function (table) used above needs considerable
expansion and testing on auditors before any use of decision theory can be
seriously considered. Basic texts i n decision theory do develop the continuous
payoff and probability function relationship that could be appropriate for audi
tors. But they need testing and evaluation i n the auditor's environment. Further,
the use of monetary values i n an auditor's payoff function does not seem reason
able. 1 0 Because of the extremely large amounts that a decision-state combina
tion resulting i n a lawsuit might involve and the nonmonetary, or at least
indirect, effects on reputation, a utility-based payoff function seems more reason
able.
In summary, decision theory offers considerable promise. Its basic promise
that decisions under uncertainty are best made based on a probabilistic collection
and evaluation of sample evidence structured i n terms of economic criteria (the
expected payoffs) is appealing as a model for the audit process. Whether or not
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the application of decision theory to auditing w i l l result i n better audit decision
making, better communication between auditors and their public, and better
communication between auditors can be answered only through research. T h e
outlook is promising.
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Appendix
T h e following tables show the computation of EVSI for a sample of 5 where the sampling
distribution under S1 is a binomial distribution with p = .2 and under S 2 , p = .05.
(1)

(2)

Sample results
1.

0 error, 5

correct

Prior

(3)
Likelihood of
Sample Result*

(4)
Product of
(2) • (3)

error
.1
correct .9

.3277
.7738

.03277

(5)
Posterior
.045
.955

.69642
.72919

2.

1 error,

4

correct

error
.1
correct .9

.4096
.2036

.04096

.183
.817

.18324
.22420

3.

2

error, 3

correct

error
.1
correct .9

.2048
.0214

.02048

.515
.485

.01926
.03974

4.

3 error, 2

5.

4 error,

6.

5 error, 0

Sample
Outcome

correct

error
.1
correct .9

.0512
.0011

.00512
.00099
.00611

.838
.162

1 correct

error
.1
correct .9

.0064
.0000

.00064
.00000
.00064

1.000
.000

error
.1
correct .9

.0003
.0000

.00003
.00000
.00003

1.000
.000

correct

Expected
Payoff

Action

Change in
Decision?

1

a1
a2

—20(.045) + 7(.955) = 5.785
3 (.045) + ( - 1 ) (.955) = - . 8 2

no

2

a1
a2

- 2 0 ( . 1 8 3 ) + 7(.817) = 2.059
3(.183) + ( - 1 ) ( . 8 1 7 ) = —.268

no

3

a1
a2

- 2 0 ( . 5 1 5 + 7(.485) = - 6 . 9 0 5
3(.515) + ( - 1 ) ( . 4 8 5 ) = 1.060

4

a1
a2

—20(.838) + 7(.162) = - 1 5 . 6 2 6
3(.838) + ( - 1 ) (.162) = 2 . 3 5 2

5

a1
a2

6

a1
a2

EVSI =

Value of
Sample Info
0
0
1.060 -

(-6.905) =7.965

yes

2.352 -

(-15.626) =

- 2 0 ( 1 ) + 7(0)
=-20
3(l) + ( - 1 ) ( 0 ) = 3

yes

3 — (—20)

-20(1) +7(0)
=-20
3(1) + ( - 1 ) ( 0 ) = 3

yes

3 -

7.965(.03974) +

yes

=

(—20)

17.978(.00611)+ 23 (.00064) + 23(.00003) =

17.978

23
=23

.443

* The likelihood of the sample result is the probability of the sample result occurring given
that the sample was from state S 1 , where the error rate is .2 or state S2 where the error rate is
.05. The probabilities are from a binomial table.
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Discussant's Response to
A Decision Theory View of Auditing
James K. Loebbecke
Touche Ross & C o .
Compliments are i n order for B i l l Felix on a fine paper. It covers the
subject well and reflects elements of both tact and wisdom. Tact is evident i n
that it presents a model w h i c h expresses decision criteria i n terms of a payoff
matrix instead of a loss function. This is a distinction which, I can assure you,
is particularly appealing to practicing independent public accountants. W i s d o m
is reflected i n that it discusses several of the broader aspects of using a decision
model i n auditing as well as the technical characteristics of the model itself.
W i t h i n the past two years I have become increasingly involved i n the
challenging problem of "modeling the audit." It would seem so nice to have
the complete audit model—the ultimate audit tool. M y research has disclosed
models which are variously described as probabilistic, stochastic, analytical and
simulation models.*
M y intent today is not to debate the technical details of B i l l Felix' model
or any of these others. Rather, I would like to consider some questions about
audit models i n general: are they feasible, are they desirable, and how should
they be implemented?
Feasibility
A u d i t models are clearly feasible. T h i s statement lies partially i n the defini
tion of audit models. Consistent w i t h Bill's paper (which presents a model, not
the model) the classical statistical inference model now common i n auditing is
an audit model. Other models are more complex, but none of their authors
show an absence of conviction about their ultimate feasibility. Further indication
of feasibility is suggested by successful applications of models i n other fields.
Examples of such models can be found i n engineering, medicine and other
sciences. Problems of computation and volumes of data previously deemed
overwhelming have been successfully solved w i t h computer assistance. T h i s tool
is causing a significant change i n auditing and is the key to further advanced
techniques.
* See the following examples:
William R. Kinney, Jr., " A Decision Theory Approach to the Sampling Problem in
A u d i t i n g , " University of Iowa W o r k i n g Paper Series N o . 74-4, March, 1974.
John Neter and Seongjae Y u , " A Stochastic Model of the Internal Control System,"
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Faculty W o r k i n g Paper N o . 106, April
1973.
Barry E . Cushing, " A Mathematical Approach to the Analysis and Design of Internal
Control Systems," The Accounting Review, January 1974, pp. 24-41.
James K. Loebbecke and David Burns, "Computer Simulation of Internal Control Systems,"
unpublished paper.
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Desirability
Accepting their feasibility, we must ask whether audit models, i n the
broadest sense, are desirable. The answer to this question is yes. Bill's paper
presents several advantages to be derived from using risk or decision models
in auditing:
• Control of risk through precise definition
• Expression of decision criteria i n more meaningful terms
• A vehicle to motivate better response to changes i n the audit environ
ment
• A framework for improved communication both between auditors
and with those affected by auditor results
I agree w i t h these and w o u l d express their sum as a means through which the
auditor can achieve objectivity; a factor that is of ultimate importance to all
concerned with the audit process.
Generally, i n auditing, the first examination for a new client is the most
objective one. More time is spent on learning activities, more attention is given
to the objectives of corroboratory activities, and there is a greater sense of aware
ness and skepticism. In subsequent examinations, however, even the best auditor
is biased by the preconceptions formed by preceding efforts and findings. If
we are to provide a high level of audit service on a continuing basis, we must
use techniques to preserve objectivity.
However, there are some dangerous elements to consider here as well. First,
since the decision model is a tool, it is liable to evoke the L a w of Instruments.
That is, its users may become so enamored w i t h its internal characteristics that
they either apply it i n situations where it is not appropriate, or they fail to use
it properly i n situations which differ slightly from the norm.
Second, a characteristic of decision models is that they are designed to
facilitate a decision, one way or the other, according to the best payoff without
considering the quality, and thereby the adequacy, of the underlying audit
evidence. I view auditing decision m a k i n g as a two-stage process. T h e l o w
order stage involves the decision of accepting or rejecting the particular proposi
tion at hand using the evidence gathered; but this can be reached only after
the high order decision is made that the evidence is adequate for that purpose.
The sum of these pitfalls is serious, but they can be overcome by proper
model design, by user understanding of the concepts underlying the techniques
used, and by intelligent application. W e must realize that one of the major
differences between advanced audit techniques and traditional techniques is a
shift i n quality control emphasis (and effectiveness) from the reviewer to the
performer. Also, most advanced techniques deal w i t h inference and not certitude.
For these reasons, a "cookbook" approach must not be taken.
The final element of desirability is cost. A u d i t models w i l l clearly require
an investment i n research, development of tools, and training. However, there
w i l l be resultant savings i n terms of increased efficiency and reduced costs of
bad decisions. I believe the tradeoff w i l l be favorable.
Implementation
Designing a model is one thing; implementing it i n practice is another.
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Implementation of advanced auditing techniques involves two groups: users
and audit management. T h e users, who are generally staff auditors, must be
given conceptual and practical training and tools to facilitate application me
chanics. F i r m management must be convinced that use of the techniques w i l l
improve audit quality without unduly increasing audit cost. Neither group can
be approached with the same "language," nor can they be approached with the
language used i n developing the technique.
T h e language of higher level mathematics is used i n model development.
W h e n model concepts are taught, a sorting out process must occur so that
overly complex aspects are presented i n terms of ideas rather than mathematical
terms, and so that any mathematical terms used are within the user's comfort
level. Application tools, of course, must utilize the proper techniques, but i n
a transparent manner, such as can be provided with computer programs.
It is likely that model users w i l l be quite receptive. Advanced audit tech
niques make auditing more enjoyable, and, fairly fresh from school, most users
are preconditioned to use them. F i r m management may not be so receptive,
and if approached through use of even a m i n i m a l amount of mathematical
jargon, may reject the idea completely.
T h e proper approach, i n my opinion, is to show audit management that
the advanced audit model or technique is simply a refinement of one or more
elements of the intuitive model he has been using all along. B i l l Felix' paper
is completely consistent with this view, as is expressed i n his presentation of an
intuitive model extracted from S A P 54. I performed this same exercise at the
time the S A P was published as a means of determining how it should be i n 
terpreted. T h e result was a model entided " A n Outline of the Basic A u d i t
Process" which contains twelve basic steps and involves five basic decision
processes (see A p p e n d i x ) .
A u d i t management knows both the importance and the difficulties involved
i n m a k i n g these basic decisions properly. A u d i t managers realize that their
behavior is affected by these difficulties i n the very direct sense that they "overaudit" to compensate for the risks that they cannot otherwise deal w i t h . If
audit managers can be presented with techniques that clarify this process they
w i l l accept them. But clarification means clear to them, not just clear to the
proposer.

Appendix
A n Outline of the Basic A u d i t Process
Step

1

Determine the nature of the client's business and industry. Primary
resources are:
A . Firm's industry expertise
B. Historical data
C . Overall organization and procedures
D . Current financial data

Step

2

Obtain description of system of internal control.

Step

3

Make D E C I S I O N I: Is the entity auditable?
74

T h e two parts to this decision are:
A . Does there appear to be an adequate system to produce evi
dence to be examined?
B. Does management appear to be honest and w i l l i n g to present
the necessary evidence?
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 4.
If answer to Question A is NO—advise that a disclaimer w i l l be
rendered.
If answer to Question B is N O — w i t h d r a w from engagement.
Step

4

Design preliminary plan of substantive audit procedures for auditing
financial statements based o n :
A . Nature of industry and company as reflected i n description of
system.
B. Practical circumstances relating to timing and scope.

Step

5

Make D E C I S I O N II: Does the preliminary plan of substantive audit
procedures indicate that the auditor is relying on internal control to
produce accurate year-end financial data?
(Examples of circumstances when reliance is implied:
• Substantive tests, e.g., confirmation of receivables, inventory
observations, etc., are performed prior to year-end.
• Detailed documentation is examined on a test basis.
• Inventory observations are not performed at all locations.
• O n l y certain units are visited i n a multi-unit company.
• There is an emphasis on tests of an analytical nature.)
If the answer is YES—proceed to Step 6.
If the answer is NO—proceed to Step 9.

Step

6

Identify the specific controls being relied upon and the degree of com
pliance assumed by the audit plan.

Step

7

Perform compliance tests of controls to be relied upon.

Step

8

Make D E C I S I O N III: Is the actual degree of compliance
to assumed degree?

comparable

If answer is YES—proceed to Step 9.
If answer is NO—update description of system of internal control,
revise preliminary plan of substantive procedures, and then pro
ceed to Step 9.
Step

9

Perform planned or revised substantive auditing procedures.

Step 10

M a k e D E C I S I O N I V : Do results of substantive procedures corroborate the auditor's understanding of the system of internal control?
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 11.
If answer is NO—update description of system, further revise substan
tive procedures and perform them, and then proceed to Step 11.

Step 11

M a k e D E C I S I O N V : Does the evidence gathered by our procedures
constitute adequate competent evidential matter in support of an
opinion?
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 12.
If answer is N O — d e s i g n and perform additional necessary procedures,
and then proceed to Step 12.

Step 12

Issue report containing opinion arrived at i n Step 11.
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6

Setting Standards for Statistical Sampling in Auditing

John C. Broderick
Arthur Young & Co.
Auditors welcome the existence of the ten generally accepted auditing
standards ( G A A S ) and the Statements on A u d i t i n g Standards. These auditing
standards and authoritative interpretations ensure order i n the tasks they perform.
A m o n g other things, G A A S require that examinations of financial statements be
performed w i t h due professional care by persons having adequate technical train
ing, proficiency, and independence of mental attitude; that examinations be
properly planned and supervised; that examinations include a study and evalua
tion of internal accounting controls; and that sufficient competent evidential
matter be obtained to provide a reasonable basis for an opinion on the financial
statements. Thus, G A A S provide an auditor w i t h the framework for selecting
and applying auditing procedures.
Importance of Judgment
T h e selection of specific procedures is largely a matter of judgment. I n any
particular audit engagement, judgment w i l l be influenced by a number of
matters; matters such as the nature and the problems of the business whose
financial statements are being examined, the quality and effectiveness of the
business' accounting procedures and internal accounting controls, and the ma
teriality of the various items being considered. A n auditor must also exercise
judgment i n determining the extent of auditing procedures, i n choosing a
method for selecting items to be examined, and i n evaluating the audit signifi
cance of matters that come to his attention d u r i n g the examination. Exercise
of judgment is at the heart of auditing.
Statistical Techniques as an A i d to Judgment
In the early 1960s, auditors began to explore the potential advantages of using
statistical sampling techniques to aid them i n m a k i n g audit judgments: i n
determining the extent of their audit tests, i n selecting their test items, and i n
quantifying their test results. Since those early explorations, statistical sampling
as an audit technique has received increasing attention, as evidenced by Statement
on A u d i t i n g Procedure N o . 54, which contained two lengthy appendices devoted
to the use of statistical sampling i n auditing. These appendices n o w appear i n
Sections 320A and 320B of Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards N o . 1. Witness
also the number of articles on the subject i n The Journal of Accountancy, The
Accounting Review, and The Internal Auditor.
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Most auditors agree that statistical sampling can be an effective audit tool.
Many, however, feel uncomfortable i n m a k i n g the decisions essential i n applying
it. Thus, it is only natural that they look to others for help. They seek advice
as to which sampling methods are most appropriate for various types of audit
tests. F o r example, they ask whether they should use the same statistical method
for tests of compliance with internal controls as they would use for tests of
financial statement items. They seek advice i n choosing statistical criteria for
their tests: they want to know what confidence levels they should use
and what sampling precision their tests should produce. Auditors first looked
to mathematicians and statisticians for help. W h o else they reasoned would be
more qualified to give advice on the application of statistical sampling? Often,
auditors were disappointed w i t h the advice they received. Part of the disappoint
ment resulted from a lack of in-depth understanding of audit objectives by the
mathematicians and statisticians; part resulted from a lack of understanding of
the meaning of sampling results by the auditors. I suspect, however, that a more
significant part of the disappointment resulted from what the auditors believed
to be overly conservative recommendations by the statistical experts. Auditors
who followed the criteria suggested by the experts often found that the sample
sizes needed to meet such criteria were larger than they expected them to be.
Many auditors believed that the use of statistical sampling i n auditing would
produce dramatic reductions i n the number of items they would have to examine.
As a result of their disappointment w i t h the advice from the statistical
experts, some auditors began to establish their o w n sampling criteria. A l l too
often, the bases for these criteria were intuitive ones. A s a result, undue weight
was given to sample size considerations (the "magic numbers") and insufficient
weight was given to test objectives.
A Search for Standards
Many auditors have naturally turned to the accounting profession i n the
hope that the profession would establish standards. T h e demands upon the pro
fession have, i n my opinion, been too narrowly directed. I see, for example,
little demand for guidance material designed to provide the auditor w i t h a good
understanding of the role of statistical sampling i n auditing. Rather, I sense
a desire for standards w h i c h may be a substitute for judgment i n the decision
making process. Auditors are asking the profession to specify numerical criteria
as to what is an acceptable sampling precision and what is an acceptable con
fidence level for audit tests. T o the extent that these persons want standards
that specify a single precision value and a single confidence level appropriate
for all tests, I am troubled. I don't believe such standards can or should be
established. The arbitrary choice of the same sampling precision and the same
confidence level for all tests is inappropriate. In some cases the choice w i l l be
too conservative, causing wasted audit effort; i n other cases the choice w i l l not
be conservative enough, creating unwanted and unnecessary risk. If, on the
other hand, standards developed by the profession further auditors' under
standing of applicable statistical techniques and, as our generally accepted
auditing standards do, provide a framework within which auditors can apply
their judgment, I w i l l welcome them.
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Precision and Confidence Level
I have referred several times to the expressions sampling precision and
confidence level, and because they often imply different things to different people,
let me describe to you m y understanding of their meaning.
W h e n I use statistical sampling for an audit test, m y purpose is to obtain
a reasonable estimate of the true condition of a group of items. T h i s may, for
example, be i n terms of the rate of compliance with a particular element of
internal control, or it may be i n terms of the value of an account balance. By
examining a sample of items selected from the group, I expect to be able to
reach a reliable audit conclusion about the condition of all the items i n the group.
Whenever I examine only some of the items i n a group, there are two
consequences:
1. I cannot determine the exact condition of all of the items; I can only
estimate the condition.
2. I cannot be sure that my estimate is 100 percent reliable.
I can, however, determine the probability that my estimate is w i t h i n any
specified range of the true rate or value. F o r example, I may be able to con
clude that there is a 95 percent chance that the actual percentage rate of
compliance with an element of internal control is within a range of two per
centage points on either side of the rate of compliance contained i n my
sample. That is, the true rate may be higher or lower than the sample rate but
there is a 95 percent chance that it is w i t h i n the specified range. T o the 95
percent chance referred to above I w i l l give the name "confidence level"; to the
range within which I believe the true rate lies, the name "confidence interval";
to one-half of that range, the name "sampling precision." If there is a 95 percent
chance that the specified range contains the true rate there is also a five percent
chance that the true rate is outside the range. T o this five percent chance I w i l l
give the name "statistical risk."
The notions of confidence level and sampling precision are inseparable.
One can never express the confidence level for an estimate without specifying
the related sampling precision. T h u s , because they are inseparable, any guide
lines for choosing confidence levels must necessarily include guidelines for
sampling precision. Recognizing this, let me illustrate h o w guidelines might
be developed.
Developing Guidelines
Because an auditor's choice of a confidence level and sampling precision
w i l l influence the size of the sample he must examine, he must be sensitive to
the increased cost of auditing when high confidence levels or narrow sampling
precision are used. But a drive for efficiency becomes a fault if it interferes w i t h
the application of due professional care and inhibits the auditor i n his under
taking to obtain adequate competent evidential matter. T h e fact is that different
statistical techniques and different audit situations call for different sample sizes.
Sample sizes must be sufficiently large to produce meaningful results i n terms
of test objectives. A n auditor who uses smaller samples than circumstances
require may as a consequence fail to detect material errors. O n the other hand,
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he may conclude that error rates are greater than i n fact they are, or that ac
count balances are misstated when i n fact they are fairly stated. T h e confidence
level guidelines shown i n the table below when applied with sampling precision
guidelines described later should enable the auditor to effectively determine the
sample size he needs to accomplish his test objective.
Preliminary Evaluation of Internal Controls
W e a k or
Nonexistent

Excellent

Fair

Range of confidence levels for
tests of compliance with internal
controls

95%
to
99%

90%
to
95%

None
required

Range of confidence levels for
tests of account balances i f pre
liminary evaluation of internal
controls is confirmed by compli
ance tests

90%
(or less if
appropriate*)

95%
to
99%

97.5%
to
99%

* I n certain situations, where the results of all related audit procedures indicate that a high
degree of reliance may be placed on internal control, it may be appropriate to use a confidence level as low as 80% for tests of account balances.

T h e guidelines i n the table recognize that the choice of confidence level for
an audit test should be related to the degree of reliance the auditor intends to
place o n elements of a client's system of internal control and to the importance
of the test w i t h regard to the fairness of the financial statements.
Some auditors believe that when their preliminary evaluations indicate that
the applicable elements of internal control are excellent, their tests of compliance
w i t h those elements need not be extensive. Consequently, they choose lower
confidence levels for the tests. O n l y when the elements of control appear to be
weak do they choose high confidence levels.
T h e guidelines presented i n the table above reflect a different philosophy.
They assume that i f an auditor's preliminary evaluation indicates that internal
control elements are excellent he w i l l intend to place a high degree of reliance
on them. Thus, he w i l l want to have a h i g h degree of assurance that the elements
to be relied upon have i n fact functioned effectively. T o attain a high degree of
assurance, he must perform relatively extensive tests of compliance. If the pre
liminary evaluation indicates that the applicable internal control elements are
only fair, an auditor w i l l nevertheless tend to place some degree of reliance on
them. If he decides to do so, he w i l l perform tests of compliance i n order to
satisfy himself that the intended degree of reliance is justified. Since the extent
of reliance is to be lower, the tests may be less extensive. W h e n the preliminary
evaluation indicates that the applicable internal control elements are weak or
nonexistent, an auditor w i l l be unable to rely on internal controls. Consequently,
he need not perform tests of compliance. I n this situation he w i l l concentrate
audit effort on tests of account balances and other types of procedure.
T h e required extent of tests of account balances w i l l usually vary inversely
with the degree of reliance the auditor places on internal controls. If an auditor
has concluded that internal controls are strong and have functioned effectively,
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he w i l l expect that there w i l l be fewer (and often smaller) errors i n the accounts.
T h u s , he may decide that he can appropriately reduce the extent of his tests of
account balances. Conversely, i f internal controls are weak, or i f the auditor
wishes for other reasons to concentrate audit effort on tests of account balances,
these tests should ordinarily be more extensive than they would be i f he were
relying more on internal controls.
Setting Confidence Levels
The confidence levels I have illustrated are relatively high, compared with
those recommended by some other auditors. Some consider it appropriate to use
confidence levels as low as 50 or 60 percent for tests of account balances. They
justify this by combining two types of risk. They assert that most systems of
internal accounting control provide some degree of protection against the occur
rence of material accounting errors. If their evaluation indicates that the elements
of internal control are excellent, they believe the chance that a material accounting
error w i l l have occurred is i n itself probably very low. They further believe that,
based on their evaluation of the elements of internal control, they can assign a
numerical reliability level to "internal accounting control and other relevant
factors." In other words, they feel that they can quantify the risk that a material
accounting error w i l l have occurred. They then maintain that they can combine
this subjectively determined risk with the "statistical r i s k " used for their tests
of account balances to determine their overall audit risk. Quantifying the dis
cussion, an auditor may intuitively believe that the risk that a material error has
occurred is, say, five percent. In view of this, he should be w i l l i n g to accept a
risk of, say, 40 percent that his tests of accounts balances w i l l be reliable, and
therefore he should use a 60 percent confidence level. H e should be w i l l i n g to
use the lower confidence level because the combined risk that a material account
ing error w i l l have occurred and that the error w i l l not be detected by the test
is the product of the two risks—i.e., five percent times 40 percent or two percent.
T h i s process may be mathematically correct and the concept of joint risk
may indeed be a factor to consider. T h e sticking point is that the first risk
included i n this equation (that a material accounting error w i l l have occurred
at all) is a subjectively determined one. T h i s may be a correct determination
but the auditor cannot be sure it is a correct one. In fact, i n any particular situa
tion, a material accounting error either has occurred or has not occurred (the
actual risk is either zero or 100 percent). T h e average or overall risk is not the
controlling factor. If a material accounting error has i n fact occurred, the risk
of failing to detect it is the specific risk assumed for the specific test designed to
detect the specific type of error.
N o w I do not intend to downplay the importance of controls. Auditors
should recognize that the better the accounting controls, the smaller the chance
that material errors w i l l occur. Certainly this should have a bearing on their
choice of confidence levels and of auditing procedures. Indeed, the condition of
controls plays a significant part i n my illustration of guidelines for confidence
levels. I believe, however, it is imprudent to rely on a subjectively determined
numerical evaluation of the effectiveness of internal control to justify assuming
an unduly high risk i n audit tests, especially tests of material account balances.
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Relationships of Confidence Levels and Precision
Earlier, I stated that the notions of confidence levels and sampling precision
are inseparable and that guidelines for choosing confidence levels must necessarily
include guidelines for sampling precision. T o illustrate the relationship between
confidence levels and sampling precision, assume that the results of his sampling
permit an auditor to be 9 5 % confident that the true value of an account balance
is w i t h i n a range of $50,000 on either side of the value estimated from his sample.
If the auditor does not feel the 95 percent confidence level is high enough, he
can easily reevaluate his sampling results at a higher confidence level, say 99
percent. If he does this however, he must be w i l l i n g to accept a sampling pre
cision of more than $50,000. Increasing the confidence level for an estimate
w i l l always widen the sampling precision of the estimate unless additional items
are selected and examined.
Statistical risk depends upon both the confidence level and sampling pre
cision of the estimate. T h e risk an auditor assumes when he uses statistical
sampling for a test of financial statement items may be described as:
1. T h e risk of concluding that a fairly stated financial statement item
is misstated and
2. T h e risk of concluding that a misstated
is fairly stated.

financial

statement item

A n auditor can control magnitude of these risks by his choice of confidence
level and sampling precision. T o illustrate this, assume an auditor is using what
is called estimation sampling; he is attempting to estimate the true value of a
financial statement item. In evaluating his sampling results, he w i l l generally
consider the financial statement item being tested to be fairly stated i f the book
value of the item lies within the confidence interval of his estimate. If the book
value lies outside the confidence interval he w i l l have reason to believe that the
book value is misstated. If the financial statement item being tested is i n fact
correct, what is the chance that its book value w i l l lie w i t h i n the confidence
interval of the auditor's estimate; what is the chance that it w i l l be outside the
confidence interval? The chance is determined by the confidence level. If an
auditor uses a 90 percent confidence level for his test, there is a 90 percent
chance that a correct value w i l l lie w i t h i n the confidence interval and a ten
percent chance that it w i l l lie outside the confidence interval. Thus, when the
estimate is made w i t h a 90 percent confidence level there is a ten percent chance
that the auditor w i l l conclude that the correct value is misstated. T h e consequence
of this conclusion w i l l generally be that the auditor w i l l expend additional and
unnecessary audit effort to satisfy himself that the financial statement item is i n
fact fairly stated. T h e consequences could be more significant if he were to
propose an adjustment to the balance when i n fact no adjustment is appropriate.
Risk of Accepting a Misstated A m o u n t
The
stated is
precision
interval.

risk of concluding that a misstated financial statement item is fairly
controlled by the auditor's choice of sampling precision. Sampling
was defined earlier as an amount equal to one-half the confidence
If the sampling precision of an estimate is extremely wide, not only
82

w i l l a correct value lie w i t h i n the confidence interval, but a misstated value may
also lie within the interval. If the misstatement is slight the auditor might not
be concerned. However, i f the misstatement is large, as, say, the smallest amount
considered to be material to the financial statements (which I shall refer to as a
material amount) the auditor must be concerned. H i s sampling plan must be
designed so as to limit the risk of accepting a financial statement item that is
misstated by a material amount.
Even though a conservative (high) confidence level is chosen for a test,
the risk of accepting a material misstatement i n a financial statement item w i l l
be high i f the sampling precision achieved is wide. Some auditor's choose to
make their estimates w i t h sampling precision equal to a material amount. If
they do this, there is a 50 percent chance that a book value which is misstated
by exactly a material amount w i l l lie w i t h i n the confidence interval of their
estimate and thus be accepted. T h i s w o u l d occur regardless of the confidence
level used to make the estimate. If, on the other hand, the sampling precision
achieved is equal to one-half a material amount, the risk that the book value
w i l l lie w i t h i n the confidence interval of the estimate is only one-half the statisti
cal risk, i.e., one-half the difference between the confidence level used and
100 percent.
Thus, i f the sampling precision of an estimate is equal to one-half a material
amount at a 90 percent confidence level, the risk of failing to detect a material
misstatement i n the account would be five percent. O f course, i f the misstatement
were by more than a material amount, the risk would lessen.
Low Confidence Levels
In an earlier illustration I stated that I d i d not agree w i t h auditors who
would use a 50 or 60 percent confidence level for their testing of financial state
ment items. If the sampling precision of their estimates at these l o w confidence
levels were extremely narrow however, say, one-third to one-quarter of a material
amount, I would be less inclined to disagree w i t h their choice of confidence
levels. Sampling results w i t h as narrow a sampling precision as that would
provide an auditor w i t h good protection against failing to detect a material mis
statement. However, I must still recognize that the choice of a low confidence
level means that I increase my chance of rejecting the fairly stated balance even
though my sampling precision is small.
Concluding Observations
The only practical way for an auditor to adequately ensure against the two
risks described above is to use adequate sample sizes. A n y attempt to minimize
unduly the size of the sample w i l l result i n undue exposure to one or both
risks. T o illustrate, small samples generally produce estimates having one of the
following sets of characteristics:
a. A high confidence level and wide sampling precision.
b. A l o w confidence level and narrow sampling precision.
c. A l o w confidence level and wide sampling precision.
A comparison of the relative risks with each of these sampling results may be
shown as follows:
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Sampling result
a. H i g h confidence level
and wide precision
b.

L o w confidence level
and narrow precision

c. L o w confidence level
and wide precision

Risk of accepting
a material mis
statement

Risk of rejecting
a fairly stated
balance

high

low

low

high

high

high

Thus, auditors should attempt to design their sampling plans to yield rela
tively narrow precision at relatively high confidence levels. A n earlier table
illustrated guidelines for confidence levels, and my discussion above demonstrates
that a desirable guideline for sampling precision is that it be no greater than
one-half a material amount.
In my view, current applications of statistical sampling techniques i n ac
counting and auditing are limited compared w i t h what we can expect i n the
future. However, new techniques must be developed; our practice w i l l demand
them. F o r example, the sophistication of computerized accounting systems w i l l
place great demands upon our ability to capture and audit data. A statistical
sampling capability w i l l be an important key to our success i n auditing such
systems effectively and efficiently. W e must strive to build that statistical
sampling capability on a strong foundation. T h e building blocks of the founda
tion w i l l be the long-standing, mathematically sound sampling techniques; the
mortar that binds the blocks must be an understanding of the techniques. In
tuitive applications of statistical sampling techniques are dangerous; they can
only weaken the foundation and i n the long r u n cause it to fall i n r u i n .
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Discussant's Response to
Setting Standards for Statistical Sampling in Auditing
Lawrence L. Vance
University of California, Berkeley
John Broderick has raised interesting and important questions about the
application of statistical sampling i n auditing. T h e two areas of most concern
that he has discussed and which I wish to comment upon are (1) the role and
method of evaluation of internal control and (2) the matter of setting standards
in general, with particular reference to the precision band i n estimates.
Evaluation of Internal Control
O u r use of internal control evaluations may be approached i n at least two
ways, which I refer to as the three-step and two-step methods. I n the three-step
method, which appears to be M r . Broderick's preference, one first evaluates
internal control on the basis of descriptive material—organization charts, pro
cedure manuals, and conversations w i t h members of the organization w h o are
operating the system. O n this basis, one forms a judgment about the apparent
quality or effectiveness of the system. T h e second step i n the three-step method
is to test the operation of the system w i t h documents and other records that
disclose directly the w o r k i n g of the system. W e are a l l aware that the system
prescribed on paper and reported as functioning by members of the organization
may i n fact be distinctly different from the one that the people involved are
actually using, and the effectiveness of the system may vary accordingly. T h e
third step is to use the results of the first two steps i n determining the "extent
of the testing" (to use the traditional phrase) or to set confidence and precision
limits for the sampling designed to appraise the bona fides of the accounts. If
either the first or second step shows weaknesses i n internal control, the confidence
level is raised and the precision limits narrowed for the tests of bona fides; i f
both indicate effective control, these levels can be reduced. Note that this three
fold concept, i f applied under a policy of keeping each step distinct, requires
separate samples for step two as against step three.
In the two-step approach to the evaluation and use of internal control i n 
formation, step one is the same as i n the three-step procedure. However, the
second step proceeds directly to tests of bona fides, and the extent of these tests,
or the statistical criteria they are required to meet, are determined by the
subjective evaluation made i n step one.
T h e question that arises when we have to choose between these two concepts
is this: is it necessary to have an objective—not subjective—estimate of the
functioning of internal control before we set standards for the test of bona fides?
In m a k i n g a clear-cut distinction between the three-step and two-step
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procedures and i n making a similar distinction between arriving at a conclusion
about internal control i n contrast with testing bona fides, I have been ignoring
what evidently is the popular practice. T h i s consists of a blending of steps two
and three of the three-step method. A judgment is made about the effectiveness
of internal control i n step one, but it is tentative—it is modified as documents
and other records are examined i f this examination shows that the system is
w o r k i n g less well than the preliminary judgment indicated. It seems to me that
this is a reasonable way to proceed, as i t eliminates the implied need for separate
tests of documents for internal control evaluation.
Testing Statement Amounts
W e must remember i n this connection that we are presumably w o r k i n g w i t h
some k i n d of estimation procedure. It is possible to use acceptance sampling
techniques to decide that internal control is or is not satisfactory, or the records
have been kept with sufficient absence of errors so that we are w i l l i n g to conclude
that the records are sufficiently accurate. However, most auditors evidently
prefer to think i n terms of amount of dollar error w h e n examining financial
statement figures. T h i s requires estimation procedures, and gives rise to the
combination of confidence level and precision range that Broderick has dis
cussed. Even i f we restrict our attention to errors without regard to their
magnitude, most auditors may prefer to estimate the percent of error rather
than to set a firm accept-reject criterion. T h i s means that there is no restriction
to a single sample size or a final sample size when examining records for a
combined check on both internal control and bona fides using estimation sampling.
T h e advantage of setting a sample size i n advance on the basis of whatever
method of evaluation of internal control is selected is that the available informa
tion can be used to indicate what a likely m i n i m u m size is; i n other words,
economy can be maximized. B u t once we have information directly from the
subject population itself we can, i n estimation sampling, calculate the indicated
result, and, i f this leaves us w i t h too wide a range of precision or too l o w a
confidence level, we can then simply increase the sample size to the point
where we have the desired assurance. Because of this possibility, I doubt the
need to make a clean separation of tests of internal control and tests of the
so-called bona fides.
Standards for Precision and Confidence
T h e second major thrust of Jack Broderick's remarks concerns the setting
of standards for precision and confidence, and he has mentioned both the seeming
desire for specific standards which some would evidently have the profession as
a whole establish, and also the problem faced by each auditor i n setting standards
for his o w n work. W e are i n agreement on the proposition that specific numerical
standards should not be set. There are infinite gradations i n the quality of i n 
ternal control and of materiality relative to dollar totals, and it does not seem
practical to fix minimums, which are always likely to become maximums. I
agree that general standards, expressed as objectives to be achieved as they are
in the standards now established by the profession, are the better k i n d of regu
lation. T h e auditor has to tailor his confidence and precision to the complex
facts of each case, and to suggest otherwise would likely do more harm than good.
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T h i s leaves the matter of confidence and precision levels to be determined
specifically by each auditor, and we must ask: what general guidelines are avail
able? W e , of course, have the fact that professional statisticians most often use
95% or 99% or approximations of them for confidence levels. Another way of
looking at the problem is to ask what percent of the time one is w i l l i n g to be
wrong i n order to economize on sample size. A n d this leads immediately to
another question: what are the consequences of being wrong? If the error is i n
accepting improper statements, either no one may ever k n o w the difference or
it may be discovered and there may be a lawsuit for $1,000,000, or some equally
impressive figure.
A practical approach to this decision was formulated for accountants several
years ago and involves, as it must, the assigning of subjective probabilities, or
expectations. 1 It is also being discussed by Professor Felix i n this symposium.
I recommend this approach to all auditors. If you are wrong i n believing an
acceptable set of figures to be materially i n error, you, of course, incur the cost
of the additional investigation necessary to establish the fact of acceptability.
T h i s cost must be built into the calculation just referred to as is the cost of
making the opposite mistake.
Since confidence level and the precision range w i t h i n which sampling results
can be expected to fall are tied together, higher confidence for a particular
sample means a wider precision and vice versa. T o improve one while holding
the other constant requires an increase i n sample size. T h e objective is to arrive
at a combination that meets our standards with as small a sample as the cir
cumstances permit. H o w then should we set precision limits? M r . Broderick
has chosen to define precision i n terms of half the range or "confidence interval";
standard statistical practice defines it as the whole range, recognizing that this
range runs both plus and minus from our estimate of the mean of the population
given by our sample. H a l f the range is, of course, the m a x i m u m amount we
expect to be off i n our estimate i n one direction or the other. M r . Broderick
has indicated that some accountants are inclined to set the precision for their
estimates at plus or minus a material amount.
I agree w i t h M r . Broderick that this is too high. M y understanding of
"material" i n accounting usage is that it represents an amount that significantly
changes the interpretation of the figure to which it applies. A precision range
or confidence interval that runs i n either direction f r o m the estimate to the
extent of a material amount leaves plenty of room for a book value that deviates
from the proper value by a material amount. Presumably we should set confi
dence intervals at plus or minus a m a x i m u m tolerable error; i.e., by an amount
that clearly leaves the interpretation of the published figure unaffected. T h i s has
to be an amount significantly different from a material amount; one can not
set these amounts side by side. F o r example, if we have an inventory stated i n
the accounts as costing $1,000,000, and i f we consider $100,000 material, we
might well use plus-or-minus $25,000 as our confidence interval. If our con
fidence interval was plus-or-minus $100,000, and i f our estimate was precisely
the true amount of the inventory cost—say $900,000—then obviously the con
fidence interval would tend to support the overstated book value and very
likely do us no good. In other words, I share M r . Broderick's concern for the
tendency to set wide precision limits and h i g h sampling risks as a means of
justifying very small samples.
87

Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, I would like to endorse one more of Broderick's concerns,
namely, that auditors need to familiarize themselves w i t h standard statistical
theory i n order to apply statistical sampling methods effectively. T h e A I C P A
has encouraged this w i t h its publication of self-study materials on statistical
sampling, but hopefully a thorough grounding w i l l be obtained routinely by
students majoring i n accounting i n college, and its achievement should be the
responsibility of the educators i n charge of college accounting programs.

Footnotes
1. Harold Bierman, Jr., "Probability, Statistical Decision Theory, and Accounting,"
Accounting Review, July 1962, pp. 400-405.

88

The

7
The Sample of One: Indispensable or Indefensible?
Gregory M. Boni1
Touche Ross & C o .
Discussions and controversies among auditors about sample size have long
been active. I personally experienced them since, at least, when detailed audits
were becoming universally recognized as unable to serve society's needs for
information about ever-enlarging enterprises. Today, however, a new relevance
and urgency arises about the question of sample size. Uncensored answers to
the question may present a challenge to the entire philosophical underpinning
of auditing practice.
The new relevance arises because of two—not entirely unrelated—develop
ments. T h e first is the articulation of Systems Theory. T h e second is the grow
ing loudness of the cry by Society that the justification for technology has not
been based upon humanistic values. Demands are growing that creators and
users of technology be responsible for whether it contributes to or detracts from
human welfare. Increasing attacks come from Society against values which give
virtue to technology with assertions that objectivity or freedom overrides re
sponsibility for human impact.
Challenge to Auditors
W h a t is the relevance to auditors of this advancing environment? If the
profession believes this is an environment i n which it can survive by circum
scribing itself so that the quality of its work w i l l be judged only by its peers
then it can continue on its present course. T h e peers can continue to argue
about 9 5 % confidence limits, or 5 0 % limits. They can argue about h o w to
combine compliance testing with substantive testing. Once they agree w i t h
each other about a l l these standards or procedures, a l l w i l l be solved. Certainty
w i l l be achieved on h o w one's work w i l l be judged. T h e upper hierarchy of
knowledge w i l l be i n the saddle.
However, Society's enlarging position makes me believe that users of
financial information w i l l continue to shout—ever louder: " H e y ! Y o u guys
aren't talking about anything that affects m e ! Y o u argue about standards and
practices of auditing i n areas that by careful definition exclude what I want to
know. A r e the financial statements a fair presentation2 of the information I
need for my decisions? I don't feel any better i f unfair presentation comes from
management fraud, collusion, or because generally accepted accounting principles
bring about that k i n d of result."
89

M y view of auditing encounters threatening forces calling now for resolution
of the mutually exclusive questions of how is "good" auditing to be judged:
By evaluation by one's peers as to compliance w i t h standards?
By pragmatism and utility i n the eyes of the users of financial informa
tion?
W h y a Sample of One?
F o r me, the use of samples of one 3 spearheads a philosophy of auditing
practice that opposes the prevailing audit-practice philosophy. T h e prevailing
philosophy leads to a methodology that predominantly looks to justify its sound
ness by the use of sample sizes that comply with standards or rules derived
externally from a specific audit. The sample of one is a tool for discovery—for
the exercise of creativity by an individual. T h e externally derived sample size
is a tool for inspection—for bringing about conformity, for controlling the w o r k
of others.
The thesis of this paper is that auditing approached w i t h a methodology
logical for inspection is not utilizing the methodology logical for meeting So
ciety's demands for pragmatism and utility. Use of tools that bring about con
formity and control of the work of employees is inconsistent w i t h "good"
auditing. A u d i t i n g involves evaluation of and judgment about interactive sys
tems, not of mechanistic systems. Therefore, if the quality of the results is to
be judged by pragmatism and utility i n the eyes of the user, I perceive that
auditing must use tools suitable for discovery and creativity. T h e stakes may
well be the future role of the profession i n Society.
T h e thoughts presented i n this paper are directed to the level of institu
tionalized concepts that directly affect and strongly influence what auditors
actually do. T h e vast auditing literature, like the Bible, undoubtedly contains
all the imperatives necessary for doing a satisfactory audit. But these impera
tives do not have the force of the institutional environment for influencing an
auditor's behavior. Effectiveness of auditing cannot be judged by only looking
at its prescriptions; auditing must be judged by what human beings do. "Use
judgment," "Be creative," " A s k good questions," " O b t a i n adequate substantiat
i n g evidence," are imperatives which, i f they are to be incorporated i n behavior,
must be institutionalized i n a process which is not overridden and contradicted
by specific and immediate directions and feedback. T h i s paper is directed to
this level of institutionalization.
T h e Mechanistic Approach
T h e implied (if not explicit) philosophy of auditing practice, particularly
as expressed by Statement on A u d i t i n g Procedure N o . 54, is that auditing is an
inspection process of " s t u p i d " objects. Statistical quality control is the most
advanced use of science for performing the inspection process. T h e principles
were developed i n contemplation of outputs (work done) which do not have a
purpose of their o w n and which do not interact with each other. T h a t is, the
outputs are independent of each other and cannot adapt themselves to a purpose.
T h e characteristics of the first unit produced do not act as a force to change
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what unit five or any other unit w i l l look like. U n i t five cannot change itself
because of the way unit one looks. A l l this contemplates behavior of objects
which are "stupid."
T h e inspection process of physical (stupid) objects has characteristics which
are distinctly different from those possible i n auditing. T h e inspector looks for
dimensions or qualities w h i c h specifically and unequivocably are intended to
determine the utility of the product. Its length, weight, color, smoothness, re
sponse become direct means for determining good or bad product. T h e nature
of "errors" need not be discovered, only their existence or non-existence—based
upon the inspection standards—needs to be observed.
Under these conditions, laws of probability logically and usefully apply to
ascertain the existence of "errors" i n the universe. Confidence limits relative to
precision are thoroughly sensible.
T h e L i v i n g System
A u d i t i n g , i n common w i t h other studies or activities related to organizational
behavior, up to now has been heavily influenced by the methodologies so suc
cessfully used i n physical sciences and its related technologies. But there is
growing recognition among management scientists and other social scientists
that continuation of a posture suitable for the physical sciences may bring about
extinction of their disciplines. 4
Accounting information is a representation of a l i v i n g system, not of a
mechanistic one. T h e accounting process is itself a living system. Accordingly,
the audit process encounters characteristics significantly different from those
encountered i n the physical inspection process. In auditing, the objects of study
are not "stupid." Differentiated characteristics of the audit process held i n
common w i t h living systems are:
1) Signals (observable characteristics) emanating from the output (work
done) during stages of processing a transaction are equivocal. T h e
signals do not uncontradictably identify "good" or " b a d " character
istics that affect the utility of information to a user.
2) T h e signals emanating at the processing stages do not provide i n 
formation that can be demonstrated to be useful for establishing
empirically the expectation for errors i n the aggregated end results
of the processing.
3) T h e utility to a user of the aggregated end-results of information
processing is affected by material errors or deviant behavior that
exist i n highly complex functional modules. These modules are the
results of interactive, self-adaptive functioning of many intermediate
processing stages. There are no independent signals that unequivo
cally identify the existence or non-existence of errors or deviant
behavior i n these modules.
I w i l l talk about each of these assertions.
What is the Error?
A missing approval on a return sale voucher or a missing receiving slip on
a payment voucher does not identify errors of interest to the users of accounting
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information. U n l i k e deviations i n length, weight or color of physical objects,
the observed deviations i n the return sale and the payment voucher are not the
characteristics which affect utility to the user. A credit for a return sale which
should not have been granted is an error. But the unapproved credit is not
necessarily an improperly granted credit. Worse yet, approved vouchers may
include improperly granted credits. Because the processing of outputs is selfadaptive (not stupid), at different times the approval or disapproval may signify
different things.
Whether or not it is efficient to track down unapproved credits i n order
to ascertain "goodness" or "badness" should be clarified by the material pre
sented later i n this paper. But for now, observe the ambiguity that comes to the
auditor from ascertaining "goodness" or "badness" at lower levels of processing.
Assume a finding, after investigation, that an unapproved credit is i n fact
appropriately and correctly issued. T h i s could be a result of many causes:
•
•

The credit was correctly prepared i n the first place.
T h e credit was corrected because of the review process even though
the reviewer d i d not reflect his approval by initialling.
• T h e psychological impact of a pending approval motivated the pre
parer into doing proper work.
• The force of system interactions beyond the reviewer either brought
about correction or created the psychological impact that motivated
the preparer into doing proper work.
Expectations of Errors
W i t h all the explanations and meaning that are possible when there are
unapproved returned sales credits, the significance is slight whether approvals,
undifferentiated as to significance, are present 99%, 95%, 9 0 % , or 7 5 % of the
time. A prediction model for forecasting the frequency of future errors cannot
be expected to be validated empirically when the model is derived from such
data.
The interaction of approving return sales credits with other control steps
can logically be expected to affect error rate. But the signals from other control
steps are just as ambiguous as those for return sales credits. I cannot imagine
how complex interactions of ambiguous signals can be used successfully to
establish, empirically, expectations of errors to be found i n the end-results of
information processing.
A serious attempt to deal concretely w i t h expectations of future error and,
therefore, to compute reliance that can be given to internal control is set forth
i n an article by Barry E . C u s h i n g . 5 T h i s article was very useful to me. A l 
though not the intention of the author, it identifies specifically the difficulties
(impossibilities?) of computing the reliance to be given to internal control
for catching those errors which affect the utility of information to the user. I
simply want to point out a few things i n this article that I think make my
position clear.
First, the article does not deal w i t h an interactive world but arbitrarily
defines its world so that it has a mechanistic character. " A feedback control may
provide a useful supplement to a system of preventive controls by monitoring
the performance of a system. However, discussion of modeling techniques which
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apply the concept of feedback is beyond the scope of this paper." 6 ( T h i s quali
fying reference to feedback probably does not contemplate all the complex i n 
teractions and the teleological behavior which i n fact exist beyond direct feed
back mechanisms.)
Second, after excluding by definition a very important part of the real world,
the author expresses the need for parameters among which are the following:
1) p = the probability that the process is correctly executed prior to
administering the control procedure
2) P ( e ) = the probability that the control step w i l l detect and signal
an error given that one exists
3) V e = the estimated average dollar effect of a single undetected error
of type i on the balance of the account
H e asserts about the required parameters: " T h e basic implementation
problem . . . is the derivation of estimates of the probability and cost param
eters . . . Estimates . . . can be developed from (1) records of error frequen
cies and error correction procedures maintained by clerical personnel who perform
the control procedures and (2) data collected by internal or external auditors
."7
H e also states: " . . . estimates for Ce and V e for the case of embezzlement
may be meaningless or impossible to estimate from past experience. . . If infor
mation of this type (experience about embezzlement) is not available, the re
liability model may be of limited usefulness i n examining control procedures
which are intended to prevent embezzlement." 8
Note then the circumscribed world to w h i c h the model applies:
•

Excluded from the model are the efforts of interactive systems and
of embezzlement. ( T h e utility of information to users would not
exclude these two factors. W h a t is the significance of " V e " computed
with these limitations?)
• T h e called for parameters appropriately relate to real "errors," not
to the frequency of omissions i n an audit trail. (Real errors that can
be reliably identified i n the manner envisioned by the author must
be mechanical, low-level operations w i t h virtually no expectancy for
self-adaptation or for changes f r o m interaction. T h i s excludes sig
nificant areas of the accounting process that are of great interest
to the user of information and the auditor. Subsequent discussion
gives support to this comment.)
Concerns of Auditing
Before attempting the important job of identifying the functional modules
that are of intimate concern to users of financial information, I w o u l d first like
to address some concepts about the fundamental concerns of auditing.
Accounting information constitutes a model. The model represents and,
therefore, gives information about the status of a business system. T h i s model
involves accounting principles designed as a means—a language and a logic—for
describing that which may exist i n a business system. Thus a prime auditing
question is whether that which has been represented as existing in terms of the
model also exists in fact. A n error, or non-congruence between the representa
tion and the fact could come from several causes:
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1) The language or the logic has been misused or misapplied, or is
inadequate to fairly describe that which is k n o w n to exist.
2) A n existing fact which the model contemplates should be identified
has been overlooked or erroneously measured.
3) That which is k n o w n to exist i n fact has purposefully not been de
scribed either by omission or by substitution of a description of a
non-existent fact.
Recorded accounting information is the output of a living system. T h e
status (health and condition) of the business system being represented is dis
closed not only by giving the results from classifying the external and internal
transactions into which the business has entered, but also by incorporating into
the model relationships (attributes) that cast light upon the influence of these
transactions upon future transactions. These attributes include collectability,
saleability, recoverability, etc. Thus, the presence of certain attributes of assets
and liabilities are recorded i n addition to the bare transactions.
Attributes result not only from the nature of the transactions, but perhaps
more importantly from economic events that occur or exist i n the environment
and from entrepreneurial decisions. Economic events include loss of market to
competition (may affect saleability of inventories), new inventions that cause
obsolescence, troubles i n the business situation of customers, change i n market
prices, etc. Entrepreneurial decisions can obsolete products, plants, etc. or, con
trariwise, they can keep life aflame i n assets, such as investments made i n
research. I n summary then, accounting information represents the state of a
business system that results from the interactions of functional modules, as
displayed i n Figure 1.
A primary issue concerning the utility of the information is whether or not
the results of the interactions of the modules shown i n Figure 1 give a fair
presentation of that which exists in fact. T h i s issue extends much farther than
whether transactions have been authorized and the mechanics of handling and
recording are relatively error free. A u d i t i n g is challenged to face this broad issue
in being measured as to its pragmatism and utility.
Modules of Recorded Accounting Information
Transactions with
outsiders

Measuring and recording
procedures

Internal activity

Organization structure
and operating
procedures

External activity

Management decisions
about recording

Entrepreneurial
decisions
FIGURE 1
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Errors i n Complex Functional Modules
Several times reference has been made to functional modules that are of
intimate concern to users of financial information. T h e presentation thus far
has been directed towards m a k i n g evident that such modules must involve re
cording functions at a level that is germane to the primary question of what
the model represents as existing. Deviant behavior of these modules constitutes
errors which affect the primary interest of the user of the information. I identify
the deviant behavior that constitutes errors expressed i n terms of such modules
as follows:
1) Errors that relate to the recording of transactions:
a) Monies received but not so recorded—representing diversion of
receipts from credit sales, cash sales of merchandise and miscel
laneous cash receipts
b) Monies paid for non-business purposes (payments that divert
monies of the business)
c) Non-bona fide sales recorded
d) Non-bona fide assets recorded—assets falsely represented as identi
fied by count, and assets physically lost or stolen not recorded
e) Liabilities incurred but not recorded
f) Transactions classified or clerically processed so as to bring about
misrepresentation of attributes w h i c h exist i n fact
2) Errors i n recording the occurrence or existence of external events,
entrepreneurial decisions, and internal activities that affect those
attributes of assets or liabilities w h i c h the model contemplates should
be recognized
First, a few thoughts that may result just from studying the classification of
errors presented.
One, the type of error that can be ascertained from an inspection methodology
exists only i n the last listed transaction module (If)—a module likely to cause
the least difficulty.
Second, the assessment of the significance of errors is not to be accomplished
by ascertaining the dollar value of errors i n an account balance. T h e account
balance approach was contemplated i n the article by Barry Cushing i n his
parameter V e . 9 O n the contrary, it is proposed that significance of errors (and
utility to the user) is to be related to the business function being recorded. T h e
functions identify and define roles that the user wants served i n the recording
system; an error is behavior that deviates from expectations of how the role
is to be served.
T h i r d , there may be all kinds of unauthorized execution ( i n the sense of
lack of approvals, etc.) i n the selected functions, but these "errors" do not add
up to, or predict, or have a demonstrable effect upon the errors which concern
the user.
Fourth, each of the user-level functional modules comprise many interacting
functional elements at several hierarchical levels. Recognition of the nature of
this complexity leads me to look to a discovery methodology rather than an
inspection methodology. A n illustration of the elements of one of the systems—
Receipt of Monies from Credit Sales—is set forth i n Figure 2.
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1. Controlled shipping record
2. Shipments accounted for
as billed

1. Billings numerically controlled
2. Control established
independently from
ledger clerk

(a) Shipments

(b) Recordings

Billings:

Control of substitute
credits:

Record Processing 1. Recorded independently of
ledger clerk
2. Checked from opener's listings
for date of deposit
(a) Exceptions explored
Deposit
1. Bank accounts reconciled;
deposits i n transit controlled
by independent count

1. Sales department interest i n
recorded sales
(a) Budgets
(b) Customer service
(c) Commissions
2. Monthly financials agreed
with books and furnished
to sales department

1. Budgetary cash control and
independent cash balance
surveillance

Operating and recording procedures (elements)
F r o m processing the transaction
F r o m collateral activity

Receipt identified 1. Listed upon receipt
2. Remittance advice saved

Control of deposits:

Elements to be
controlled

FIGURE 2

Elements of System for Receipt of Monies from Credit Sales

1. Organization has only a few
large shipments readily known
widely by management
2. Budgetary control by a wide
spread management group
supported by financials which
are agreed with books
3. Internal audit function

3. Internal audit function

2. Numerous very small checks
making mishandling
cumbersome

Large checks only, m a k i n g
collection a matter of wide
spread management interest

Events and conditions
affecting procedures
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1. Independent and highly
placed authorization

Write-offs
(bad debts, etc.)

Control over access
to other monies

1. Original remittance advice
forwarded to ledger clerk
(deters lapping)

1. Independent authorization
2. Supported by receivers for
returned sales
3. Audited for validity
4. Recorded independently from
ledger clerk
5. Numerically controlled

Follow up of
uncollected items

2—Continued

1. Cash not accessible to
handlers of checks
2. Bank transfers available

1. Frequent account
agings
2. Uncollected accounts followed
by independent credit
department
3. Independent trial balancing

1. Sales department
(a) Budgets
(b) Operating problems
(c) Commissions

Operating and recording procedures (elements)
F r o m processing the transaction
F r o m collateral activity

Customer credits

Elements to be
controlled

FIGURE

Elements of System for Receipt of Monies from Credit Sales

1. Size and concentration of
accounts
2. Internal audit function

1. Size and concentration of
accounts—credit character and
ready recognizability of
customer

1. Internal audit function

Events and conditions
affecting procedures

Anatomy of the Error-level Functional M o d u l e
Inspection of the Elements to be Controlled, shown on Figure 2, that can
be found i n a system for receiving monies without diversion, gives specifics on
which to base some important conclusions: (1) Whether or not monies may be
expected to be diverted need not be independent upon the existence, or the
manner of application of one procedural element. (2) T h e interlocking of the
elements provides the strongest and most meaningful assurance of whether or
not there is compliance as to any one element. If one key element exists, a
whole cluster must exist. (3) T h e non-existence of a control element, or low
frequency i n the number of times evidence exists of its application, is not of
itself indicative of an error where it hurts: diversion or loss of assets.
There is an entire chain of systems available that can deter diversion of
receipts that might result from failures i n any one of the categories. Note that
in Figure 2, the degree of control may be challenged i n this sequence:
1) A r e the incoming checks under direct control from the time of
receipt until deposit?
2) If the incoming-check control suggests that checks could be diverted
without a signal, is there any way to get r i d of, or initially avoid
the accountability charge on the books?
3) If the accountability charges are not eliminated, w i l l there be effort
to contact the customer?
T h i s sequence of questions contemplates the manner i n which major control
elements interact. That there is extensive interaction of lower level elements
with each other must also be apparent. A t the major-control level the interactions
extend to the elements comprising collateral activity, and to the nature of events
and transactions, w i t h the elements for controlling the processing of a transaction.
Reliance versus Understanding
Reference by the reader to the function of receiving monies, as an illustra
tion, w i l l help me convey what I believe the auditor must rely upon i n order
to formulate a judgment on the existence of deviant behavior—or non-congru
ence between that which is recorded and that which exists i n fact.
It appears obvious to me that the auditor cannot simply use an inspection
process methodology to observe unequivocal error signals that come from this
module and conclude that an error does or does not exist. It also appears obvious
to me that the auditor cannot rely upon the system to catch part of the errors
and upon "substantive" auditing to catch an adequate portion of the remaining
errors. There is only one error that either is discovered or not discovered: re
ceipts of monies of a significant amount have been diverted. A realization about
diversion either exists or does not exist i n the auditor's m i n d .
In short, I do not believe that final reliance and, therefore, the confidence
in a stated precision, comes from the sum of two separate contributions for dis
covering error. I believe there is only one source for an auditor's final reliance:
the gut feel of a critical, competent human being who has developed an understanding (by combining hypotheses and empiric evidence) of the manner i n
which a functional role is being performed. I n other words, the reliance of the
auditor is belief i n his judgment as to the nature of reality.
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The understanding of the manner i n which a functional role is being
performed comes from asking questions and getting responses. Philosophers of
science today assert that even i n the most "objective" of sciences, understanding
involves intuitive leaps. Understanding exists when a critical, competent person
feels right. A critical person does not feel right unless he has touched base with
an adequate number of his perceptions of facts, logical deductions, and visions
of outcomes. H i s process is more simultaneous than sequential. Findings at
one base don't settle the issues for the next base; bases cast light upon each other
by being related like the chicken and the egg. The critical person touches base
with countless perceptions that without conscious control present themselves to
his m i n d ; he considers whether or not they are relevant to the outcome he is
struggling w i t h . H e gets hunches about relevance by combining the things he
perceives; an answer satisfying to h i m may result. Above all he exercises judg
ment holistically.
In short, understanding is a creative act each time it occurs. Leaps occur
that give new meaning to old facts. N e w relationships are faced, unexpected
conclusions may be reached, stimulation for new follow-on steps may emerge.
Decisions that come from reference to predetermined concepts are not creative.
Perhaps the issue of h o w to make a decision by judgment is epitomized by the
question of whether you know what you see, or you see what you know. I
submit that creative thought is to k n o w what you see. Reference to pre-estab
lished hierarchies leads to seeing only what you know, or worse yet, seeing what
someone who isn't present once knew.
The Sample of One is Indispensable
If understanding comes from grasping and perceiving relationships among
data which were initially unrelated; i f achieving understanding is the process
by which a human being makes a discovery; if understanding is built upon
getting meaning from the answers to questions, then the sample of one is i n 
dispensable to auditing. T h e sample of one is the tool for asking those questions
that can make answers meaningful. Inspection-type sampling of processing steps
either is not pragmatic or is counterproductive for freeing the creativity needed
to develop understanding—the creativity needed to discover.
F r o m time to time, I have reached the same conclusions concerning a sample
of one starting from different points than i n this article: analysis by examining
concrete and specific situations gives me particularly satisfying results about the
pragmatism of such samples. F o r this article, however, space and time limit
the presentation to mostly deductive arguments at abstract conceptual levels. T o
help somewhat i n perceiving concretely the approach that I am advocating, an
oversimplified illustration is presented.
Illustration of Auditing for Diverted Receipts
The functional module related to receipt of monies is utilized to provide an
illustration solely because the material already provided i n Figure 2 makes dis
cussion of this module more understandable and meaningful.
In Company X Y Z , the auditor finds a system that provides little direct
control over checks received but little chance of substituting credits for any
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diverted checks. H e also finds that there is excellent follow-up by the credit
department using an aged accounts receivable trial balance furnished by the
ledger clerk. Thus, his overall view is that, i n spite of lack of direct control over
checks received, there is little opportunity for diversion of receipts, except that
the aging furnished by the ledger clerk may not correspond w i t h the data i n the
ledgers. T w o alternatives may be considered for learning more about the attri
butes of monies received: either (1) compare the ledger w i t h a recent aging
furnished to the credit department, or (2) confirm w i t h customers accounts
with overdue balances. (It should be noted that, i n this example, one test of
the attributes of aging i n the latter part of the period would be sufficient to
form a judgment. A t any point that the credit department receives valid infor
mation about accounts, the auditor's findings are that strong contact w i t h the
customer may be expected. Diverted receipts handled i n this manner should
not long remain undetected.) T h e auditor chose to confirm overdue accounts
shown on the ledger, but since many accounts were with chain stores, confirma
tion replies received (after specific follow-up efforts) covered only a minor
portion of these accounts.
Under these circumstances, the auditor determined that his next questions
should be asked by performing either one or both of the following steps:
1) Compare the ledger w i t h the most recent aged trial balance used by
the credit department for follow-up.
2) A s k customers to confirm the unpaid status of specific past due i n 
voices.
M y experience leads me to believe that the methodology used by our illus
trative auditor w i l l give h i m a better basis than the usual auditor has for forming
a judgment about receipt of monies. Current audit methodology would probably
differ from that i n the illustration i n several important respects:
1) Non-replies to confirmation requests would not be followed by
checking of an aged trial balance actually used by the credit depart
ment; chances are attempts to confirm specific overdue invoices w o u l d
not be made. ( T h e meaning of the customers' non-responses to the
usual auditor would be different from that for the illustrative auditor
of Company X Y Z . )
2) Emphasis on confirming overdue accounts receivable would not be
developed from the review of internal control.
3) Status of control over processing of checks would not affect the
number of confirmation requests to any accounts. T h e issue con
cerning check processing would be weighed w i t h other controls
involving receivables to decide i f control is weak, ordinary, strong,
etc. A t best, this evaluation would be the controlling influence on
how many confirmations to send but it would not influence to w h o m
they should be sent.
4) If the overdue customers' accounts were i n the sample of confirma
tions requested, non-reply would not stir further action that differs
from the action taken for non-reply to other customers' accounts.
If the two audit approaches are to be evaluated i n terms of pragmatism
for discovering diversion of receipts, then if diversion exists, the approach used
in the illustration must be seen as superior. Information theory defines infor100

mation as the existence of interrelationships which constitute constraints upon
behavior; thus information constitutes a reduction i n the uncertainty of be
havior—random behavior means non-existence of information, i.e. non-existence
of, knowledge about relationships. More relationships concerning receipt of
monies w i l l be recognized by our illustrative auditor than by our usual auditor.
There w i l l be less uncertainty for our illustrative auditor (his gut can feel
better) than there w i l l be for our usual auditor i f he were to consult his anatomy.
T h e problem for our current auditor, expressed i n less formal language
than by the use of information theory, is that he is not motivated by his meth
odology nor does he have adequate information w i t h which to think through
what he has available for judgment about a specific function. H i s methodology
does not encourage finding interrelationships to give h i m a gut feel; his emphasis
is on sufficient (as defined by authority) evidence to "verify" individual pieces
as though they exist independently. So, for non-receipt of replies to confirma
tion requests, he refers to standards and practices for what to do next. H e asks
if he can accept examining subsequent payments of the account or i f he must
examine shipping records. H e does not personally attempt to evaluate what
the steps contribute to a particular situation on a particular audit; rather, he
asks what he must do i n order to comply w i t h authority.
Sample-of-one Questions Find More Interrelationships
Broader inferences can be drawn from the illustration by relating the audit
work done by the illustrative auditor to a conceptual framework. A framework
for classifying the steps available to an auditor for increasing information (and
thus reducing uncertainty) follows:
1) Ascertain interconnections
that exist between transactions, events
and entrepreneurial decisions, and direct processing steps, operating
procedures, collateral material and recording decisions (the modules
of Figure 2 ) .
2) Ascertain the actual processing work done—this to include what was
perceived by the worker, his response to what he perceived, the inter
actions w i t h other work, and responses to that interaction. (Data
needed to meaningfully determine the nature and quality of work
done.)
3) Ascertain the nature of the audit trial and the extent of its existence.
4) Obtain representations from the sources of existing or potential
transactions, events, and decisions and compare these representations
with recordings i n the accounting records. Representations from
the source of the occurrence must not be taken from the medium or
channel regularly used for communications to the accounting system.
5) Obtain representations from sources (both inside and outside the
Company) other than the accounting records to develop data for
casting light upon the existence of attributes of recorded informa
tion.
6) Develop symptoms by examining recorded representations and utiliz
ing internal logic to channel inquiries directed to discovery of the
non-existence of expected interconnections. (Internal logic refers to
the dualisms which bring about expectations that a pair must exist
if one thing is represented to exist. Some few examples are: interest
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expense with debt, property taxes and insurance with real property,
current age of accounts with collectibility and bona fides, twelve
monthly charges with annually rented property, rise i n sales prices
w i t h increased dollar amount of sales when there is no increase i n
physical deliveries.)
I maintain that opportunity for discovery increases when the m i n d has
acquired an increase i n data w h i c h is amenable to the forming of interrelation
ships which are specifically related to the objective. (Interrelationships are data
converted into information.) O n this premise, an increase i n pragmatic power
occurs i n each of the classifications of audit steps shown above, i f the steps are
directed to developing separately information about each of the functional modules
i n which "errors" are significant to the user. F o r each such functional module,
the following table shows h o w the relationship of each of the six audit-step
classifications is viewed with respect to its usefulness for understanding the
functional module, and i n turn, to the usefulness of developing further informa
tion separately by sub-categories of the module.
Specific understanding
needed for:

Audit-step
classifi
cations

Usefulness
for under
standing
the module

Categories
of events,
transactions
and
decisions

Short
periods of
time

Used i n
illustrative
case

1.

Essential

Yes

Ordinarily
no

Yes

2.

Impractical

Yes

Yes

No

3.

None

....

....

No

4.

Essential

Yes

Yes

Potentially
yes—to con
firm specific
overdues

5.

Essential

Yes

Ordinarily
no

Yes

6.

Essential

Yes

O n l y as
selfindicated

Yes (eg.,
aged trial
balance, or
confirm
response)

Comments about the audit-step classifications and other items i n this table follow.
Previous discussion has been directed to explaining why audit-step classifica
tions 2 and 3 are indicated as having low priority when they are evaluated by
the test of pragmatism and utility.
Audit-step classifications 1, 4, 5 and 6 are contemplated to contribute to the
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final judgment only i n their combination, not separately. F o r example, the
non-return of confirmations (audit-step classification 5) i n the illustrative case
is also a symptom (audit-step classification 6) from which meaning emerges
when related to information developed about interconnections (audit-step classi
fication 1). But i n turn, more is k n o w n about interconnections than can be
gleaned from audit-step classification 1 standing by itself. T h e meaning given
by audit-step classification 1 to results i n the other audit-step classifications,
creates meaning not previously existing. Thus, there is no separate or additive
reliance, only an integrated reliance. T h e final reliance is based on information
not even partially present i n any one of the classifications separately.
Questions, incited or driven by symptoms relevant to a particular function,
can be expected to lead to answers that give more information about each particu
lar function than questions asked randomly (without being driven by symptoms)
over all functions combined. Increase i n information may similarly be expected
to be developed w i t h respect to transactions, events and decisions i f questions
are driven by symptoms relevant to individual categories underlying that which
occurred i n the business system. The existence of order (information) within
each functional module about such things as geographic areas, large transactions,
productive material versus supplies versus services, bar steel versus hardware,
large customers, single source-of-supply vendors, etc., increases the opportunity
for the m i n d to leap to creative relationships. In statistical theory, ascertaining
whether one or more "universes" are present, also stratification, is somewhat
analagous to developing specific understanding i n significant categories. T h e
impact of this upon a "sample of one" w i l l be discussed shortly.
Attention is directed to the tremendous importance of directing audit-step
classification 2 towards developing representations from the sources about the
existence of events and entrepreneurial decisions. T h e utility of accounting infor
mation often may be more affected by these factors than by transactions. N o n directed questioning, or sampling (or even completely examining transactions),
as a means of following the audit trail does not provide adequate understanding
of significant events and entrepreneurial decisions.
Is understanding increased by isolating information to short periods of time
throughout the year? The view reflected i n the table is that only for audit-step
classification 4 (representations from the sources about events, etc.) is time
always significant. F o r audit-step classifications 1, 5 and 6, the nature of the
initial inquiries casts light on whether a spread over time is significant. O r d i 
narily, audit-step classification 5 gives adequate understanding through inquiring
about cumulative results. A n example of such inquiring is i n the illustrative
case.
How the Sample of One Works
T h e assertion has been advanced that the discovery process for auditing is
satisfactorily concluded when a critical, competent person feels right about inter
relationships i n his m i n d . T h e interrelationships consist of concepts and experi
ences that are relevant to objectives he has undertaken to accomplish. H e has
brought the interrelationships to that concluding point by asking questions
prompted initially by his previously experienced relationships with analagous
subject matter; his subsequent questions are prompted by the interrelationships
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experienced after answers to his question are obtained. W h e n he no longer is
prompted to ask questions, he understands, he feels right, and he can shout
Eureka! The shout expresses the satisfaction that comes from having successfully
combined logic w i t h an intuitive leap beyond that indicated by the data.
In my approach, the sample of one denotes a methodology for asking useful
questions when one is engaged i n the discovery process. F o r auditing, the
sample of one embodies two concepts:
1) Each question is framed so that the answer is required to be i n a
form that eliminates ambiguity as to whether communication exists
between questioner and responder. Wherever possible, this calls for
answers i n the form of an existing example that is responsive to a
request to "Show me one."
2) Each question is designed i n keeping w i t h the expectation that the
sample produced w i l l provide information useful for framing a next
question; expectations do not exist that samples w i l l produce informa
tion that independently establishes or substantiates reality.
Since the incidence of questions is largely dependent upon the answer to
the preceding question, an inherent quality of the sample of one is that the
pattern of coverage w i l l vary from engagement to engagement, as well as, from
year to year. Consider that auditing with the objective of discovery is akin to
hunting. A hunter catches up to his quarry by learning its fixed patterns; if
a hunter's patterns are fixed, he can be made into the hunted.
A sample constituting one example provides optimal increase i n information
(relationships brought to m i n d ) when i t is obtained from a highly ordered
process. The h i g h degree of order removes uncertainty as to the meaning of the
sample; its message is clear. A second example under these circumstances can
give no more nformation than the first.
T h i s concept of the relationship of order to meaning is evident when con
sidering a blood sample. O n l y one sample is taken. Its meaning is clear because
of the h i g h degree of order that prevails i n the blood system. Observe that the
high degree of order removes uncertainty as to the meaning of the sample, but
the order i n no way removes uncertainty as to whether the blood w i l l show
deviant behavior (an error i n good functioning).
T h e auditor's commonly held intuitive feeling that increased control i n a
system warrants a smaller sample must be founded upon this sense of needing
fewer examples for understanding. However, there is no sound basis for the
extension of the feeling about reduced uncertainty i n understanding so that it
includes reduced likelihood of error or deviant behavior. In statistical quality
control deviant behavior is asked to speak for itself—it is not inferred from the
orderliness of the machine that produces the product.
If "errors" must be discovered by developing increased information, a
second sample of blood is not taken. Other interconnections are made. So i n
auditing, samples of one are logical, but it is not logical to use size samples
where "strong" control exists. Note that i f a system ordinarily expected to be
orderly has no order, this too is determinable from a sample of one. If meaning
is obliterated by uncertainty, then again, more meaningless samples do not
increase information. F o r example, a sample of petty cash vouchers found to
be prepared i n pencil gives all the information obtainable from them—their
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meaning for control is uncertain. Examination of more vouchers prepared i n
pencil w i l l not reduce the uncertainty.
The concept embodied i n a sample of one is applicable to all of the auditstep classifications deemed useful for the process of discovery. T h i s covers
classifications 1, 4, 5 and 6 previously discussed. W h a t this contemplates for each
category w i l l be made more concrete.
For audit-step classification 1, ascertainting interconnections between occur
rences with processing (including the interconnection between processing steps)
and collateral material, the sample of one approach contemplated is straight
forward. Following the concept that orderliness reduces uncertainty of under
standing, the questioning is effected by drawing samples. T h i s contemplates
w o r k i n g along paths that reflect functional relationships, using representative
categories of occurrences. F o r example, one payment voucher for each repre
sentative vendor, or for each representative material, service, etc. is traced
through all of the elements related to the payment cycle. H o l d i n g the same
sample throughout the processing cycle increases the information about the inter
connections of the processing and of the occurrences. T h e same payment vouchers
should be taken through the engineering department, the procurement depart
ment, the receiving department, etc., etc.
Answers received at each stage should always be utilized for framing the
next question. Expectations of the manner of processing i n related stages are
developed from answers to questions. Answers received should be particularly
considered for whether the sampled items i n fact represent homogenous cate
gories. Also note that an ambiguous answer always warrants or requires a
new sample of one to determine whether the ambiguity is representative of
what is to be found.
For audit-step classification 4, obtaining representation of occurrences from
the source (sometimes including sources outside the company), the questioning
initially follows the pattern just described. W o r k i n g along functionally related
paths the auditor looks for samples of representations of what i n fact occurred.
What's happened this year? D i d prices go up? Has the number of customers
increased w i t h w h o m the company dealt? Have new products been developed?
W h a t has been the obsolescence problem? Have new markets been entered?
Is the company getting advertising behind new products? Has the support of
any products been dropped? W i t h i n each department the auditor would want
to ask about what information is used for decision making, what written infor
mation there is concerning the matters discussed.
Representative samples of one, developed at the sources of occurrences, may
be used to frame questions to the accounting recordings. In most cases it is
likely that the question can best be asked by comparing an aggregation (either
regularly available or specifically computed) from the source w i t h an aggrega
tion of results reflected by the accounting records. T h e concept previously given
that identifies a sample of one is embodied i n this form of questioning. It con
stitutes one question "designed w i t h the expectation that the sample produced
w i l l provide information useful for framing a next question." T h e distinguishing
characteristic of the sample of one is that the w o r k is one step that is part of
a purposeful process; it is not an inspection step that exists independently of the
entire audit process.
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In this same sense random sampling and statistical theory could be utilized
to develop an estimate of the aggregate effect of occurrences, as represented by
the source, for asking one question to obtain one sample about the recording
of these occurrences.
For audit-step classification 5, obtaining representation from outside sources
for casting light upon recorded attributes, the concept embodied i n a sample
of one is again present. T h i s audit step is concerned w i t h confirmation i n its
generic meaning—i.e., "added information." Nonaccounting-department data
provides a source of confirmation that auditors seldom utilize.
F o r the sample of one philosophy to be followed, "substantive" audit steps
must be converted from being viewed as the upper hierarchy of evidence (hard
evidence) obtained to prove that an account balance is substantiated, to being
information gathered for answering a question about the interconnections i n
a function.
F o r example, the existing practice w i t h respect to customer confirmations
replies records the dollar proportion of the total customer accounts that have
been "confirmed." The initial selection of accounts to be confirmed is unrelated
to a question about a function. T h e meaning of the replies cannot be and is not
looked upon i n the light of the interconnections that exist i n those functional
modules which are significant as to "error" characteristics.
T o change this approach, the relationship which the customer's confirmation
reply can have to the functional modules must be identified. These relationships
are:
1) Bona fides of the account (the sales recording function)
2) U n p a i d status of the account (the receipts diversion function)
3) Disputes over charges (the function of recording events that affect
attributes to be recognized)
T h e initial requests for confirmation must be influenced by the next question
that needs to be asked about these functional modules. A s i n the situation of
the illustrative case, this both brings about different selections of accounts for
confirmation and changes the meaning of the replies.
Where an attribute to be sampled is distributed over a large number of
homogenous accounts, random sampling is appropriate. (But confidence limits
are not a dependent variable of "reliance" upon control.) T h e aggregate result
w i l l permit asking one question for each attribute being sampled.
In the same way, confirmation (getting added information) must proceed
i n connection w i t h each of the "error" functional modules. Particular emphasis
must be placed upon the functional module relating to attributes; this stimu
lation may bring about the change i n audit methodology that turns out to be
the most significant.
Conclusions
T h e question H o w much testing is enough? asked so many times over
the past forty years was the wrong question. W e needed to first ask whether
auditing is an inspection process or a discovery process. T h e right question was
whether the auditing problem is to see what you know, or to know what you see.
Further, we needed to make clear to ourselves that the resolution of this question
is to be governed by pragmatism and utility to the user of information.
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W h e n this fundamental issue is resolved, the methodology to be used for
sampling readily becomes clear. I believe resolution i n terms of pragmatism and
utility leads readily to the conclusion that auditing calls for methodology appro
priate for asking questions about the nature of subject matter that does not
emit unequivocal signals. A u d i t i n g is a process of discovery, not observation
of signals. If the resolution were that auditing is an inspection process, the
sample of one is indefensible; i f auditing is to know what you see, the sample
of one is indispensable. O u r present methodology implies the pursuit of a phi
losophy of auditing consistent w i t h seeing what you know.
The discovery process successfully functions as a mixture of science and
intuition. Science must contribute guidelines that encourage and assist human
creativity. I believe that the most important such guideline is that the audit
effort should be built from, around and related to functional modules
relevant to error determination. Clear identification by the profession of these
modules is the first order of business. T h e conceptual analysis and comprehen
sion of audit steps available, i n the manner set forth i n this article, also is an
important guideline to assist creativity. Comprehension of the strengths, weak
nesses, and nature of the methodology involved i n the use of the sample of one,
must be i n the tool k i t of a discoverer. Certainly not least, the auditor should
k n o w systems theory and technology and be highly conversant w i t h business
system practices.
The content of today's auditing standards is the most significant manifesta
tion of the audit philosophy presently being advocated. W h e n the standards
assert that the auditing process is driven by symptoms, not by mandatory pro
cedures, we w i l l know that the auditor as a discoverer—as a creative human
being—will have been encouraged.
I believe the most significant change that the sample-of-one philosophy of
auditing would bring about is the new discoveries of the non-congruence be
tween the representation and reality of attributes that come from events and
entrepreneurial decisions. Relating the significance of auditing results to func
tional modules rather than dollar balances of accounts might even bring insights
on dealing with the attribute which is an ever-present bogeyman—the going
concern question.
Adoption of the advocated sample-of-one philosophy must introduce a
challenge to the organization and professional staffing of public accounting firms.
I believe the challenge is: can the responsibility to society, evaluated i n terms of
pragmatism and utility, be met by organizations designed for mass production
and staffed w i t h professionals educated and trained to be dependent upon
direction and control from the top.
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Ahead, Proceedings of the 1972 Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing
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3. T h e meaning given to "sample of o n e " is an extension of that presented in "Some
Observations on Statistical Sampling in A u d i t i n g , " by Howard F . Stettler, The Journal of
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paper.
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Discussant's Response to
The Sample of One: Indispensable or Indefensible?
Alvin A. Arens
Michigan State University
Before examining i n somewhat greater detail the content of M r . Boni's
stimulating paper, I would like to establish m y perceptions of the primary
differences between the "Sample of O n e : Indispensable or Indefensible" and
H o w a r d Stettler's classic original article of which this is an extension, "Some
Observations on Statistical Sampling i n A u d i t i n g . " 1 M y reason for doing this
i n no way is to criticize Boni's paper, but rather to demonstrate that the basic
concepts so well known from Stettler's article are completely different from the
ones included i n this paper.
The relevant section i n Stettler's article is where he rejects the recommenda
tion of the A I C P A Committee on Statistical Sampling for use of reliability
levels of 50 to 95 percent confidence for compliance testing and states instead:
By contrast, it is my contention that the auditor may properly
ignore the question of sample reliability when adequate controls over
internal control are present, reducing reliability practically to zero, so
that only one of each type of item need be tested. O n the other hand,
if internal control is deficient, the auditor's modification of his examina
tion should not be i n the direction of increasing sample size for his tests
of transactions to achieve increased reliability for his conclusions about
compliance w i t h the system of internal control. T h e sample of one of
each type of transaction should suffice to indicate that the system such
as it is, is operative, and a larger sample that would disclose the extent
of compliance helps very little i n assessment of the fairness or propriety
of the account balances produced by the system. 2
T h e point Stettler was making, using the terminology of S A S # 1 , section 320,
is that compliance testing is not necessary beyond a walk-through test to help
understand the system and that the emphasis should be on substantive testing.
Boni takes a similar but much broader view of the meaning of a sample
of one. Although he certainly believes i n the concept of a walk-through test,
his use of the term "a sample of one" is a m u c h broader concept than Stettler's.
H e gives an example near the end of the paper where a sample of confirmations
of accounts receivable is used to test for aging and other attributes of interest.
Since the items included i n the sample are dealing w i t h one question, the test
is referred to as a part of a sample of one. Similarly, he also talks about com
pliance tests w i t h a random sample and statistical theory being used to estimate
the aggregate effect of certain occurrences.
W h i l e Stettler restricted his use of a sample of one to a sample of one or
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two items, Boni's sample of one pertains to both compliance testing and sub
stantive testing, and it can include sample sizes of more than one. T h i s use
of a sample of one, as stated by Boni i n his paper i n footnote 3, is an extension
of Stettler's concept. It also makes it a considerably different concept.
Boni's Integrated Approach to Auditing
Instead of a paper discussing the concept of a sample of one i n the sense
used by Stettler, my perceptions are that the paper deals w i t h the notion that
the individual parts of the audit should be carefully integrated with the overall
objectives of the audit rather than treating each part independently. T h e basic
concept B o n i deals with involves asking intelligent questions i n all aspects of
the audit and interrelating relevant parts of the audit by understanding the
client's system and following up on inquiries and the responses to the inquiries.
In this context, many excellent and useful comments are made throughout the
paper.
Since there are parts of the paper w i t h which I am i n agreement and other
parts where I disagree, I have chosen to limit my comments to M r . Boni's
paper rather than digress into writing a separate paper on the subject. It is
always tempting for a discussant to depart from the assigned topic and write
a completely new paper on a related subject. In this case, I prefer to avoid that
temptation.
Areas in Which We Are in Agreement
Although it is not feasible to state all of the areas where Boni and I agree
i n his paper, the following areas of agreement should suffice to demonstrate that
I support most of his basic ideas. T h e areas where we agree are not listed i n
any order of importance and are not meant to be mutually exclusive. Since
these areas where we agree are discussed more extensively i n his paper, there is
little need for extensive elaboration here.
1. Auditors should be concerned about transactions w i t h outsiders,
external economic conditions, and entrepreneurial decisions that
affect the financial statements. More emphasis should probably be
placed on external economic conditions and entrepreneurial deci
sions both i n auditing research and i n practice.
2. T h e auditor must understand and evaluate the client's system i n the
broad sense of the use of systems. T h i s includes the accounting
system, personnel, interrelationships between people, the overall
organization, the marketing organization to the extent it is relevant
to the audit, etc.
3. T h e development of the audit tests should be based on an under
standing of the client's system and should emphasize efficient tests
to locate errors that are expected to exist.
4. T h e auditor should not simply comply w i t h auditing standards i n
a rote manner independently of the unique circumstances of the
audit. A mechanical approach to auditing is unlikely to result i n
a well-performed audit.
5. Intelligent questions should be asked throughout the audit and
they should be the basis for further questions. W h e n auditors do
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6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.

not have inquiring minds, there is increased likelihood of over
looking errors.
Questions asked i n a systematic manner about the system are more
useful than random questions. T h e questions should be framed
i n a logical fashion that aims toward a complete understanding of
the client's system.
T h e sample results of every sample should be carefully analyzed
to determine the impact of the errors on the system.
Substantive test results should be carefully analyzed to evaluate
their impact on the client's system. T h e tendency to evaluate sub
stantive errors only i n terms of their impact on the financial state
ments should be avoided. It is important to determine and under
stand the system weakness that permitted the error.
Once the auditor understands the client's system, he should not
expand his sample to get a greater understanding of the system.
The tendency of automatically increasing the sample size whenever
errors are found should be strongly resisted. Naturally, there are
instances where it is appropriate to increase the sample beyond the
original initial sample.
Errors and exceptions of all types must be directed at determining
their impact on financial information. F r o m an audit point of
view, only errors i n the financial statements directly affect the audi
tor's opinion. A l l errors should ultimately be evaluated i n terms
of the effect on the statements.
Creative discovery of problems is highly desirable. It is necessary
to be constantly on the alert for the unusual, to ask relevant ques
tions and obtain satisfactory answers, to develop meaningful and
relevant audit programs that meet specific objectives and to avoid
being mechanistic i n performing audit responsibilities.

One area of the paper where I believe a particularly useful contribution is
made by the author is i n his extensive discussion of errors i n the functional
modules. H e demonstrates clearly that errors discovered i n most auditing situa
tions are highly complex and must be analyzed carefully to determine their
cause and their implication on the audit. A s a part of this discussion of errors,
the comprehensive table that was developed for " T h e Elements of a System
for the Receipt of Monies from Credit Sales" is especially useful. It demon
strates clearly the difficulty of evaluating systems of internal control and modi
fying audit programs for weaknesses i n the system. A n extension of the table
to include other areas of interest to the audit would be a meaningful contribution.
There are also several areas i n the paper where M r . Boni and I hold different
views. It is these areas where the remainder of the critique w i l l be directed.
Comparison of the Worst Aspects of Existing
Practice to a Theoretical Approach
In several parts of Boni's paper criticisms are made of existing auditing
methods that to me reflect weaknesses i n the day-to-day performance of the
audit function, rather than shortcomings of existing auditing concepts. It is
almost certain that any practicing auditor who frequently performs the review
function w i l l find that there are many audits i n which there are weaknesses i n
the application of good audit theory.
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It does not seem to be justifiable to compare the conceptual and somewhat
esoteric approach advocated by Boni to the worst aspects of the practice of public
accounting that are encountered i n the review of w o r k i n g papers or discussions
w i t h practitioners. It is likely that if the approach recommended by the author
were adopted i n practice, there would be equally significant shortcomings
encountered as a result of the pressures of time budgets and as problems arise
i n applying theory to practice.
Three examples from Boni's article of his criticism of existing auditing
philosophy should be sufficient to demonstrate the point that his criticisms are
of existing auditing practice rather than the current body of theory.
1. Statistical sampling

in auditing

is referred to as a mechanical process.

Statistical sampling i n auditing should be exactly the opposite of a mech
anistic approach. T o the extent that it is mechanistic, it is a reflection of the
poor practice of public accounting rather than poor theory. There are several
aspects of statistical sampling that tend to make it non-mechanistic, when
properly applied. These include requirements of formally specifying the ob
jectives of the test, definition of the population about w h i c h the auditor plans
to generalize, definition of an error, and perhaps most importantly, an intensive
follow-up of all errors discovered i n the statistical test. It seems to me that
careful tests of the client's system using statistical methods are completely
consistent with an imaginative, integrated approach to auditing.
2. There is reference to the fact that auditors do not relate things to each other,
but rather follow a mechanistic approach.
There is extensive professional literature to demonstrate that auditors should
interrelate different parts of the audit into an overall conclusion rather than
follow a mechanistic approach to auditing. F o r example, virtually everyone i n
auditing agrees that tests of sales transactions should be related to confirmations,
cash receipts tests, and other aspects of the audit. Nevertheless, i n practice there
may be a tendency to fail to integrate sales transactions tests, confirmations, and
sales cut-off tests as much as is probably desirable. A g a i n , this is more a reflec
tion of weak practice than of the existing body of available auditing concepts.
T h e extensive illustration that Boni offers of the elements of a system for
the receipt of monies from credit sales is an excellent contribution to the com
plex interaction of different elements of the system, but i f practitioners were
to follow this approach on a day-to-day basis, it is likely that there would be
many instances of deficient or improper application. These aberrations would
not be a basis for concluding that Boni's proposals are not appropriate or relevant.
It would be unfair to criticize his approach to audit program development on
the basis that some, or even many, practitioners were applying his concept
improperly.
3. It is implied that auditors do not evaluate external conditions
ment decisions as a part of the audit process.

and manage-

W h e n auditors do not evaluate external economic conditions and the deci112

sions made by management while they audit, there is a significant deficiency i n
their audit performance. It is essential that auditors consider such things as the
product selling price i n the subsequent period as a part of inventory valuation,
and general economic conditions i n evaluating the allowance for doubtful ac
counts. Similarly, auditors must determine whether management decisions i n
such areas as charge-off of bad debts, inventory obsolescence write downs, and
capitalization of fixed assets are i n accordance w i t h generally accepted accounting
principles and are consistent w i t h the preceding period. Although there is a
need for additional research i n more appropriate methods of evaluating external
conditions and management decisions i n the audit process, both of these are
currently necessary as a part of good auditing.
In summary of this section, I believe that M r . B o n i has compared some
of the worst aspects of existing practice to his theoretic approach. A s might be
expected, whenever practice is compared to a concept or theory, the existing
practice comes out a very poor second. In m y opinion, a good portion of M r .
Boni's criticism of auditing i n this paper is a criticism of what sometimes occurs
in practice, and most auditors would be similarly critical.
Relevance of Compliance Testing i n A u d i t i n g
A major area where M r . Boni and I apparently are i n substantial disagree
ment is the relevance of compliance testing as a part of the entire audit process.
This comes up indirectly i n several places, but is specifically stated i n the early
part of the paper when he asserts that " T h e signals emanating at the processing
stages do not provide information that can be demonstrated to be useful for
establishing empirically the expectation for errors i n the aggregated end results
of the processing."
Depending upon how expectation of errors is interpreted, this statement
implies to me that compliance testing is not useful for prediction of monetary
errors i n the financial statements. T h i s is a very strong statement and incon
sistent w i t h m y interpretation of most existing professional literature. I n order
to better understand the nature of our disagreement, a brief summary is given
of m y interpretation of Section 320 of S A S #1.
1. T h e initial review of internal controls is performed to determine
the controls the client believes to be i n effect. T h i s is done through
flowcharting, internal control questionnaires, walk-through tests,
and discussions with the client.
2. T h e extent to which the auditor is w i l l i n g to rely upon the existing
controls to reduce his substantive audit tests is determined by the
auditor under the assumption that the apparently existing controls
are actually operating effectively. W h e n the existing controls reduce
the auditor's expectations of monetary errors i n the financial state
ments, the auditor should normally perform compliance tests and
then reduce the substantive tests accordingly if the compliance tests
indicate an effectively operating system. T h e compliance tests should
not be performed if the expected cost of the compliance tests exceeds
the reduction of cost of substantive tests resulting from relying upon
the client's system. T h i s could result from relatively ineffective con
trols or a high cost of the particular compliance tests.
113

3. The auditor must perform compliance procedures to test the controls
that w i l l be relied upon to reduce the substantive tests. Naturally,
these tests must be done intelligently and w i t h great care. I n many
instances, the tests w i l l be done jointly w i t h substantive tests, again
under the still unproven assumption that the compliance tests w i l l
establish that the client's controls are likely to effectively reduce the
likelihood of errors.
4. If the compliance tests yield good results, the auditor can rely upon
the client's system to reduce the substantive tests as originally
planned. If the actual tests indicate the client's control system is not
operating effectively, he cannot rely upon the system to reduce the
substantive tests. A careful evaluation of the nature of the com
pliance errors and w h y they exist must be made at this point even
though the system cannot be relied upon to reduce the substantive
tests.
There are at least four implicit assumptions underlying the philosophy of
using compliance testing as a means of reducing substantive tests. These are
as follows:
1. It is possible to relate particular controls i n a system to a final dollar
balance aggregate. F o r example, specific controls over recording sales
must i n some way be related to the final dollar balance i n the sales
and possibly accounts receivable.
2. T h e existence or non-existence of a particular set of controls i n a
particular environment significantly affects the likelihood of dollar
errors i n the related financial account(s).
3. T h e degree of compliance w i t h the control system significantly affects
the likelihood of dollar errors i n the related financial account(s).
4. W h e n compliance deviations exist, a predictable effect on the dollar
errors on the related financial account(s) is possible.
It is apparent that M r . B o n i rejects one or more of these basic assumptions
i n concluding that the errors detected i n testing the processing stages do not aid
the auditor i n establishing the expectation of dollar errors i n the final dollar
balances. T h e only ultimate test of the validity of the above assumptions is i n an
extensive empirical test of them by relating actual errors discovered i n different
client systems to the existence or non-existence of particular controls and to the
extent of compliance w i t h the controls by the client's employees. Since this
has not been done formally i n any reported research results, there can be no
absolute assurance that any of the four assumptions are valid.
If the assumptions are invalid, organizations that set up sophisticated sys
tems have been wasting resources i n setting them up. In addition, it would
imply that auditors who have been evaluating and testing controls have also
been inefficient i n their approach to auditing. Since companies continue to spend
considerable resources to set up complex systems of control and to utilize ex
tensive compliance procedures to assure system effectiveness, it seems likely
that the controls serve a useful purpose. It is unlikely that most clients would
waste money on ineffective controls. Furthermore, auditors do have considerable
experience i n evaluating the effect of clients' internal controls on final financial
aggregates. Since auditors continue to test clients' systems by compliance tests,
that is some evidence, but certainly not conclusive evidence, that compliance tests
are useful.
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Although there is no irreputable empirical evidence to support either M r .
Boni's position or mine, I conclude deductively that different client control
systems and the extent to which these controls are operative have an effect on
the likelihood of errors. Furthermore, when auditors carefully evaluate the
client's system and test the system i n a prudent and reasonable manner, I be
lieve the results of the tests are also useful i n determining the necessary sub
stantive tests.
Other Areas of Disagreement
There are several other minor areas where M r . Boni and I do not agree.
T h i s final section w i l l briefly discuss three of these.
First, is M r . Boni's statement that "the use of tools that bring about con
formity and control of work is inconsistent with good auditing." I disagree
strongly with this statement. Although I concur that rote mechanistic work is
undesirable, it does not follow that the use of tools such as statistical sampling
should or w i l l result i n mechanistic auditing. Specifically, it seems to me that
statistical sampling can, and usually does when properly applied, provide a
higher quality of audit performance. F o r example, the use of random sampling
and the measurement of sampling error i n statistical applications provide great
potential benefit without reducing the auditor's judgment.
Second is the author's criticism of the combining of compliance testing and
substantive testing into an overall level of reliance as suggested i n Appendix B
of Section 320 i n S A S #1. T h e combination of evidence into a final overall
conclusion is always done either implicitly or explicitly on every audit. T h e
author's method of combining evidence from interrelated activities subjectively
by asking questions and seeking answers is highly complex and difficult to do.
I do not see any great difference between his approach and the somewhat more
formal and objective approach stated i n S A S #1. A g a i n , I agree wholeheartedly
that combining different tests should not be done mechanistically or rotely, but
more sophisticated methods of combining evidence should be recommended.
T h e article presented i n this symposium by B i l l Felix on the use of decision
theory i n auditing is a far more sophisticated and potentially useful method
of combining different tests than the methods recommended i n S A S # 1 .
Finally, I disagree with Boni's notion of the desirability or acceptability of
a " g u t feel" or "intuitive leaps." It seems to me that attempts at logical con
clusions based upon actual evidence should be encouraged and emphasized i n
the professional literature. I n recent years where there has been considerable
pressure from legal liability it is essential that audit evidence be as defensible
as possible. "Intuitive leaps" and "gut feel" hardly seem adequate legal defenses.
Summary and Conclusion
G r e g Boni's article is long and sometimes difficult to interpret and compre
hend, but many of his ideas are imaginative, stimulating and certainly worth
while to think about by anyone interested i n auditing. I n a paper w i t h so many
existing auditing conventions rejected, there are almost certainly some parts of
the paper with which virtually every thoughtful reader w i l l disagree. A t the
same time, many of his feelings and philosophies about auditing w i l l appeal to
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anyone who understands auditing. Yet, the most important contribution i n the
paper is that it does provide a vehicle for stimulating thoughtful discussions
about the objectives of audit evidence accumulation and alternative ways of
satisfying those objectives.

Footnotes
1. The Journal of Accountancy, A p r i l 1966.
2. Ibid., p. 58.
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8
The Case for Continuation of Mandatory Independent Audits
For Publicly Held Companies
John C. Burton
Securities and Exchange Commission*
W h e n I was asked to speak on this topic I w i l l have to admit that I did
not initially view it as a hot one. Nevertheless, it d i d seem desirable to look
once again at the somewhat strange phenomenon called an audit by an inde
pendent public accountant to see whether or not the conventional wisdom which
asserts its necessity is justified.
H o w M u c h Independence?
T h e first question to be considered is whether or not, i n fact, we want
totally independent audits. Here I think the answer is probably no. Independence
does not necessarily lead to assurance, and absolute independence, which would
require elimination of all dependence on communication w i t h clients, would
be bad news indeed. T h e ultimate independent audit would be where the
auditor arrives on the scene, is handed the financial statements and the books,
and talks w i t h no one w i t h i n the company. I think we could agree that such
an audit would very likely be a rather bad one since an audit depends on candid
communication between auditor and client i n order for the auditor to develop
the necessary thorough knowledge of the company and its business which he
must combine with a knowledge of the accounting measurement model.
What we do want, therefore, instead of absolute independence is a dis
passionate unbiased professional review of financial statements. In addition,
we expect auditors to be proficient i n the measurement and communication of
financial information, and to assist their clients as necessary to insure adequate
reporting to the public.
Parties at Interest
A s indicated above, an audit is a rather strange creature and not at all the
way i n which it is perceived by most outsiders. In an overwhelming majority
of cases, the audit is essentially a cooperative effort because the interests of
management, the auditor, and the public coincide. In these engagements the
* T h e Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication by any of its employees. T h e views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's
colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
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auditor has as his principal responsibility a review of the adequacy of financial
information systems of the firms w i t h emphasis on the needs of the outside
investor. I n this review, the auditor should also be aware of the information
needs of management and, as necessary, make appropriate recommendations to
improve management's control of operations. T h e auditor's role then is twofold
—attestation and consultation. T h e auditor uses his professional skills and ab
sence of bias to bear public witness to the reliability of financial information
included i n an annual report to shareholders and to work w i t h management
to improve the usefulness of the financial information system for both external
and internal reporting purposes.
It is worth noting that i n a cooperative audit engagement even a bad audit
does not have a very high social cost because when the financial statements
prepared by the client do present fairly the results of operations, an audit de
ficiency w i l l not result i n misleading data being given to the public. It may be
that total stockholder information falls a bit short of what it could be and that
the audit fee is largely wasted, but these are minor compared to the potentially
major costs that way arise if deficient audits coexist with managements who
are trying to obscure the reality of their operation.
W h i l e an audit is normally a cooperative effort, perhaps 5 % of the time
adversary conditions arise. These are situations i n which the interests of man
agement and the public are diverse, where there are benefits to management
from a process of reporting other than the full and fair results of operations.
These are the tough audits, where the auditor more than earns his fee and has
trouble collecting it. In these circumstances the auditor has the principal role
of arbitration between the interests of management and the public, and i n such
cases he must always remember that he serves the public first. H e must avoid
the situation i n which the public perceives it has been cheated as a consequence
of deficient financial reporting because abuses of this sort carry a very high cost.
Economic Considerations
After considering the nature of the audit, we must next test its economic
utility. In this connection the cost of audits of public companies i n the United
States is not difficult to measure. It has been estimated to be between $750
million and a billion dollars per annum. T h i s is not a small figure and the
question that must be answered is whether the value to society justifies the cost.
The benefits from audit services, however, are harder to quantify. A s a
starting point there are the benefits of improved financial information systems
which result from the auditor's review and suggestions. F o r most companies
the auditor also contributes to improved external financial reporting procedures
and results; presumably he improves the communication process between man
agement and investors. Finally, the auditor contributes significantly to the
avoidance of abuse and, as previously indicated, the cost of abuse is very high.
T h i s service helps keep the company out of trouble, protects the board of
directors, and builds the confidence of investors.
Confidence is a key to good markets. Analysts and other investors must be
confident that the numbers on w h i c h they base their investment decisions are
realistic within the framework of the accounting model or they w i l l be reduced
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to a feeling of being a part of a random process without knowing what is being
done to them.
In the final analysis, the weighing of costs and benefits must represent a
subjective judgment. T h e number of independent audits was growing prior to
the Securities Acts and it can therefore be inferred that, at least for many
companies, a hard-nosed market judgment justified the cost of an audit. I
believe this case is stronger today than it was at that time, but since there is no
definitive evidence or answer, one must have Faith—as I do.
Should There be Change?
If we agree that the principle of audits is a worthwhile one, we should
explore next the question of whether or not things should be done differently.
A number of suggestions have been made that perhaps there is a better alterna
tive to the current approach of having independent accountants perform the
audit function. Some have suggested that this should be a role for Government.
Although i n my current position I have developed a respect for the role of
Government i n the market place, I am not convinced this is the right answer.
Government audits might be cheaper. I believe, however, that they would not
be as creative, nor would they be as effective i n avoiding abuses. A Government
audit almost by its very nature is an adversary audit and the record of adversary
audits i n catching abuses is not very good. Such an audit discourages coopera
tion, which is still the key to most audits. W h i l e the auditors of the Internal
Revenue Service, the Defense Contract A u d i t Agency, and the General Account
i n g Office achieve many successes, their overall record also shows the major
difficulties which arise when the auditee is steadfastly trying to avoid w o r k i n g
with the auditor. I believe, therefore, that Congress was wise i n rejecting the
idea of Government audits of companies offering their securities i n the public
market place.
Another possibility is to create an audit function within the corporation.
The A u d i t Committee of the Board of Directors or some other internal source
might supervise an internally performed function. I think, however, that it is
apparent that not only would such auditors tend to lack breadth of expertise
which comes to independent public accountants through experience with many
companies, but this approach would also be defective i n those cases where man
agement had reason for advocacy—at the bottom 5 % of the cases where the
auditor is most tested. T h i s leaves us then w i t h independent accountants, who
I think can justify the faith which has been placed i n them.
If we mutually agree that things should not be done differently, we should
then consider the question of who should select the auditor. There have been
numerous suggestions that if an outside party such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange were to select auditors they
would not be so dependent upon the economic market place, and would be able
to be more independent and less subject to the pressures of management. Once
again, however, we can get to the question of whether the cost i n terms of lack
of cooperation i n such audits would be greater than the benefits created by the
lack of relationship. I a m not persuaded that the benefits of such a system
outweigh the very substantial problems that coexist with it.
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Finally, there are questions raised as to who should pay for audits. Many
of those suggesting that auditors be appointed by outside agencies also suggest
some pooling of resources to pay audit fees. They suggest a N e w Y o r k Stock
Exchange fee or some other device by which a pool of funds w i l l be generated.
W h i l e this again has some appeal, since the economic relationship between the
auditor and his clients is one of the principal problems of outward appearance
that exists, I am doubtful that it would be an improvement. T h e discipline of
the market place is still beneficial i n the audit world, and an auditor who d i d
not have a responsibility to his client to do a good job i n economic terms might
well tend to over-audit. W e should not encourage a steady increase i n pro
cedures simply because money is available. W h i l e there are problems w i t h the
current fee arrangements, I think that they represent as good a solution as any
that have currently been proposed.
Increasing Auditors' Rights
If we are to continue to operate w i t h i n the current broad framework then
we must determine what changes might be made to improve the quality of audit
work and avoid perceived problems. I n the first place, a number of things can
be done to increase auditors' rights. W h i l e I would hesitate to suggest tenure, it
would seem that a longer period of appointment might be beneficial. It is well
k n o w n that during the first year of an audit, auditors generally absorb some
significant nonrecurring costs. If the auditor could be assured of three, four
or five years of audit relationships some economic pressures that might otherwise
exist could be avoided.
Secondly, auditors should be given the right to attend meetings of the
board of directors and stockholders of corporations. Corporate policy is set at
directors' meetings and if the auditor is to be fully apprised of what is going
on and if his services are to be most productively used, his attendance at such
meetings would be beneficial. Stockholders' meetings are generally attended by
auditors today and the availability of the auditor to answer stockholders' ques
tions, as well as to make a statement i f necessary, seems desirable.
T h i r d , there should be increasing pressure for mandatory audit committees
comprised of board members to w h o m the auditor w i l l have a direct channel
of communication. T h i s is not only a protection to the board but also an i m 
portant right for the auditor since he is able to deal with members of the board
on a continuing institutionalized basis.
Fourth, it might be desirable to permit the auditor to communicate directly
to the shareholders whenever he feels it is necessary for h i m to do so. W h i l e
such communications would be infrequent, it seems an appropriate lightning
rod and device by which auditors could encourage greater corporate disclosure
when they felt it was necessary. Such a right might be implemented by a change
i n the SEC's proxy rules to require management to make a section i n the proxy
statement available to the auditor to enable h i m to make any statement to the
stockholders which he feels necessary under the circumstances.
Finally, the auditor should have certain rights i n regard to the disclosure
of his dismissal. O u r 8-K requirements currently represent a significant step
forward i n this regard, but it may be that they should be extended to require
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disclosure i n a proxy statement or annual report any time an auditor is changed.
In addition, it might be that some public notice of auditor change should be
required of any corporation beyond the simple 8-K requirement to report the
hiring of a new auditor.
Some Accompanying Added Obligations
If auditors are to have more rights as I recommend, they should also recog
nize additional obligations. In this regard I believe that there is a need for
increased use of the attest function. Auditors should be prepared, for example,
to attest i n some fashion to a company's internal control system and perhaps to
forecasts or projections.
In addition, the concept of auditor of public record needs development.
Under this concept, the auditor has a continuing responsibility to review all
public communications to investors and shareholders on a timely basis—not
with the objective of performing an audit on interim and other data but to
provide assurance that audited financial results are not being misused i n press
releases and annual reports and to be certain that accounting and measurement
problems have been adequately aired prior to the publication of interim reports
and other announcements. It is apparent that substantial work must be done i n
the development of standards i n this area but the concept seems to be one which
is growing i n acceptance.
Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary Change
In the final analysis then, this re-examination of the role of the auditor has
not created a cry for revolutionary change. Rather, I believe that evolution of
the auditor's role is essential and that the opportunities are very great for i n 
creased social service and function by the public accounting profession. Such
increased opportunities should result both i n increased revenues and increased
responsibilities. A s we see the tremendous growth i n accounting enrollments
i n schools of business today, we can perhaps take pleasure i n the fact that stu
dents are voting with their careers for a broader accounting function. If the
profession avoids the paralysis which fear of liability can bring it and is prepared
to see its role evolve, then both the public and the profession w i l l be well served.
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